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ABSTRACT 
 
This research project returns to Duchamp’s gesture of the Readymade to investigate our 
relationship to language, of how we produce and respond to it, as some ‘thing’ that represents 
what and how we ‘think’.  Rather than considering it as a transparent and pliable medium, 
this project reconceives language as a contingent and physical material that contains the 
presence and absence of an already made ‘voice’.  
 
Accordingly, this project sets out to create the conditions for language to speak itself.  Its 
[un]creative goal is to say ‘nothing’ by limiting and exposing the process of artistic production, 
and outcomes themselves, to the inherent contingency of the ‘inert matter’ of the materials 
employed.  To achieve this, I draw from Duchamp’s notion of anartist to subtract and displace 
the artist-as-author (the ‘source’ of meaning of a work) by replacing it with the notion of 
artist-as-anauthor. 
 
Rather than follow Duchamp’s strategy of re-authoring by inscribing a new ‘external’ 
relationship on an already made object, this project identifies an internal limit within language 
and develops an algorithm to pass an ‘artwork’ (or textual object) through another.  Through 
subsequent works, it determines whether the absent ‘voice’ of this automatic process can 
become present in, and as, the work itself.   
 
To develop this algorithm, this research identifies three key steps to disorganize and 
reorganize language: subtraction, decomposition and transposition.  Firstly, to subtract an artwork 
from itself, it draws from Henri Bergson’s theory of perception and Samuel Beckett’s 
strategies of ‘unwording’ literature (as filtered through the work of Alain Badiou and Gilles 
Deleuze).  Secondly, to decompose words into ‘primitive’ objects (or ‘urwords’), it applies the 
basic principles of prime numbers and Set Theory to language.  Finally, to transpose an object 
into another, this research adheres to Walter Benjamin’s requirement for a ‘good’ translation, 
by discounting overall meaning and translating word-for-word, so that the ‘pure’ language of 
a translation may be glimpsed in the interstices between languages.  
 
The key outcome of this project is the development of an algorithm that simulates an ‘event’ 
of language by re-producing and [un]authoring a ready[un]made text.  A series of subsequent 
artworks shifts the relationship between the process of the algorithm and its outcome so that 
the means by which this process takes place may appear as the work itself.   
 
This research offers new insights into our relationship to [un]thinking, [un]seeing and 
[un]saying language; it extends and complements the knowledge of art after the Readymade 
to that of the ready[un]made: as the [un]creative and [un]original ‘re-production’ of artworks 
that show, after Stéphane Mallarmé, that ‘nothing will have taken place but the place’ of 
language and art itself.  
 David Christian  
 
2 
  
READY[UN]MADE: ABSENCE & PRESENCE IN THE INTRA-RELATIONAL OBJECT 
 
3 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Background and context of the problem 
 
This research project engages with the art object after the Readymade.  If we consider Marcel 
Duchamp to be a ‘founder of discursivity’, who initiates a discursive field that operates as, or 
forms part of, contemporary art itself, then, this project sets out to re-engage with this ‘origin’ 
and, by doing so, participate in the ‘effective and necessary task of transforming the discursive 
practice itself’ (Foucault 1991, p. 116). 
 
With the Readymade, Duchamp demonstrates that a core feature of an art object relates to its 
relationship to, and re-contextualisation by, language.  His work also shows that the 
traditional notion of ‘art’ is founded and grounded upon a set of conventions about what it 
can—and cannot—be. Through works such as Fountain (1917), he demonstrates the limit of 
such presuppositions by attempting to introduce a ‘foreign’ object that literally corresponds but 
does not conform to these conditions in terms of how it resembles a preconceived idea(l) of 
art itself.   
 
A reading of Fountain identifies two key moves that operate as part of the gesture of the 
Readymade.  Firstly, Duchamp subtracts an already made object of practical utility from its 
typical context and places it in the wrong place, as an object of aesthetic utility (Scanlan 2003).  
Secondly, he subtracts the ‘essential’ conditions of art making by limiting the artist’s work to 
the ‘choosing’, ‘naming’ and ‘signing’ of an already made object (de Duve 1991).  For Duchamp, 
an already made object becomes Readymade by way of a kind of rendezvous that involves 
‘planning for a moment to come […] to inscribe a readymade’ where ‘the [object] can later be 
looked for’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 32; emphasis added). 
 
In his Apropos of ‘Readymades’ (1961), Duchamp stresses the importance of the inscription or 
‘short sentence’ that marks this rendezvous which ‘instead of describing the object like a title 
[is] meant to carry the mind of the spectator to other regions more verbal’ and that the 
‘looking for’ and selection of a Readymade is not based on ‘esthetic delectation’ but rather on 
‘visual indifference’ and a ‘complete anesthesia’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 141).   This 
suggests that the inscription is designed to initiate or catalyse a reaction in the mind of the 
spectator, where she perhaps no longer simply ‘sees’ the already made object of the Readymade 
as a physical referent but, rather, reads it as language, as metonymy.  Moreover, the selection 
(and reading) of a Readymade is not driven by or open to subjectivity and a ‘feeling’ for the 
visual but, rather, appears to be limited to following—as an instruction—the words of the 
‘short sentence’ in a state of self-imposed visual numbness or blindness. 
 David Christian  
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This ‘short sentence’, whether as a name or signature, serves to initiate a delay in the 
signification and significance of two ‘identical’ identities: one as an already made object of 
practical utility and the ‘other’ as a Readymade object of aesthetic utility.  While in the mind 
of a spectator, these ‘meanings’ may vacillate across the impermeability of what Duchamp 
refers to as the ‘infrathin’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 144; Perloff 2012), the physical 
composition of the already made object remains unaffected.  Therefore, the inscription of the 
‘short sentence’ is limited to a surface effect, as it does not coalesce or combine with the object 
but remains contiguous with it.  According to Octavio Paz, 
 
The Readymade is not only a dialectical game; it is also an ascetic exercise, a means 
of purgation. Unlike the practices of the mystics, its end is not union with the 
divinity and the contemplation of the highest truth; it is a rendezvous with nobody 
and its ultimate goal is noncontemplation.  The Readymade occupies an area of the 
spirit that is null […]  (Paz 2012, p. 400). 
 
The gesture of the Readymade may suggest a ‘splitting’ or ‘doubling’ of the relation(s) a 
‘spectator’ may—or may not—have with a familiar object.  However, as a physical 
‘rendezvous’ of language and object, it perhaps remains an empty act that reproduces ‘nothing’ 
in its attempt to ‘copy’ without copying.  If it is a product of language and object at all, the 
Readymade remains delayed in a process of a mitotic and ‘asexual’ reproduction1 and is 
thereby limited to the framing and ‘external’ effects of language.   From the point of view of 
a spectator or reader, it becomes an undecidable object.  For example, is Fountain a urinal or art 
object, both or neither? As a work of ‘art’, is it simply a joke; a visual pun?  Or, is it something 
more than this: a metonym for a ‘split’ subject (or spectator) that is confronted by it?  Or, the 
artist?  Or, the art object itself?  Perhaps, it marks nothing but the appearance and disappearance 
of a gesture of ‘negation that, through humour, becomes affirmation’ (Paz 2012, p. 399).  The 
Readymade may in this regard lend support to Mallarmé’s observation that ‘nothing will have 
taken place but the place’ (Mallarmé 1996, p. 142), where if any ‘thing’ happens that appears 
out-of-place in a given place, it re-presents nothing other than a failure to recognize it as an 
example of the operation of the place itself.   
 
 
Summary of the problem 
 
As the gesture of the Readymade mimes the minimal conditions of making art, it subtracts 
the ‘expressive mimeticism’ traditionally associated with the internal composition of an artwork 
made by an artist and replaces it with a metonymic ‘[…] demonstration of conceptual acuity’ 
(Roberts 2007, p. 3; original emphasis).  Such a gesture establishes a dialectical relationship 
between the verbal and visual aspects of the Readymade object and, by doing so, appears to 
limit its effectuality to the renaming of an object as a visual pun.  In combination with the 
physical gesture, of selecting and placing a urinal on its back, the punning play of the ‘short 
                                                        
1 Mitosis is a form of asexual reproduction involving a ‘process of division by which a cell nucleus gives rise to 
two daughter nuclei identical to the parent in number and size of chromosomes.’  (The Shorter Oxford 
Dictionary 1993, p. 1797).   
READY[UN]MADE: ABSENCE & PRESENCE IN THE INTRA-RELATIONAL OBJECT 
 
5 
sentence’ disrupts what the object may typically denote, thereby revealing other connotations, 
purposes and possibilities.  The already made object itself, however, remains unchanged by this 
and only acts as a physical correlate for the inscription of the ‘short sentence’.  In this way, it 
is a substitute for the ‘purity’ of the traditional canvas and displaces the ‘neutrality’ of its frame.  
As a support with a more explicit ‘history’, an already made object becomes a referent of itself, 
the word-play of the inscription, and the physical gesture of the Readymade.  
 
In a previous project, I tried to move beyond Duchamp’s strategy of relying upon the surface 
‘effects’ of inscription, by attempting to physically pass an ‘idea’ through an object.  Using a 
cliché as an instruction to interfere with the intra-relational arrangement of an object’s parts, 
I physically disrupted, rectified and subtracted its already made form from itself.  The 
instruction, as an act of [un]naming, is materially manifested and performed by the object.  
While this approach alludes to the presence (and absence) of the instruction as the basis of the 
re-configuration of the object, the internal limit or pathway that enables such a physical 
transmutation remains concealed by the materiality of the object itself.   
 
 
Current approach 
 
Duchamp shows how language can reveal the contingency inherent in already made objects; 
how they can be something other than what they are typically conceived to be.  As the 
‘traditional’ aspects of the Readymade relate to the composition and painting of wordplay on 
objects, this project sets out to return to Duchamp’s use of language to critically investigate 
how it is an already made and contingent material.   
 
Rather than follow his focus on the ‘external’ relationship between language and an already 
made object (and how it names, frames and informs a ‘new’ relation and content), this project 
aims to re-engage with the internal or intra-relational composition of an object.  By doing so, 
it seeks to move beyond the ‘external’ limits of language to identify an internal ‘boundary’ or 
basis upon which a textual ‘object’ can be brought into relationship with itself and/or other 
objects.   
 
My intention is to investigate language as a contingent material by identifying what may always 
already be inherent to, and yet foreign from, our understanding and use of it.  This project 
seeks to step out of, and back into, the place of language in an attempt to critically interrogate 
and challenge how it serves to limit, mediate and ‘guarantee’ the relations we have and do not 
have with it.     
 
 
  
 David Christian  
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Research Questions 
 
1.  Can an ‘object’ or artwork be passed through another? 
   
2. What are the steps required to facilitate this and what is the product of this process?   
 
3. Can the process (the intra-relational logic) that both creates and drives a product’s re-
production become apparent in and as the work itself?   
 
 
 
 
 
Research Objectives 
 
This research project engages with Duchamp’s early work (1913 - 1917) towards the 
development of the Readymade to identify the ‘logic’ of its gesture and investigate how it 
operates as a contingent material by undertaking the following: 
 
1) Test what can constitute an internal limit, ‘boundary’ or ‘part’ of a textual object and how 
it can be used to: 
i) subtract an artwork from itself  
ii) identify a common basis within language to allow a textual object to ‘pass’ 
through and/or displace another. 
  
2) Develop and implement an algorithm that mimes the gesture of the Readymade, as the 
[un]creative act of an artist-as-anauthor to reproduce an ‘event’ in language. 
 
3) Interrogate the product of the algorithm through the production of a number of 
derivative works to attempt to expose or make present (the ‘absence’) of the internal limit 
or logic of the algorithm as the work itself.   
 
4) Analyse the project outcomes to show how they position the viewer as a reader, and 
interrogate and challenge how language operates to limit, mediate and guarantee the 
relationship we may have and may not have with it. 
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Key ideas & Literature Review 
 
While the majority of the relevant literature is detailed throughout the body of this exegesis, 
I outline below the key ideas that inform my response to the above research questions together 
with the broader literature that both contextualises and supports the theoretical and practical 
underpinnings of the project. 
 
 
Re-examining the Duchampian Readymade 
 
One of the principle research aims of this project is to re-examine some of Duchamp’s early 
work (in regard to language, translation and cryptography) to identify what Feuerbach terms 
as the entwicklungsfähigkeit of a body of work: its viability and capacity for development 
(Agamben 2009, pp. 7-8).  This involves identifying the ‘philosophical element’ that remains 
‘unsaid […] and demands to be unfolded and worked out’ (Agamben 2002).   
 
In my attempt to locate this ‘element’, I draw from Molly Nesbit’s and Naomi Sawlson-
Gorse’s (1996) Concept of Nothing: New Notes by Marcel Duchamp and Walter Arensberg, and 
Nesbit’s Their Common Sense (2000) to undertake a speculative reading of Duchamp’s language 
games to show how some of the phrases inscribed on his Readymades appear to be derived 
from and express the abstract logic of number ‘strings’.  That is, the first string (1 2) equates 
to A B in the phrase In Advance of the Broken Arm that, then, returns to ‘A’ to extend the string 
to 1 2 → 1 (or 12 = 1) (Nesbit and Sawlson-Gorse 1996).  I argue that this doubling or squaring 
of ‘one’ not only suggests the production of space (or ‘nothing’) but literally describes in advance 
the ‘event’ of language in the gesture of the Readymade itself: as the logic of a break, where 
a series of ones is ‘broken’ in two, by two and, then, returns as an ‘other’ one.  Moreover, this 
‘logic’ provides a formula that—as an instruction—serves to encode or re-express the 
language of the phrase itself which is, then, extended and performed again in the gesture of 
the Readymade that ‘transforms’ a simple object of practical utility into a ‘multi-dimensional’ 
one of aesthetic utility. 
 
The discussion of the above is drawn ostensibly from the literature developed by the ‘October’ 
group of writers, most notably, Thierry de Duve, David Joselit, Molly Nesbit, et al. (e.g. de 
Duve 1996; Buskirk & Nixon 1996; Joselit 1998).  More specifically, the notion of the gesture 
of the Readymade is drawn from the work of Thierry de Duve (1991; 1994; 1996; 2007; 
2014a; 2014b; 2014c), where he considers Duchamp’s reduction of the artist’s ‘act’ to the 
choosing, naming and signing of an already made object effaces and, thereby, subverts four key 
‘senses’ that underscore a ‘traditional’ work of art: ‘handmade object, trace of its author, visual 
phenomenon, institutionalized value’ (de Duve 1994, p. 88).  For de Duve, the ‘paradigm’ of 
the Readymade is ‘enunciative’ in that it reduces any work of art to being nothing more than 
a ‘referent’ of the (implicit) claim: ‘This is a work of art’ (ibid., p. 90).  As a result, the gesture 
of the Readymade effectively sets aside any previous requirement in terms of the manual skill 
and ‘creative’ labour of the artist, the subjectivity and originality of the artist’s ‘authorship’, 
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the visuality or aesthetic condition of the art object, and the exclusivity of the role the 
institution plays in validating or attesting to the ‘quality’ and/or ‘authenticity’ of an artwork.   
 
Replacing and displacing these four ‘senses’, the ‘paradigm’ of the Readymade can be 
characterized perhaps more in terms of what it does not do rather than what it does.  That is, 
as a strategy that limits and subtracts, it empties-out and deskills the manual gesture of the 
artist’s hand (Roberts 2007) and effectively refuses or avoids ‘work’ both in terms of 
‘maintenance’ and a particular form of artistic (creative) labour (Molesworth 1998) and, 
thereby, replaces the traditional ‘production of an image from the mind’s interior’ with an act 
of ‘consumption’ and the ‘editing and arranging of mechanically produced images made by 
someone else’ (Molesworth 2003, p. 179).  Another key strategy is limiting artistic labour by 
way of deferring artistic ‘control’ to chance operations and, thereby, limiting and displacing 
‘the amount and effect of an artist’s labour’ (ibid.).   
 
While the gesture of the Readymade involves the avoidance of a certain kind of work, it does 
not involve the avoidance of work altogether.  In his broader approach to art practice, to 
‘make works which are not works of art’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 74), Duchamp also 
sets aside subjective and aesthetic sensibilities traditionally associated with creative ‘labour’ by 
working ‘scientifically’.  He adopts and misapplies the language of science and industry 
(Henderson 1999), conducts experiments (Molderings 2010) and draws from mathematical 
‘creativity’ to investigate the notion of the fourth dimension (Henderson 1983; Adcock 1984; 
Holton 2001).  These efforts, however, are not limited to science.  As Humble (1998, p. 52) 
notes, the anti-art gesture of Duchamp, as anartist and ‘annihilator’ and one committed to an 
‘aesthetics of indifference’, ‘remains forever unreconciled’ with the aestheticism of a chess 
player who pursues the formal beauty of ‘an extremely narrow, minor art in which the only 
ideas that can be expressed are chess ideas’.  While Humble (ibid., p. 43) identifies that 
Duchamp’s fascination with the ‘beauty’ of chess relates to the ‘mechanical reality’ of its 
‘movement’2 and notes Duchamp’s observation that ‘while all artists are not chess players, all 
chess players are artists’, I would argue that, as ‘artists’, chess players are anartists.  Chess is a 
game of annihilation, where the goal is to ‘trap’ and take an opponent’s pieces by way of three 
principle tactics or moves: the ‘fork’, the ‘pin’ and the ‘skewer’. 3   Rather than being 
‘unreconcilable’, Duchamp’s interest and practice of chess appears to be analogous with the 
gesture of the Readymade (that effectively ‘splits’ or ‘doubles’ a practical/aesthetic object in 
and by ‘two’), as each of these chess ‘moves’ confronts an opponent (or ‘viewer’) with a double 
bind which either limits options or forces a particular move in order to protect one’s ‘king’ 
directly or, indirectly, by attempting to conserve pieces of ‘higher’ value.  
 
                                                        
2 According to Duchamp, ‘In chess there are some extremely beautiful things in the domain of movement, but 
not in the visual domain. It’s the imagining of the movement or of the gesture that makes the beauty […]’ (quoted 
in Humble 1998, p. 43; his emphasis). 
3 A ‘fork’ is used to make a double threat on a piece (which is particularly effective when used to place the king 
in check); a ‘pin’ is used to prevent a lower value piece (e.g. a knight) from being moved because, to move it, 
would expose a high value piece (e.g. the king), and a ‘skewer’ is the opposite of a pin ‘where a high value piece 
is attacked and, if it moves away to escape capture, it exposes a piece behind it’ (Kasparov 2004, p. 44). 
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The gesture of the Readymade effaces or is indifferent to the ‘traditional’ visual aesthetics of 
the art object.  By subtracting and displacing the internal content of the art object (or painted 
surface) and replacing it with the painted ‘short sentence’, Duchamp effectively reduces the 
creative work of the artist’s hand to the naming and/or signing of an already made object.  With 
reference to Derrida’s notion of the ‘parergon’, Tucker (2009, p. 56) suggests that ‘the title 
becomes a textual object—a ‘linguistic readymade’—in its own right’ that operates as a 
‘parergonal frame’ around the physical object and, thereby submits it ‘to a new order of 
language’.  However, I contend that Duchamp’s ‘short sentence’ does not simply function as 
a parergon (to re-frame a ‘wrongly’ placed object) but, rather, also operates, albeit in a very 
limited way, as the ‘ergon’ or ‘the work done, the fact’ (Derrida 1988, p. 54) of his formulation 
of the words of each phrase. 4   Accordingly, the already made object also operates as a 
‘parergonal frame’ by providing a concrete reference or correlate for the word-play of the 
inscription.  According to Derrida, 
   
The parergon inscribes something which comes as an extra, exterior to the proper 
field but whose transcendent exteriority comes to play, abut into, brush against, 
rub, press against the limit itself and intervene in the inside only to the extent that 
the inside is lacking.  It is lacking in something and it is lacking from itself (Derrida 
1988, p. 56). 
 
By emptying-out or limiting the ‘ergon’ or ‘work’ (composition) of the artist, the double 
gesture of Readymade appears to ‘abut’ two decontextualized parerga.  Firstly, as language, 
that frames and names but lacks a ‘concrete’ referent, and secondly, as an object of practical 
utility that has been removed from its ‘proper field’ so that it may serve as a material reference 
(and support) for the inscription.  The ergon, or ‘work’, of the Readymade, thereby takes 
place as an ‘immeasurable gap between two things as they transition or pass into each other’ 
(Tucker 2009, p. 66).  Duchamp’s term for this ‘absence’ or ‘the smallest possible, indeed, 
imperceptible, difference between two seemingly identical phenomena or moments’ is the 
‘infa-thin’ (Perloff 2012, p. 22) which, in the context of the Readymade, may re-present the 
lack of ‘work’ as the work within the work itself.   
 
Lastly, the gesture of the Readymade displaces the ‘institutional value’ of the art object as a 
means of validating its ‘quality’ in terms of visual aesthetics and appeal to good ‘taste’, of what 
can—and cannot—be considered ‘art’.  By introducing the notion of anti-art or ‘non-art’ as a 
gesture that seeks to oppose and limit the role of a ‘jury’, Duchamp opens a space of resistance 
to institutional ‘authorship’ and ‘censorship’ of the ‘place’ of art.  Contrasting George Dickie’s 
‘institutional theory of art’5 with de Duve’s (1996) post-Kantian approach, Humble (2002) 
                                                        
4 With that said, one must also note that the gesture or act of displacing and re-placing an already made object as 
an aesthetic object (e.g. of purchasing and placing a urinal on its back on a plinth, etc.) also constitutes the ‘ergon’ 
or work done of the Readymade.  Hence, the Readymade involves the ‘rendezvous’ of two art ‘works’.  Firstly, 
the ‘composition’ and inscription of the ‘short sentence’ (as an expression of a mathematical operation) and, 
secondly, the act of the re-manipulation or re-placement of an already made object. 
5  Whether or not an object is a ‘work of art’ has little to do with whether it ‘contains’ or exhibits a particular 
‘observable characteristic’ or aesthetic quality.  It becomes an art object when it takes place in the ‘art world’, 
that ‘consists of creators, presenters and appreciators which is surrounded by critics, theorists and philosophers 
of art’ (Dickie 1975, p. 419).   
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outlines how a Readymade such as Duchamp’s In Advance of the Broken Arm should be 
considered ‘anti-art’ because it is pointless to contemplate it as an aesthetic object, in terms of 
its ‘beauty’ alone.  For Dickie (1975, p. 120), ‘anti-art’ refers to ‘art’ produced by way of 
chance that alters the composition of internal content, to readymades that offer a ‘wholly new 
dimension’ that displaces the intra-relational content (of painting and sculpture) and, finally, 
to art that relates ‘not to objects but to the actions of the artist’.6  On the other hand, de Duve’s 
approach does not seek to ground his definition on the irregular or ‘non-aesthetic’ content of 
a work but, rather, on whether or not it is ‘anti-taste’ and, thereby, falls outside the Kantian 
‘ambit of art’ (Humble 2002, p. 250).  As a result, a Readymade like Fountain displaces and 
confronts the expectations of the ‘this is beautiful’ of aesthetic judgement and replaces it with 
the ‘modern judgement’ and declaration: ‘this is art’ (ibid., p. 251).  However, as Humble 
notes, de Duve identifies that the Readymade as anti-art is not simply ‘anti-taste’ but, rather, 
represents a broader gesture which negates the ‘place’ of art itself.  The Readymade, thereby, 
becomes both art and anti-art, where Fountain may be defined as ‘art’ because it (eventually) 
takes a place in the ‘place’ of art, but, as a gesture that seeks to limit, expose, and oppose a 
particular ‘grounding’ of this ‘place’, it remains an example of ‘anti-art’ as (or in the guise of) 
‘art’. 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this project to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
paradigm of art after the Readymade, it is important to note the influence the Readymade on 
the art of John Cage and his ‘aesthetics of indifference’.  For Ian Pepper (1997), 4’33” (1952) 
is the ‘cornerstone’ of Cage’s oeuvre and his response to Duchamp’s Three Standard Stoppages 
(1913-14).  Consisting of three ‘movements’ of varying duration (33”, 2’40”, 1’20”), this 
work also resounds the gesture of the Readymade by ‘displacing’ and reducing the ‘music’ of 
the composition to the already made sounds of the (outdoor) auditorium and the visual 
performance of the pianist, who is instructed to open and close the keyboard lid at the 
beginning and end of each ‘movement’.  In addition to subtracting the ‘music’ of the 
composition, Cage also transposes and reduces its score into ‘words and numbers’ (‘I TACET, 
II TACET, III TACET’) 7  which can be performed by anyone, regardless of whether a 
performer has received any formal musical training (Kotz 2007).  Cage’s innovations, in turn, 
lead to the development of the ‘event scores’ of Fluxus artists such as La Monte Young and 
George Brecht (Kotz 2001), where the work appears to provide an instruction (Draw a Straight 
Line, 1960) or a description of an everyday event (Exit, 1961), respectively.   
 
For Julia Robertson (2009, p. 103), Brecht’s engagement with Duchamp’s Readymade shifts 
a spectator’s perception away from an already made object and towards ‘a spectrum of 
perception issuing exclusively from language.’  Moreover, some of Brecht’s works appear to 
                                                        
6 Dickie (1975, p. 420) uses Vito Accioni’s ‘actions’ as an example, where he ‘periodically notifies the artworld, 
by mail, that on certain dates he will mount a stool in his studio x number of times and that this ‘work’ may be 
viewed at designated hours’.   
7  The score published by John Cage (1960, Henmar Press Inc.).  A note added inter alia details that each 
‘movement’ has a set duration that is to be marked by the opening and closing of the keyboard lid.  Cage also 
observes this work is suitable for a soloist or an ensemble and may be played for any length of time (Kotz 2007, 
p. 21). 
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echo or ‘transpose’ Duchamp’s Three Standard Stoppages into the language of the ‘event score’.  
For example, Three Gap Events (1961) lists, by way of dot points, three ‘language strings’: 
‘missing letter sign, between two sounds, meeting again’8, that ‘detail’ three variations of 
‘standard’ everyday durations or intervals that are brought about by the separation and re-
establishment of an (anticipated) ‘continuity’.  In Three Telephone Events (1961), Brecht lists 
three actions that may occur in response to telephone ringing: allowing the phone to ring 
until it stops, lifting and replacing the receiver, and ‘answering’ the call.9  In a ‘performance 
note’ he outlines that ‘Each event comprises all occurrences within its duration’.  At face value, 
this suggests that there are other ‘micro’ events that make up, or are associated with, each of 
the listed events.  By corollary, this may suggest that the events listed are not always mutually 
exclusive but may also describe the discrete steps that take place during the ‘single’ event of 
answering the telephone.  In this way, Brecht’s work not only records the duration of an event, 
but also alludes to a multiplicity that lies within everyday actions.  By breaking down the 
‘duration’ of everyday events into discrete options or steps, Brecht extends Duchamp’s notion 
of ‘delay’ by re-presenting everyday action(s) as a ‘delay in language’ brought about by ‘the 
temporal structure of the Event score’ (Robinson 2009, p. 97).  
 
Brecht’s ‘event scores’ both describe the intra-relational ‘mechanics’ of the everyday 
‘durations’ and provide instructions for their on-going presentation and performance (by a 
viewer).  According to Kotz (2001, p. 80; original emphasis), ‘If the event can be repeated it can be 
repeated by anyone not just the ‘author’’.  In this regard, Brecht does not attribute his work to 
‘authoring’ per se but, rather, to the act of ‘bringing things into evidence’ that already exist yet 
remain unseen or unnoticed (Kotz 2001, p. 84).  Like Cage, Brecht sets aside the traditional 
creative and interpretative work of the musical composer and performer by re-structuring a 
‘listener’s’ perception of the ‘non-music’ of the ambient sound of the auditorium or the ‘non-
art’ of everyday actions or performances.  Moreover, by subtracting the ‘musicality’ of the 
musical score and replacing it with language, Young’s and Brecht’s scores provide a structure 
for their repeat performance, interpretation, adaptation and extension by anyone, artist or 
otherwise.10 
                                                        
8 George Brecht, Three Gap Events (from the Water Yam portfolio), 1961, Offset card from cardboard box, 
containing 69 offset cards, 9x7.5 cm. MOMA, New York.  For an image, go to MOMA: 
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/156535 
9 George Brecht, Three Telephone Events (from the Water Yam portfolio), 1961, Offset card from cardboard box, 
containing 69 offset cards, 10.8 x 11.4 cm. MOMA, New York.  For an image, go to MOMA: 
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/156539 
10 Examples of artists following La Monte Young’s ‘event score’, Draw a Straight Line, include Nam June Paik’s 
Zen for Head (Kotz 2007, p. 87), where he dips his hair in ink to draw a straight line, which, in turn, appears to 
be further de-contextualised and re-contextualised in the performance work, Loving Care (1993), by Janine 
Antoni.  Moreover, Martin Creed’s prosaic works appear to reflect and extend the gesture of George Brecht’s 
everyday ‘events’.  For example, Brecht’s Piano Piece #1, where the lights are switched on for 20 seconds (with 
the pianist present) and, then, switched off for 20 seconds (where the pianist departs), leaving the piano alone on 
stage, appears to de-contextualised and re-contextualised in, for example, Creed’s Work No. 227, The Lights 
Going On and Off, 2000, and Work No. 372 (2004-2005), where the lid of a grand piano is engineered to 
automatically open and close, etc. (Creed 2010, pp. 227 & 372). 
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Place, event, placeholder 
 
While the multitudinous notion of the ‘microscopic’ event, of the backdrop of what happens 
when something else is ‘happening’, appears important to the work of Cage and Brecht, this 
research project engages with a more specific notion of what ‘counts’ as an ‘event’.  For 
Jacques Derrida (2007, p. 446; Lucy 2008), the problem with ‘saying an event’ is that it always 
takes place after the event and, thereby, when it is re-presented as knowledge or information, 
it remains ‘bound to the generality, iterability and repeatability’ of the structure of language.11  
The ‘event’, rather, exceeds the possibility of a situation, and always arrives as an unexpected 
and unforeseeable singularity.  Therefore, prior to it taking place, an event is unthought of 
and ‘exists’ not as a potentiality but, rather, as an impossibility and ‘exception to the rule’ (ibid., 
p. 457).   
 
To theorize the ‘event’ of the Readymade, I draw from Giorgio Agamben’s ‘What is a 
Paradigm’ (2009, pp. 9 – 32) and his exposition of the double nature of the term, derived from 
his analysis of the work of Kuhn, Foucault, Aristotle, etc.  In Kuhn’s work, the first and 
broader sense of ‘paradigm’ refers to the ‘techniques, models, and values’ that the members of 
a field of enquiry consciously agree upon (ibid., p. 11). Whereas, the second sense (which 
Agamben develops), relates to the paradigm as a singularity or example that is ‘excluded from 
the normal case not because it does not belong to it but, on the contrary, because it exhibits 
its own belonging to it’ (Agamben 2002).  To differentiate these two notions of paradigm, I 
use the term, ‘place’, to denote the ‘structurality’ or ‘disciplinary matrix’ (Kindi 2013; 
Marcum 2013) that defines a system or field of practice; and, ‘placeholder’, to identify an 
example that exhibits its belonging to place and, by doing so, reveals the presence (and 
absence) of a ‘non-place’ that ‘marks the point of articulation between a system’s closure and 
its openness to alterity’ (Bosteels 2003, p. 126).  In this regard, Alain Badiou’s observes that 
an ‘event’ reveals ‘the inadmissible empty point in which nothing is presented’ (Badiou in 
Hallward 2003, pp. 114-115) because it exceeds the ability of the ‘language’ or ‘rules’ of place 
to account for it and thereby ‘counts as nothing in the situation in which it takes place’ (ibid, 
p. 115).    
 
It is only by way of ‘forcing’ or altering the language of ‘place’ that ‘still hypothetical elements’ 
can be provisionally named and, in time, verified as belonging to (or also being an expression, 
of) the place itself (ibid., p. 136).  For example, to claim ‘non-art’ objects like Fountain are 
works of ‘art’, Duchamp needs to develop new ‘art’ terms (e.g. ‘readymade’ and ‘anartist’) to 
enable the development of a broader and ‘deeper’ conception of what can—and cannot—be 
considered ‘art’.  Accordingly, the appearance and eventual acceptance of a placeholder, as 
some ‘thing’ that represents a truth of ‘place’ by anticipating and re-presenting a future 
knowledge of it, necessarily requires changes to the nomenclature of place before it can begin 
to be ‘counted’ as part of the place itself. 
                                                        
11  An example of this is the way news media make ‘news’ events by selecting, editing and producing the 
significant ‘events’ of the day according to a model of newsworthiness, etc.    
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Within the context of this project, the presence and absence of an ‘event’ is thereby marked 
or suggested by the emergence of a placeholder (an example) that is brought into being by the 
imposition of a limit-function or formula that suspends or sets aside the presuppositions that 
pre-determine what ‘can’ and cannot be considered as belonging to a given place or situation.  
The appearance of a ‘placeholder’ demonstrates that the ‘rules’ of place are in fact conventions 
(founded upon predilection and presupposition) and, as such, they fail to take account of some 
‘thing’ that literally conforms to the conditions of place and, by doing so, (unconventionally) 
exhibits its own belonging to it.  
 
 
Formula, limit, instruction 
 
As briefly noted above, the gesture of the Readymade involves the imposition of a limit that 
reduces the creative actions (and work) of an artist to choosing, naming and signing an already 
made object.  To develop a model of how a limit-function operates in a literary context, I turn 
to Gilles Deleuze’s analysis of Herman Melville’s work in his essay: Bartleby; or, The Formula 
(Deleuze 1997a).   
 
In Melville’s text, Bartleby, The Scrivener, Bartleby is a legal copyist who, in response to the 
repeated requests of his employer (the lawyer), replies: ‘I would prefer not to.’  For Deleuze 
(1997a, pp. 73-74), this short sentence is a formula or limit-function that operates by 
disconnecting not only ‘words and things, words and action, but also speech acts and words’.  
As language, these words are cut-off from their usual function and no longer correspond or 
refer to some ‘thing’ in particular: they are literal and hence possess their own materiality and 
inertia.  Bartleby’s ‘blind’ adherence to this formula (and its variations) is expressed by an 
unassuming yet self-assured repetition of, ‘I would prefer not to’.  What results is the 
proliferation and reverberation of effects in the lawyer and other characters who attempt but 
fail to take account of Bartleby’s attitude and inactions.  The formula, as an internal limit of 
language, is thereby inscribed in (the ‘place’ of) language, as language itself.  By way of its ‘logic 
of preference’, the formula thereby undermines and displaces the ‘logic of presuppositions’ (Deleuze 
1997a, p. 73; original emphasis) of his ‘employer’, who may ‘represent’ or act on behalf of the 
already made place of language.   
 
Melville’s story documents the ‘event’ of the formula’s appearance and disappearance in the 
place of language through its material expression and extension in the words, behavior, 
gestures, stillness and eventual death and disappearance of Bartleby.  As a limit-function that 
embodies the contingent materiality of language itself, the formula initiates a process that 
disavows the connections that are taken for granted and thereby works to [un]do any attempt 
to master it.  The formula, I would prefer not to, is a placeholder that exposes what perhaps 
always already remains ‘unsaid’ in and by the place of language: its presuppositions and 
conventions are premised on an employer/employee or master/slave dialectic, on membership 
and non-membership of a category or class. 
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In a broader sense, the use of formula, limit and instructions in literature, conceptual art and 
concrete and visual poetry is nothing new.  Stéphane Mallarmé plays a key role in recognizing 
and responding to the contingency of language and expanding the semantic possibilities of 
poetry beyond standard lineage and towards the visuality of the printed word and its spatial 
relationships with the blank spaces of the page (Drucker 2011).  He works systematically to 
eliminate chance word-by-word and declares first and foremost himself to be ‘profoundly and 
scrupulously a syntaxer’, where his writing is ‘lacking entirely in obscurity’ and his ‘sentence 
is what it has to be, and to be forever…’ (Mallarmé quoted in Derrida 2004, p. 194).  Such 
precision in the deployment in language appears contradictory when one contrasts his 
‘sentences’ with their typographical arrangement in his iconic poem, Un Coup des Dés 
(1897/1914).  Words are scattered and clustered in groups so that their placement and 
arrangement affect the way the poem can be both seen, read and ‘understood’.  Therefore, 
one cannot simply undertake a serial reading of the text and ignore its visual materiality and 
spatial arrangement across the page (Goldsmith 2011).   
 
Another literary form that draws on the application of a limit, to pair words with their spatial 
arrangement, is concrete poetry.  The most striking feature of the concrete poems of Eugen 
Gomringer’s constellations12 (McCaffey 2013; Williams 2013) is their brevity and use of 
spatial arrangement to verbally and visually signify meaning(s).  For Perloff (2010), what 
defines concrete poetry is that the meaning of a work cannot be dissociated from its visuality.  
While concrete poetry materializes language by displaying and re-arranging it, conceptual 
artists (e.g. Kosuth and Art & Language) tend to deploy language in their attempt to 
dematerialize the art object (Hilder 2013).  Whereas, conceptual artists like Sol Le Witt, use 
language to free the artist from artistic labour and the physical production or execution of an 
artwork (ibid.).  Language, as a set of instructions, forms the ‘idea’ of the work and functions 
as a ‘machine for making art works’ (LeWitt 1992a, p. 834).  Lovatt (2012, p. 376) argues that 
Le Witt’s Sentences on Conceptual Art (1969) are ‘prefigured’ by the ‘language Mallarmé uses to 
describe his Le Livre’13—as ‘a ‘mechanism’ or ‘apparatus’ […] to be set in motion by an 
‘operator’ according to a predetermined plan […]’.  
 
Finally, one further literary movement should be noted: OuLiPo (Ouvroir de Littérature 
potentialle; Workshop of Potential Literature).  Founded in 1960, it is a group of French 
speaking writers, mathematicians, artists (Marcel Duchamp joined in 1962), chemical 
engineers and academics, who can be ‘situated within a national lineage of French game-
playing that started with [Des Inchorents and later] Dada and Surrealists, subsequently 
spawning the Lettrists, Situationists and finally the Pataphysicists’ (Bray 2016, p. 41).  Unlike 
                                                        
12 For example, Silencio (1954), Flow (1954), and Mensch (1960).  The Anthology of Concrete Poetry (edited by 
Emmett Williams), Gomringer’s works are not titled.  The ‘names’ above are the first word of each work (reading 
from left to right).     
13 Mallarmé’s Le Livre, dating from 1866, is a series of incomplete notes that are published in English in 1957.  
Hans Rudolf Zeller’s essay ‘Mallarmé and Serialist Thought’ (1960) aims to show the importance and validity 
of ‘translating Mallarmé’s literary experiments into the field of music’, in particular with regard to, Mallarmé’s 
‘systematic nullification’ of the everyday function of words’ and transposition of them into a ‘poetic system’ 
(Lovatt 2012, p. 375). 
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concrete poetry, OuLiPo is not interested in brevity or the arrangement and visuality of 
language as material but, rather, sets out ‘to invent (or reinvent) restrictions of a formal nature 
(contraintes) [...]’ (Jacques Roubaud quoted in Perloff, p. 79) to provide a means for structuring 
and generating texts.  Jan Beetens and Jean-Jacques Poucel (2009) define an OuLiPo constraint 
as follows: 
 
A constraint is a self-chosen rule (i.e. different from the rules that are imposed by 
the use of a natural language or those of convention); it is also a rule that is used 
systematically through the work…both as a compositional and reading device.  
Constraints are not ornaments: for the writer, they help generate the text, they 
help make sense of it. (Jan Beetens and Jean-Jacques Poucel 2009, p. 613). 
 
The constraint not only provides a means to drive the production of the text but also 
safeguards a writer from artistic spontaneity and ‘freedom’ and offers instead ‘the freedom of 
the difficulty mastered’ (Jacques Roubaud quoted in Perloff 2010, p. 81).  A famous example 
of an OuLiPo text is George Perec’s La Disparition (1969) where the 300-page novel details 
the exhaustive search for the missing ‘character’ of the story, Anton Vowl.  This absent 
character ‘tells’ of the constraint Perec applies: the exclusion throughout the entire novel of 
the most common vowel of the French language: the letter, ‘e’.  While this approach may 
produce a given text, as a ‘limit-function’, it is also ‘potentially transposable and adaptable to 
other contexts’ and can, thereby, ‘function as a point of connection or crossing-over of 
languages’ (James 2016, pp. 866-867).   
 
Marjorie Perloff in Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century (2010) sets out 
a history of ‘unoriginality’ by drawing on precedents such as TS Eliot’s Wasteland, Marcel 
Duchamp’s Readymades, Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project, concrete poetry, etc., to stress the 
importance and relevance of applying or combining ‘avant-garde sensibilities of the past and 
present with the new technologies and media of recent days’ (Aryal 2011, ii).  She argues that 
the immediacy and spontaneity of the ‘romantic artist’ is no longer relevant and that, in the 
‘place’ of poetry, ‘the demand for original expression dies hard: we expect our poets to 
produce words, phrases, images, and ironic locutions that we have never heard before.  Not 
words, but My Word’ (Perloff 2010, p. 23).  Similarly, Kenneth Goldsmith (2011), in 
Uncreative Writing: Managing Language in the Digital Age, argues that language or ‘words today 
are bubbles, shape-shifters, empty signifiers, floating on the invisibility of the network’ and, 
thereby, demand alternative reading and writing strategies (e.g. drawn from the visual arts) to 
re-engage with it as material, as stuff, not for an author to express thoughts through words 
but rather so that language can express itself.  
 
 
Samuel Beckett and the ‘unwording of literature’ 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this project to provide a comprehensive overview of Samuel 
Beckett’s approach to ‘unwording of literature’, it is important to briefly consider his attempt 
in The Unnamable (1953) (‘UN’) to ‘speak and yet to say nothing, really nothing’ (Beckett 
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quoted in Weller 2003, p. 102).  This aim, however, is not simply to say nothing or ‘to avoid 
speaking by speaking’ but, rather, ‘to speak the nothing, to speak it into its non-being, to make 
non-being possible for the one who speaks’ (ibid.; original emphasis).  While Weller (ibid., p. 
103) considers Blanchot’s suggestion that the ‘worklessness’ or ‘redundancy’ of ‘idle words’ 
provides a ‘vacant site’ from which the ‘being without being’ of language ‘speaks’, he 
concludes that this position fails to recognize that the radical undecidability of Beckett’s text 
is not concerned with the relation ‘between language and being, but between language and 
nothing’.  As a result, it is the act of ‘the saying’ itself that always obstructs ‘the saying of (the) 
nothing’ (ibid.). 
 
In a similar vein, Andrew Gibson (2006, p. 126-127) notes that Badiou’s reading of Beckett’s 
‘unwording of literature’ is not related to the ‘semantic instability’ between ‘words and things’ 
as a means of ‘deconstructing the unity of saying’ but, rather, an attempt to say that which 
counts as the ‘nothing’ of the event.  As this ‘nothingness’ exists ‘beyond’ ‘le bien dire’ (‘well 
saying’ or proper speech), it ‘cannot be named with reference to the existing lexicon’ (ibid., p. 
127).  That is, to begin to say ‘nothing’, one must unsay (or missay) saying itself.  This effort, 
however, is not in the service of restoring a ‘lost unity’ of a subject that is ‘dissolved’ in and 
by language but rather requires an ‘ascesis and vigiliance’, where a writer ‘must commit to 
bring about the subtraction of being from the One’ (Poiana 2009, pp. 137-138).  In this regard, 
Badiou (2005, pp. 89-121) draws a comparison between Beckett’s Worstward Ho (1983) (‘WH’) 
and Mallarmé’s Un Coup de Dés (rather than to the work of philosophers and novelists), because, 
as ‘originary naming’, poetry (as poiesis) draws on the infinite power of language to mark the 
presence and absence of the event as ‘improper speech, a disorder within or scandal for le bien 
dire’ (Gibson 2006, p. 127).   
 
A recurrent claim in Beckett criticism is that his work presents ‘a state of mind and mode of 
expression’ of what Beckett himself terms the ‘schizoid voice’’ (Weller 2008, p. 32).  
According to R.D. Laing: ‘the term schizoid refers to an individual the totality of whose 
experience is split in two main ways: in the first place, there is a rent in his [sic] relation with 
his world and, in the second, there is a disruption of his relation with himself (Laing 1960 
quoted in Weller 2008, p. 34).  Schizophrenia thereby involves the single symptom of 
‘dissociation or splitting’, a fracturing of the ‘self’ in terms of one’s relationship to reality.  
While neurosis involves simply ignoring reality, for Freud, psychosis is a ‘complete disavowal 
of the external’ (ibid., p. 34).  Any split we see in Beckett’s work, however, is not so much an 
attempt to deny the physical but, rather, it is to disavow the ‘reality’ of the linguistic world, 
as an attempt to ‘break’ with doxa (or opinion) and ‘the mistaking of the linguistic for the real’ 
(ibid., p. 46).  For Badiou (2005, p. 101-102), however, to attempt a complete failure and 
disavowal of saying (by way of unsaying) is a ‘temptation’ that is ‘challenged, revoked, 
prohibited’ throughout the course of WH.  Badiou characterizes this ‘temptation’ as follows: 
 
Since well saying is impossible, the only hope lies in betrayal.  To attain a failure 
so complete it would elicit a total abandonment of prescription itself, a 
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relinquishment of saying and of language.  This would mean a return to the 
void—to be void or emptied, emptied of all prescription. (Badiou 2005, p. 101) 
 
Such a strategy, however, would necessarily involve ‘a going away from humanity’: ‘to go 
where all shade is gone, where nothing is any longer exposed to the imperative of saying’ 
(ibid.).  Badiou argues that this temptation to a ‘prescription of silence’, as an absolute failure 
and disavowal of language, is ontologically impossible.  To show this, he cites the following 
passage from WH:  
 
Back unsay better worse by no stretch more.  If more dim less light then better 
worse more dim.  Unsaid then better worse by no stretch more.  Better worse 
may no less than less be more.  Better worse what?  The say?  The said?  Same 
thing.  Same nothing.  Same all but nothing.  (Beckett quoted in Badiou 2005, p. 
102) 
 
A ‘return to the void’ via unsaying however is not possible, as unsaying always already 
remains saying, even if the ‘all’ that is [un]said is reduced to: there remains nothing to be said.  
As a result, ‘The say? The said?  Same thing.  Same nothing.’, is not reducible to ‘nothing’ in 
and of ‘itself’ and, as such, the ‘said’ of the unsaying of ‘nothing’ always remains some ‘thing’: 
‘Same [as] all but [as] nothing’ (ibid.).   
 
In view of the above and to help structure the practical response to the research questions, I 
draw on Beckett’s ‘unwording’ of literature as discussed by Deleuze (1997b) in his essay, The 
Exhausted.  If ‘language states the possible’, then, Beckett’s strategy is to ‘renounce any order 
of preference’ to empty-out the place of language of its orientation towards its goal of 
signification (ibid., p. 153).  Such an approach attempts to unsay the possibility of the ‘place’ of 
literature by exhausting what remains unrealized in or by it.  This strategy has no ‘goal’ of its 
own other than the apagogic demonstration of its own impossibility.  For Gibson (2006, p. 
112), this process operates ‘as a kind of clearing the ground for an event, or an invocation of 
the event in its absence’. 
 
Deleuze (1997, pp. 156-60) identifies as the three languages or strategies that Beckett employs 
in his attempt to exhaust and un-word literature: 
 
1) A ‘language of voices’ which aims ‘to exhaust words themselves’ [and] ‘dries 
up their flows’ by way of strategies such as subtraction (e.g. via parataxis); 
 
2) A ‘language of names’ that involves the substitution of one logic of naming 
for another (e.g. ‘the combinatorial for the syntactic’);   
 
3) A ‘language of images’ that incorporates a paradoxical condition of something 
appearing indefinite yet being completely determined.  (Deleuze 1997, pp. 
156-60) 
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Accordingly, in my attempt to establish an internal limit or ‘boundary’ that may exist within 
language, I adapt Beckett’s three languages or strategies to develop three steps required to pass 
a textual object through another: subtraction, decomposition and transposition. 
 
 
Subtraction  
 
Hallward (2003, p. 161) notes that for Badiou ‘every true attempt to grapple with the real of 
a situation must first find a way of cutting through what passes for the reality in that situation 
(e.g. the status quo).’  This can be achieved in two ways: by destruction or subtraction.  Firstly, 
destruction presupposes that the appearance of the ‘new’ can only take place by way of an 
absolute destruction of the ‘old’.  Badiou, however, considers such an approach to be fatally 
flawed, as it aims to offer a ‘final solution’ which, for example, would result in the 
‘consummation of Art in the avant-garde (with Breton or Debord)’ (ibid., p. 162).  
Alternatively, subtraction does not seek to ‘annihilate’ the reality (of the old) but, rather, sets 
out by ‘withdrawing it from its apparent unity so as to detect in it the miniscule difference, 
the vanishing term that is constitutive of it’ (ibid.).  By attempting to subtract or displace the 
unity, consistency and coherence of ‘place’, subtraction aims to identify ‘the inconsistency 
that sustains it’ and, by doing so, reveal the presence and absence of an ‘immanent exception’ 
that ‘only barely’ takes place in the place itself (ibid.).  For Clemens (2005, p. 106), this 
‘immanent exception’ is the ‘subtractive’ which cannot be reduced to ‘the law of the count-for-
one’ that pre-determines the reality of the situation itself and, thereby, appears as ‘a vanishing 
surplus of being’ that is ‘both impossible and illegal’.  Subtraction, in this regard, involves 
withdrawing or reducing ‘place’ to its minimal conditions, to show or to make ‘space’ for the 
appearance and disappearance of the ‘pure illusion’ of a ‘nothing’, which is ‘nothing other 
than being itself’ (ibid., p. 104). 
 
To develop a practical means of applying the notion of subtraction above, I draw from Henri 
Bergson’s theory of perception where he considers our perception of phenomena to be 
different in quantity, not different in kind (Bergson 1988).  Perception doesn’t alter, embellish 
or add to what it perceives but rather subtracts from the infinity of images (the vibrations of 
matter) that pass through one’s body and, then, into one’s consciousness.  This process of 
subtraction has two stages:  firstly, the body unfreely subtracts what it is capable of perceiving 
from the infinitude of images; and, then, the conscious mind subtracts what is relevant to it 
in terms of the practical concerns of a situation (from the finite selection of images that the 
body has made) (Ansell-Pearson 2005).   
 
Meillassoux (2007, p. 75) notes that Bergson’s theory of perception is anti-Kantian in that it 
is an ascesis and not a synthesis: ‘Perception does not connect, it disconnects.  It does not inform 
a content but incises an order.  It does not enrich matter, but on the contrary impoverishes it’. 
Moreover, such a subtractive process excludes what the order it incises, by its very ‘nature’, 
cannot include, such that a living being ‘conquers infinitude through the power of refusal’ 
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and thereby embodies a ‘barricade erected by a formidable power of disinterest for that which 
communicates’ (Meillassoux 2007, p. 74).  Consciousness thereby does not illuminate an 
object as a ‘whole’, but rather darkens it by ignoring those aspects that are not relevant to the 
(practical) concerns of a sentient being (Ansell-Pearson 2005).  
 
I apply Bergson’s idea of perception, as a double subtraction of the communication of matter, 
as means of ‘reading’ or interrogating textual objects.  That is, an already made text (analogous 
to the unfree selection of the body above) is darkened when the unity of it is subtracted so that 
it is reduced to a part, as the ‘subject’ of it.  What, in this sense, remains is the ‘consciousness’ 
within the text that literally expresses the limit or constraint that is imposed upon it.   
 
 
Decomposition 
 
Rather than being an immaterial and ‘transparent’ medium that simply facilitates 
communication, this project considers language to be material, as some ‘thing’ that not only 
enables communication but also obscures, ‘taints’, and hinders it (Lecercle 1990).  Words are 
already made materials that embody a whole host of conventions, agreements, habits, uses, and 
associations that affect the way we name and navigate not only texts but, more broadly, the 
everyday itself.  Moreover, language, in the form of code, ‘grounds’ the digital world of 
appearances and provides the ‘genetic’ and structural means to store, locate, construct and 
deconstruct what takes place upon the screen (Goldsmith 2011).  To read a text or novel as 
material, then, is to view it not as a ‘narrative [that] creates a cause-and-effect trajectory of 
seeming unordered items (events)’ but rather as a database, that is defined as ‘a structured 
collection of data […] organized for fast search and retrieval’ (Manovich 2001, p. 435, 440).  
 
This project adopts an atomistic model, where language as material can be reduced to 
‘primitive’ (or ‘first’) objects that form a basis to link textual ‘objects’.  Badiou uses such an 
approach where he appropriates the ‘empty set’ of ZF or axiomatic Set Theory (‘ZF’)14, where 
‘nothing’ or ‘the ‘void’ becomes the atom of being’ (Clemens 2005, p. 105).  In this regard, 
the empty set is the only set that is ‘directly asserted’ (Hallward 2003, p. 338), as it is common 
to (or the ‘urelement’) of all sets.  It provides the basis upon which all sets (that cannot be directly 
asserted) are constructed.  Rather than use the element of ‘nothing’ as the basis to construct 
and deconstruct texts, my project draws upon and mimes the role prime numbers—as the 
‘atoms’ of arithmetic—play in being able to decompose and re-express non-prime (or 
composite) numbers as unique multiples of primes (du Sautoy 2003).   
 
Reconceived as constructible materials, words are not simply a combination of the individual 
letters of the alphabet; they are composed of ‘original’ or ‘primitive’ words that they may also 
                                                        
14  This name refers to axiomatic Set Theory, named after Zemelo and Fraenkel, who led a group of 
mathematicians to identify nine basic axioms (1908) to provide a secure basis for the ideas George Cantor began 
to set out from 1874.  
 David Christian  
 
20 
contain.  These ‘urwords’ are literally the ‘first’ words that are created when one begins to 
compose words from the letters of the alphabet.  For example, by pairing and, in some cases, 
doubling individual letters, the first words created in English (other than ‘I’ and ‘a’) are two-
letter words (e.g. aa, ab, ad, …).  As ‘first’ words, urwords have similar properties to prime 
numbers in that they are ‘elemental’ and cannot be decomposed into simpler or shorter words.  
While ‘urwords’ are not necessarily limited to two-letter words, they are (for the purposes of 
this project) defined and limited to the official two-letter Scrabble words (Cooper, Ferguson 
& Higgleton 2004).   
 
The intention of this approach is to reconceive and re-organise language so that is can be re-
arranged in terms of its visual appearance, where words literally embody and resemble each 
other.15  Such an approach provides a ‘material’ basis for the exchangeability of words with 
other words, within and across textual objects. 
 
 
Transposition  
 
While subtraction and decomposition may provide a means for investigating textual objects 
and identifying a common basis for the exchangeability of words within and across texts, I 
draw on Walter Benjamin’s essay, The Translator’s Task (1923/1997), to identify a means to 
attempt to pass a textual object through another.  According to Sandbank (2015, p. 215), the 
task of a Benjamin’s translator is to reduce the literary ‘event’ (of a text, etc.) from ‘writer, 
work, world and audience’ to simply ‘writer and work’.  That is, a literary ‘event’ has no 
destination or point of arrival attained through the context of the work.  For Benjamin (1997), 
a translated text’s utility does not lie in the transmission of meaning into another language but 
rather on realizing or exposing a ‘pure language’ that may be found or glimpsed in the 
interstices (and differences) between languages. 
   
Benjamin’s example of a ‘good’ translation is Hölderlin’s translations of Sophocles’ Oedipus 
and Antigone (1804), where the translation is carried out ‘literally, disregarding German syntax 
and forfeiting clear comprehensibility’ so that the ‘destruction of intelligible meaning […] 
reveals the inherent difference between languages’ (Liska 2014, p. 221).  Rather than 
translating sentences to preserve meaning, Hölderlin translates Sophocles’ Oedipus and 
Antigone word-for-word and, thereby, retains the organizational ‘logic’ and rhythm of the 
original Greek. If, as Badiou after Parmenides16 contends, ‘logic and appearing are one and 
the same thing’ (Badiou 2009, p.99), then, the preservation of the ‘internal’ form of the Greek 
provides a ‘truer’ version than one that attempts a wholesale translation into the language and 
                                                        
15   It is important to note here that this project does not look at the possibility of letters to approximately 
resemble and or reflect each other as individual objects or in combination with another letter.  For example, see 
the analysis of the words ‘red circle’ by Goldsmith (2011, p. 69), where, for example, he observes that the ‘d’ is 
‘mimicked’ in the combination ‘ci’ and ‘cl’, etc.   
16 ‘It is the same to think and to be’ (Badiou 2009, p. 99). 
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grammar of German.  By transposing and not interpreting, Hölderlin’s translations do not 
state meaning, they preform and resound it.    
 
In a similar fashion, I use a one-to-one correspondence of the urwords within and across textual 
objects in my attempt to pass or transpose one textual object through or into another.    
 
 
Methodology 
 
Whereas Duchamp’s notion of a creative act involves a collaboration of sorts between the 
artist and spectator in the realization of the work, this project aims to practice what Reza 
Negarestani (2011, p. 15) refers to an ‘ascesis of closure’ as a means of ‘collaborating’ or being 
an ‘accomplice with the thought of contingency and uncovering the conspiracy of contingent 
materials in opening the work beyond its confines.’   According to Reza Negarestani: 
 
[…] the contingency inherent to artist’s materials does not entail any 
commonality with the artist’s intentions; if anything, such contingency bends, 
hijacks and punctures such schemes, sensibilities, and intentions.  In reality, the 
work is not created based on commonalities but on patterns of intrusion, twisting, 
and suspension determined by its contingent materials (during the movement from the 
so-called ideas to physical materials) in the process of artistic production. 
(Negarestani 2011, pp. 13-14; original emphasis). 
 
Within the context of this project, practicing an ‘ascesis of closure’ means attempting to limit 
and subtract—as much as possible—any ‘artistic’ intentions that aim to realise a particular 
form of subjective expression or signification.  I thereby attempt to maximize Duchamp’s 
‘personal art coefficient’, which he defines as the ‘arithmetical’ difference between what an 
artist intends but fails to say—of what remains unsaid in the work—and what she 
unintentionally express in its place (Sanouillet & Peterson 1973, p. 139).    
 
The [un]creative ‘goal’ of this project is to say ‘nothing’.   
 
To attempt this, I limit and expose the process of artistic production and, hence, the artwork 
itself to the inherent contingency of the ‘inert matter’ of the materials employed.  Accordingly, 
the overall strategy of the research is to apagogically adopt the role of an artist-as-anauthor.  To 
subtract and displace the notion of the artist as the (subjective) source of meaning of the work, 
I attempt to adopt a kind of authorial ‘asceticism’, where my aim is to operate as ‘objectively’ 
as possible to ensure that the relationship between the materials, their one-to-one 
correspondence and the outcomes are self-contained and not corrupted or ‘cooked’ by any 
‘taste’ or personal ‘designs’, I may harbour.  To achieve this, I adopt an ethics of deferral that 
seeks to [un]author the project’s practical outcomes in two ways.  Firstly, by drawing upon 
and misapplying other ‘sources’, I undertake a series of experiments that aim to identify an 
internal ‘pathway’ in language and develop the steps (of an algorithm) required to pass an 
object through another.  Authorial decisions are thereby [un]made, with responsibility for 
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them deferred to commonly established and agreed ‘standards’.  Secondly, I attempt to 
[un]subjectively and [un]creatively take responsibility for the work by deferring to and 
blindly implementing the steps of the algorithm to allow it to reach its ‘natural’ end.  
Moreover, in response to this outcome, I ‘repeat’ the individual steps of the algorithm in my 
attempt to reveal its ‘logic’ as the appearing of the work itself.  In producing these works, the 
strategy again is to defer and ground decision-making in either some ‘external’ source of 
‘authority’ or upon the instructions of the algorithm itself. 
 
 
Method 
 
To respond to the research questions, this project investigates the intra-relational and inter-
relational aspects of textual object(s) through the principle means of the imposition of a limit-
function.  This is achieved in three ways: firstly, by using a part of an object to subtract it from 
itself; secondly, to decompose ‘composite’ words into their constituent urwords; and finally, to 
transpose textual objects by imposing a one-to-one correspondence between the urwords 
common to both textual objects.  
 
The use of a limit-function or ‘subject’ to subtract an object from itself is key strategy adopted 
to identify the commonalities that may—or may not—exist between textual objects.  As 
outlined above, this approach is influenced by Bergson’s theory of perception, where the 
perception of consciousness results from the ‘images’ of matter that are subtracted unfreely 
selected by the body and ‘chosen’ according to the practical ‘interests’ of the consciousness.  
Subtraction is thereby a process of impoverishing a whole in favour of a ‘subject’ or ‘part’, so 
that it reveals how this ‘part’ takes place in and as the object itself. 
 
While similar to subtraction, decomposition is a strategy used to develop an atomistic model of 
language where a written text is considered to be a constructible set that is comprised of 
smaller subsets and hence can be broken down into simple elements or parts.  This approach 
draws on the mathematical principle that prime numbers are the ‘building blocks from which 
all whole number can be made’ (Neale 2017, p. 6) and can be used to decompose non-prime 
numbers into unique multiples of primes (e.g. 4 = 2 x 2; 6 = 2 x 3; 8 = 2 x 2 x 2; 9 = 3 x 3; 10 
= 2 x 5, ...).  Rather than follow Duchamp’s ‘search for prime words’ as ‘abstract words […] 
which have no concrete reference’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p.31), I misapply the 
principle of prime numbers—as building blocks—and use decomposition to identify the 
presence and absence of ‘primitive’ words within ‘composite’ words.  The term I adopt for 
these ‘first’ words is: ‘urword’.  Analogous to prime numbers, urwords provide a means to re-
ground language which allows for the interaction between and exchangeability of individual 
words and larger textual objects. 
 
The process of transposition is another key means by which the research examines the 
relationship between textual objects.  While the use of subtraction and decomposition help to 
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identify a common basis of exchange between textual objects, the imposition of a one-to-one 
correspondence between word and urword provides a means for the ‘transfer’ of one object 
into and across another.  The approach draws from Benjamin’s The Translator’s Task and from 
the use of prime numbers in George Cantor’s Set Theory, as discussed by Badiou (2009, pp. 
10 – 16).  For example, by forcing the infinite set of all whole numbers (1,2,3, …) to 
correspond in a one-to-one relationship with the infinite set of all prime numbers (by simply 
counting prime numbers to infinity), Cantor shows an apparent paradox within number 
theory: how can prime numbers, as a subset of whole numbers, be the same size as the infinite 
set of all whole numbers?   
 
 
Research outcomes 
 
In response to the research questions, the project identifies a means by which two textual 
objects can interact according to a common internal limit or boundary.   
 
Perhaps the most significant research outcome is the development of the algorithm as a means 
of reproducing [un]creative and [un]original artworks.   As a formula or authoring-function, it 
remains independent of the product(s) it reproduces.  Its application and implementation, as 
an ‘ascesis of closure’, reflects not so much the ‘intentions’ of the selections of its material 
inputs but rather provides a means to rethink (via its outputs) language as a contingent 
material and our relationship to it, as readers, viewers and listeners.   
 
The algorithm reproduces two [un]creative outcomes.  Firstly, by attempting to pass the 
material of Stephane Mallarmé’s A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance  (‘ATOTD’) 
(1996) through the ‘structure’ of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho (‘WH’) (1983), the algorithm 
reproduces a ‘new’ text entitled Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (‘WOCIT’).  Secondly, 
by imposing the material of WH on the typographical structure of ATOTD, the algorithm 
reproduces a textual object entitled A Somehow of Where Dim (‘ASOWD’). 
 
By forcing a ‘mathematical’ logic to displace the syntactical logic that usually supports and 
promotes the development of meaning, the transposed text(s) resist any reader’s attempt to 
draw any one meaning from it/them.  It not only forces a reader to reconsider her relationship 
to the text but also, more generally, to the act of reading and our relationship to language 
itself.  In this regard, the text is a paradoxical object: while being completely determined, it 
remains from the standpoint of a conventional attitude to a text and its reading, an indefinite 
expression, devoid of any one source of signification and significance.   
 
The product(s) of the algorithm represent a dialectical relationship between its source objects.  
However, unlike the Duchampian Readymade, they are not ‘split’ and externally articulated 
across the impermeable ‘gap’ of the ‘infrathin’, but rather ‘fused’ and mediated by the present 
yet ‘absent’ urwords that both bridge and facilitate the displacement of one object by another.  
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In my attempt to show the presence of the ‘logic’ or operation of the algorithm in and as the 
work itself, I produce three derivative works that respond to WOCIT.  In Work 3, I ‘expand’ 
and dilute WOCIT by subtracting each of the 124 urword categories (in addition to the 
[un]transposable WH words and punctuation marks) to multiply the ‘abridged’ version of 
WOCIT into an ‘unabridged’ edition of 125 volumes.  Each volume contains the words that 
correspond to an individual urword category and where they are placed in the [un]original text.   
In Work 4, I attempt to show the intra-relational ‘absence’ and presence of the urwords within 
and across categories by way of a stop-animation video.  The algorithm is transposed or 
mimed through bringing the visual text, the play of urwords, and spoken words into a one-to-
one correspondence with each other.  In Work 5, WOCIT is reduced to an ‘urtext’ and re-
presented as a spatialized ‘narrative’ in a sound installation. The interplay of the interjections, 
imperatives and exclamations of urwords within and across space of the ‘text’ allow a listener 
to be physically ‘moved by’ the intra-relational workings of the algorithm itself.   
 
 
Summary of chapter contents 
 
This exegesis is structured in two halves.  Firstly, in Chapters 1 – 3, I set out the theoretical 
considerations and context that inform the development of the practical outcomes.  Secondly, 
in Chapters 4 – 6, I detail the practical development and identification of the algorithm, its 
implementation and the products it reproduces.   
 
In Chapter 1, I argue that the ‘external’ (or inter-relational) gesture of the Readymade involves 
the application of apagogic reason that demonstrates the presence and absence of non-art 
‘within’ the place of art.   I begin, by way of literary analogy, and briefly discuss a fictional 
biography of the fabulist, Aesop (1961), to illustrate how the introduction and strict 
application of a limit-function can be used to demonstrate the absurdity of the presuppositions 
and habits of mind that pre-determine what does and does not belong to a given category or 
class.  Then, I discuss how Duchamp’s Fountain is apagogically produced and how it operates 
as a speculative hypothesis or example to expose the limits of the ‘disciplinary matrix’ of a 
paradigm of art that always already presupposes and privileges a general type of art making 
that produces a particular kind of art object.   
 
In Chapter 2, I examine the ‘internal’ content of the Readymade in an attempt to understand 
the role language (as a contingent material) plays in reproduction of ‘nothing’.  Firstly, I draw 
on Gilles Deleuze’s analysis of Herman Melville’s Bartleby, The Scrivener, to show how the 
introduction of limit-function serves as ‘foreign’ element that displaces the presuppositions and 
conventions that usually govern the ‘place’ of language.   Secondly, I analyse Duchamp’s early 
work, The (1915/1916), to identify how he deploys visual and verbal language and, then, draw 
upon the work of Molly Nesbit and Naomi Sawlson-Gorse to identify and suggest that the 
abstract and transformational logic of 1 2 → 1 may operate as a formula or limit-function for 
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the gesture of the Readymade.   Finally, by returning to Fountain, I aim to show how this 
abstract logic is expressed, extended, and performed as the gesture of the Readymade itself. 
In Chapter 3, I draw on Giorgio Agamben’s notions of ‘praxis’ and ‘poiesis’ to discuss the 
implications of Duchamp’s The Creative Act and Reza Negarestani’s notion of an ‘ascesis of 
closure’ to discuss the relationship between the ‘creative act’ of the artist, the materials she 
employs, and the outcome that this process produces.   Then, I briefly discuss by way of 
Derrida, Hegel and Badiou, the notion of the book and writing as a product of the ‘inner 
discourse’ of mind and how poetic language may operate as the contingent materiality of 
‘unthinkable’ thought.  Finally, I discuss Bergson’s theory of perception to re-consider the 
role of the viewer or reader may have in the creative act of the ‘transmutation’ of ‘inert matter 
into a work of art’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 139-140) 
 
In Chapter 4, I outline my relevant previous practice to contextualize the development of this 
project’s aims and objectives.  I discuss the work of Samuel Beckett as filtered through the 
writing of Deleuze and Badiou to identify a practical approach to the project.  By 
misappropriating Bergson’s theory of perception, I develop a range of material and process 
investigations that aim to subtract a textual object from itself or use a part or ‘subject’ of a 
particular text to investigate what it may have in common with another.  Through a series of 
word ‘painting’ studies, I develop a means to decompose already made texts and their individual 
words into elementary parts or urwords.  Urwords provide a common internal limit or 
boundary that can be used to examine the relationship within and between words and texts.  
By misappropriating Cantor’s idea of counting primes to align a set with a subset, together 
with Benjamin’s The Translator’s Task, I develop a means to force a one-to-one 
correspondence between words by way of urwords and, thereby, attempt to transpose or pass 
one textual object through another.  
 
In Chapter 5, I summarise the assumptions and decisions involved in the development of the 
algorithm to analyse its ‘autonomy’, as a limit-function and means of passing one object 
‘through’ another.  I, then, identify and detail the steps of the algorithm and outline the 
process and difficulties of implementing it.  Finally, I briefly discuss the principle outcome of 
the algorithm, Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (‘WOCIT’) and, then, set out the key 
issues that drive the development of the practical outcomes of this project.   
 
In Chapter 6, I set out the [un]creative outcomes of this project and briefly discuss the issues 
each work addresses in the attempt to show how the logic that forms the basis of the algorithm 
and its product can be conceived as the ‘appearing’ of the work itself.  Work 1 involves the 
representation of the product of algorithm as a work of ‘literature’.  In Work 2, the algorithm 
is reversed so that ATOTD is transposed into the vocabulary of WH and, then, represented 
as a work of ‘art’.  Work 3 attempts to shift the focus in Work 1 on its ‘content’ towards the 
presence and absence of the relationship between urword and word which provides the basis 
for the algorithm to [un]author and reauthor.  Work 4 repeats Step 3 of the algorithm and 
decomposes WOCIT into urwords and re-presents it as a reading of a visual-audio ‘book’.   
Finally, Work 5 sets out to transpose the visuality of urwords into their aural form and, by 
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doing so, ‘show’ the intra-relational play of urwords as the logic and appearing of the work 
itself.  
 
In the Conclusion, I evaluate the [un]creative outcomes of the project as a response to the 
research questions and consider the implications of the project within the broader context of 
the ‘paradigm’ of art after the Readymade.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
In this chapter, I set out to argue that the ‘external’ (or inter-relational) gesture of the 
Readymade involves the application of apagogic reason that demonstrates the presence and 
absence of non-art ‘within’ the place of art.  I begin, by way of literary analogy, and briefly 
discuss a fictional biography of the fabulist, Aesop, to illustrate how the introduction and strict 
application of a limit-function can be used to demonstrate the absurdity of the presuppositions 
and habits of mind that pre-determine what does and does not to belong to a given category 
or class.  Then, I discuss how Duchamp’s Fountain is apagogically produced and how it 
operates as a speculative hypothesis or example to expose the limits of the ‘disciplinary matrix’ 
of a ‘paradigm’ of art that always already presupposes and privileges a general type of art 
making that produces a particular kind of art object.   
 
 
1.1 Apagogic reason as the reproduction of nothing: Aesop’s empty vessel 
 
The fables of Aesop are simple animal tales that serve as paradigms, or examples, of human 
behaviour (Daly 1961, p. 17).  Among other things, fables may have been developed as an 
indirect means of speaking truth to power or as a ‘secret way slaves [talked] to each other 
without being understood by their masters’ (Hopkins 1993, p. 13).  According to Aristotle, 
‘Fables are suited to popular oratory and have this advantage that, while historical parallels 
are hard to find, it is comparatively easy to find fables.  For fables have to be invented, like 
illustrations, if one has a faculty for seeing analogies […]’ (quoted in Daly 1961, p. 14-15).  
Fables are useful as analogies because they supplement a point being made by transposing what 
may be abstract and difficult to comprehend into a familiar ‘visual’ form.   
 
It appears that the fables attributed to the historical figure, Aesop, have many authors and 
form a body of material drawn from a broader oral tradition that became known as ‘Aesopic’ 
due to his mastery of their use and application (Daly 1961, p. 19).  When compared to the 
Homeric tradition, Aesop’s tales of talking animals appear to be emblematic of a ‘low’, base 
and everyday art form and not reflective of the high-mindedness and serious nature of Epic 
poetry that documents the ‘play’ of meddlesome gods, tragic heroes and culturally significant 
events. 
 
It may be of little wonder, then, that the ‘biography’ of the fabulist Aesop is an utter fiction 
and a ‘fable’ itself in the form of a bawdy satirical comedy concerning the relationship between 
masters and their slaves.  Written anonymously in first century Roman Egypt, The life: The 
Book of Xanthus the Philosopher and Aesop His Slave or The Career of Aesop (‘The Life’), details 
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Aesop’s life from that of a slave, to his cunning attempts to free himself, his gaining freedom 
and finally to his death by throwing himself off a cliff at the behest of Apollo, for honouring 
the Muses and not the god of art and artistry himself.   
 
The Life describes Aesop as physically ugly and ‘of loathsome aspect’: the antithesis of any 
Greek ‘ideal’ of beauty. ‘Worthless as a servant’ and a ‘portentous monstrosity’, Aesop is 
portrayed as ‘potbellied, misshapen of head, snub-nosed, swarthy, dwarfish, bandy-legged, 
short-armed, squint-eyed, [and] liver-lipped’ (Daly 1961, p. 31).  Moreover, unlike the 
animals of his fables, he cannot speak until he kindly assists a priestess to find her way and, in 
recompense, the goddess, Isis, restores Aesop’s voice and bestows on him the ‘most excellent 
speech.’  She also persuades the nine Muses to each endow him with their individual gifts so 
that he has the divine ‘power to devise stories and the ability to conceive and elaborate tales 
in Greek’ (Daly 1961, p. 24).    
 
Xanthus, a philosopher sent to the slave market by his wife to acquire a ‘pretty’ male slave, 
purchases Aesop at a bargain price in an attempt to, among other things, stave off his wife’s 
infidelity.  Unaware of Aesop’s wit and troublesome nature, Xanthus feels happy and safe to 
introduce this new slave to his household. The story then details how the ‘supremely astute 
and cunning’ Aesop continually outwits his master and his wife in the attempt to gain freedom 
(Hopkins 1993, p. 15).  Even though he is divinely endowed, Aesop’s approach is not without 
risk, as slave masters in the Roman Empire have the power of life and death over their slaves 
and severe beatings—even for minor ‘offences’—are commonplace.  It is important to note 
that Xanthus is a philosopher who naturally thinks himself reasonable and, thereby, doesn’t 
want to punish his errant slave without good reason.  However, after being thwarted many 
times, Xanthus attempts to ‘take back control’ by rather naively instructing Aesop to ‘do 
nothing more or less than you are told’ (Hopkins 1993, p. 19).  Aesop obliges and, by doing 
precisely what he is told, uses this instruction as a formula and defense for his ongoing attempts 
to frustrate his master into gifting him his freedom. 
 
One example is when Xanthus commands Aesop to ‘Pick up the oil flask and the towels, and 
let’s go to the baths’ (Daly 1961, p. 50).  Following suit, Aesop retrieves the oil flask and 
towels and they proceed to the bath.  After Xanthus undresses, he asks Aesop for the oil flask 
only to discover that it is empty.  Upending the flask, he asks: ‘Aesop where’s the oil?’ To 
which Aesop replies: ‘At home.’ Xanthus queries: ‘Why?’  Aesop, in his defense, retorts: 
‘Because you told me ‘take the oil flask and the towels,’ but you didn’t mention oil.  I wasn’t 
supposed to do anything more than I was told.  If I slipped up on my instructions, I was going 
to be answerable at the cost of a beating’ (Daly 1961, p. 51).  This strategy continues when 
Xanthus, with more care, instructs Aesop to ‘… go out and cook us lentil.  Put it in a pot, put 
some water in it, put it on the cooking hearth, put some wood under it, and light it; if it starts 
to go out, blow on it.  Now do as I say’. (Daly 1961, p. 51) Aesop does exactly just that and 
only cooks one lentil.  Moreover, when Xanthus and his friends return from the baths, he tells 
Aesop to ‘give us something to drink for men right from the bath’.  Aesop obliges with a jug 
filled with bath water or literally ‘something to drink, right from the bath’ (Daly 1961, p. 51).   
READY[UN]MADE: ABSENCE & PRESENCE IN THE INTRA-RELATIONAL OBJECT 
 
29 
By requiring Aesop’s to follow his instructions word-for-word, these examples show how 
Xanthus unwittingly shifts all responsibility and blame for Aesop’s ‘inactions’ to himself.  
Aesop’s literal observation of, and strict adherence to, Xanthus’ commands not only spares 
him a beating, but also provides an indirect means of teaching his master a lesson.  By 
becoming nothing more than a ‘talking tool’, Aesop takes on the role of an ‘ideal’ slave, who 
know knows his place and that his role is not to question, think for, or second guess, his master.  
He limits his obedience to acting and thereby restricts his slavery to ‘copying’ Xanthus’ words 
regardless of whether or not they are accurate or appropriate for the desired intention.  If 
Aesop’s role is to act on behalf of his master, by corollary, Xanthus must think for his slave.  
 
Rather than embodying and fulfilling what Xanthus desires, the oil flask, lentil or pitcher of 
bath water contain what he perhaps deserves: an object devoid of what he meant to say and 
expected to receive.  With each of these ‘empty’ vessels Xanthus is confronted with what 
remains unsaid in his instructions.  They not only reveal the disjunction between Xanthus’ 
intention, words and anticipated outcome with the reality of the situation (e.g. of the oil flask 
being empty), but also are emblematic of his presumptuousness and lack of mastery over his 
own thought and command of language.  For Xanthus to get what he wants, he needs to 
anticipate all possible situations (e.g. the flask with or without oil in it) and, then, exhaustively 
carry out in thought all the actions required so he can transpose them into a precise set of 
instructions for Aesop to follow.  To achieve this, however, Xanthus unthinkingly limits his 
mastery, authority and agency to what he imagines the world to be and to the play and 
vagaries of the language he uses to describe it, by presuming that his thoughts and words 
can—without remainder—anticipate and accurately take account of the place of objects and 
actions.  Given the context, this is clearly a very absurd and impractical task.   
 
By blindly following Xanthus’ instructions, Aesop’s subsequent ‘failures’ perhaps 
demonstrate the impossibility and absurdity of the master/slave relation as mutually exclusive 
yet co-dependent categories.  An empty vessel reveals to Xanthus that, as a master, he too has 
a place and that he has forgotten it: he cannot reasonably expect the benefit of Aesop’s slavery 
without the burden and responsibility that the ‘authority’ of his categorical definition of 
mastery requires. With an ‘empty vessel’, Aesop begs the question: rather than limiting his 
engagement with the world to the representation and mediation of language (and the action 
of slaves), surely, it is easier and more expeditious to simply get the oil, oil flask and towels 
himself! 
  
The above story shows how Aesop applies apagogic reason to outwit his master.  By assuming 
the truth of his master’s proposition—to only do as he is told—Aesop reasons by way of a 
reductio ad absurdum to show that the position of his master’s commands is not logical17 and 
thereby leads to absurdity.  The empty vessels he produces contain nothing of what Xanthus 
intended and, as a result, stand for nothing but the lack of mastery and hypocrisy of his master.   
                                                        
17 If logical, the axioms or assumptions that inform the instructions would be reflected in, and not contradicted 
by, the outcomes. 
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In what follows, I aim to discuss the ‘external’ gesture of the Readymade and, by discussing 
Duchamp’s most famous work, Fountain, show how he uses language to displace and 
apagogically demonstrate how the definition of the art of the time was circumscribed by 
conventions and presuppositions of what art could—and could not—be.   
 
 
1.2 The ‘external’ gesture of the Readymade 
 
Around 1913, Duchamp shifts his artistic practice away from painting and towards an 
experimental mode that aims to capture the nature of chance. The work of mathematician 
Henri Poincaré introduces Duchamp to the basic principles of three major branches of modern 
geometry: n-dimensional geometry, non-Euclidean geometry and topology (Adcock 1984).  
Poincaré considers that ‘invention [is] discernment, choice’ and that ‘concepts and hypotheses 
[are] not given to us by nature […] but [are] rather conventions chosen by the specific 
investigator for reasons of convenience and guided by what he called ‘predilection’’ (Holton 
2001, p. 129).  Key to Poincaré’s approach to mathematical invention is the placing together 
of apparently disparate elements to form a new relation—the most productive of these 
‘unlikely combinations’ being commonly formed from ‘elements drawn from domains which 
are far apart’ (Adcock 1984, p. 259).   
 
The notion of chance, or the chance encounter, became essential to Duchamp’s approach to 
reinvestigating perspective and to his attempts to find a means of representing a four-
dimensional figure in three dimensions using similar means that the artistic innovators of the 
Renaissance used to develop linear perspective (e.g. Leon De Batista Alberti’s frame in his 
treatise of painting and perspective, Della pittura, 1435) (Molderings 2010).  Duchamp’s The 
Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even (‘The Large Glass’) (1918) represents his sustained yet 
abandoned attempt to represent the fourth-dimensional space of desire using the 
contemporary visual language of industry, science and mathematics (Henderson 1999).  To 
achieve this, he would have to ‘demonstrate the conventional nature of aesthetics—to show 
that how one chose one’s art was also a matter of context’ (Adcock 1984, p. 251). 
 
The story of Fountain begins with the founding of The Society of Independent Artists (‘Society’) in 
1916.  Duchamp is one of the twenty founding members and is appointed chair of the hanging 
committee of its inaugural exhibition.  The raison d’être of the Society is ‘holding exhibitions in 
which all artists may participate independently of the decisions of juries’ (De Duve 1996, p. 
97).  That is, it seeks to provide an unmediated platform for artists to present their work to an 
audience.  Article II, Section 3 of the Society’s bylaws sets out the definition and obligations of 
membership: 
 
Any artist, whether a citizen of the United States or of any foreign country, may 
become a member of the Society upon filing an application therefor, paying the 
initiation fee and the annual dues of a member, and exhibiting at the exhibition 
in the year that he [sic] joins. (quoted in de Duve 1996, p. 97) 
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To test this ‘instruction’ and the democratic ambitions and pretenses of the Society, Duchamp 
orchestrates a ruse and surreptitiously submits to the inaugural exhibition a mass-produced 
white porcelain urinal that he, in collaboration with Joseph Stella and Walter Arensberg, 
purchases and, then, places it on its ‘back’ (on a plinth), re-names it Fountain and signs and 
dates it under the pseudonym, R. MUTT 1917.  
 
This submission echoes Epimenides’ liar paradox18 by asserting that this non-art is art and, 
thereby, presents the directors of the Society with a double bind.  If they accept and exhibit 
Fountain, they effectively endorse it as a work of art and risk public ridicule (and potential 
ruin) or, if they reject it, they betray their principles, vitiate their bylaws and contradict 
themselves, by effectively operating as a jury in an exhibition that is marketed with the slogan: 
‘No jury, no prizes’.  The directors opt for the ‘lesser’ of two evils and conclude that ‘[t]he 
Fountain may be a very useful object in its place, but its place is not an art exhibition and it is, 
by no definition, a work of art’ (de Duve 1996, p. 99) and, thereby, exclude it from the 
exhibition and catalogue.  In their view, Fountain is a non-art object and thereby counts as 
‘nothing’ in terms of a traditional definition of a work of the art because it is an industrially 
produced copy or multiple and is therefore ‘not a product made by the artist’ and ‘not an 
original work’ (de Duve in Formis 2004, p. 249).   
 
By responding literally to the rules of the Society and the intentions of the exhibition, 
Duchamp—like Aesop—submits an ‘empty’ vessel, one devoid of the essential conditions of 
what, in the directors’ view, can—and cannot— constitute an ‘art’ work.  Duchamp (and his 
accomplices), empty Fountain of the ‘traditional’ creative work by way of a double abduction.   
Firstly, he abducts an already made object from its usual context (as an object of practical utility) 
and thereby ‘transforms’ it by placing it ‘wrongly’ (on its back) and by attempting to put it in 
the ‘wrong’ place of a new context (as an object of aesthetic utility) (Scalan 2003).  Such a 
move is perhaps based on how Duchamp explains that industrially made paints are, in 
themselves, already made objects, ‘since the tubes of paint used by the artist are manufactured 
and ready made products we must conclude that all the painting in the world are ‘readymades 
aided’ and also works of assemblage’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 142).  The gesture of 
the Readymade thereby involves setting a minimal limit of the quantity and type of labour 
required to ‘aid’ already made material(s). It involves substituting the intra-relational 
multiplicity (as the placing and combination of various paints to form a painting) for the 
‘singularity’ of the selection and placement of a Readymade.  Moreover, it demonstrates an 
essential truth of ‘art’: it always already incorporates and relies upon ‘non-art’19 (Formis 2004).  
Secondly, Duchamp abducts the creative act of the artist by reducing it to the choosing, naming 
and signing (de Duve 1991) of an already made object.  By doing so, he subtracts the manual skill 
and the intra-relational composition of an artwork and thus transforms artistic production, 
where an object is ‘unmade’ and ‘remade’ by way of an appropriative and plagiaristic act of 
                                                        
18 This statement is false. 
19  Art relies on ‘non-art’ both, literally, with regard to the materials that are not made by an artist and, 
referentially, as mimetic of some ‘thing’ else. 
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renaming and/or signing an object.  By reducing the role of the artist to that of an ‘anartist’,20 
Duchamp displaces painting’s traditional role of portraying images on a neutral ground (e.g. 
canvas) and replaces it with painting words (of a ‘short sentence’ or signature) onto a particular 
object.  By doing so, he inverts the relationship between the ‘non-art’ and ‘art’ components 
of a work.  The act of an anartist ‘strips bare’ the traditional painted surface from its support 
and, thereby, reduces the act of painting to the inscription of words so that the non-art object 
is brought forward and takes place as the visual element of the work itself. 
 
As an act of avoiding and effacing the traditional ‘work’ or techne of the artist, the gesture of 
the Readymade also sets aside the technical ‘work’ of a ‘juror’, of the typical means by which 
she may evaluate the artistic merit of a work.  According to Agamben (1999):  
 
In front of the ‘ready-made’, for instance, in which the otherness of the formal-
creative principle has been replaced by the alienation of the non-artistic object 
that is inserted by force into the sphere of art, critical judgment is, so to speak, 
immediately confronted with itself, or to be more precise, with its image in 
reverse: what it is supposed to trace back to non-art is already non-art on its own, 
and the critics operation is limited to an ID check.  (Agamben 1999, p. 50) 
 
By literally corresponding to, and being a substitute for, the ‘formal-creative’ product of an 
artist’s act, Fountain is emptied out of its traditional art value, so that judgement of it is limited 
to a binary decision and may thereby expose the presuppositions, habits and ‘taste’ that 
underlie the conclusions of any ‘juror’.   
 
Rather than being exhibited, Fountain remains behind a partition for the duration of the 
exhibition and is later sold (to Walter Arensberg) and subsequently lost.  As a physical object, 
it remains absent from the (traditional) context of art and only becomes present in its 
documentation: as a photograph (by Alfred Steiglitz) published on the cover of the journal 
The Blind Man, no. 2 (May 1917); in an unsigned editorial entitled, ‘The Richard Mutt Case’, 
and in Louise Norton’s, ‘Buddha of the Bathroom’ (Judovitz 1995).  Fountain thereby only 
physically takes place in the act(s) of its appearance (submission) and disappearance (rejection).  
Its status, as perhaps the ‘first’ and ‘only’ non-art object, is established solely in art’s discourse, 
as a series of representations (documentation, photographs, personal accounts, critical analyses, 
etc.) and reproductions (e.g. the eight hand-made replicas produced by Gallaria Schwarz and 
authorized by Duchamp in the 1960s) but never as a physical referent.  
 
                                                        
20 An anartist is Duchamp’s term (emphasis added).  By subtracting the ‘space’ between the word ‘an’, as an 
indefinite article or determiner that refers to ‘one, some, any (the oneness, or indefiniteness, being implied rather 
than asserted)’ (The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1993, p. 1), and ‘artist’, he further limits (and 
divides) the traditional understanding of what this term may refer (its oneness as a category) into its other 
possibilities.  If we unpack, an-, and its potential use as a prefix, we find that it can suggest, as a non-productive 
prefix, the notion of ‘in’ (‘from Old French en from Latin in, into’) as in anoint, and, ‘add’ ‘representing Latin an- 
assimilated form of AD- before noun, directly or indirectly through French (Old French a-  refashioned after 
Latin in French itself or after adoption in English), as annex, announce, annul.  However, an-, ‘(representing Greek 
privative an- without, lacking, not, the original form of A- retained before vowels, as anecdote, anonymous)’ can 
also function as ‘a productive prefix of negation and privation in modern technical terms, as analgesia’, anaesthesia, 
etc.  (The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1993, p. 71). 
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Fountain demonstrates that the ‘location’ of an art object’s (traditional or otherwise) status as 
a referent is to be found perhaps in its discursivity—as an effect of language—rather than in 
its materiality.  As a physical object, it remains superfluous in its absence and only takes place 
in the ‘non-place’ of its disappearance, as an un-authored and un-original object, and 
reappearance, as documentation and discourse.  In this way, Fountain shows that the ‘place’ of 
art operates both physically (in terms of if and when an object is exhibited) and, perhaps more 
importantly, consensually, in terms of whether an art object conforms to the accepted models 
and patterns of practice associated with the traditional ‘paradigm’ of art.   
 
In the field of science, Kuhn refers to the term, paradigm, in two ways: firstly, in a broader 
sense, it refers to a ‘disciplinary matrix’ (Kindi 2013, p. 93) or the ‘set of techniques, models 
and values to which the group members more or less consciously agree’ (Agamben 2009, p. 
11); and secondly, in a narrower sense, it refers to ‘concrete individual cases which are 
irreplaceable and indispensable in the process of instruction and initiation and in building and 
carrying out the relevant practice’ (Kindi 2013, p. 94).  A ‘disciplinary matrix’ and overall 
theory, that defines a tradition or ‘place’ of practice, is thereby ‘built’ through individual 
examples.  That is, when the ‘singular specific logic’ of an example is shown to be 
incompatible with the universal logic of a paradigm (Agamben 2009, p. 11), it does not result 
in a wholesale replacement of a ‘disciplinary matrix’ but rather adds to it, in a similar way to 
how individual cases serve as precedents in the practice and development of common law 
(Kindi 2013). 
 
For Agamben (2009, p. 31), a paradigm is an original or special case because it simultaneously 
suspends and exposes its belonging to a group.  As an example, a paradigm is not a generality 
nor a particularity but a singularity.  It defines its own class or set (of objects) because it is 
‘never possible to separate its exemplarity from its singularity’ (ibid, p. 31).  By way of the 
gesture of the Readymade, Fountain ‘claims’ to belong to the place of art but, at the same time, 
retains its association with industrially made (non-art) objects.  Therefore, it cannot be 
reduced to either class: it is simultaneously both and neither and, thereby, takes place as its 
own class. Fountain supplements the paradigm of art by demonstrating its belonging to it, as an 
analogy of ‘art’ in the language of ‘non-art’.21  It should be noted that this relationship is also 
reversible, where an already made art object (of aesthetic utility) can become a readymade object 
(of practical utility).22   
 
According to Kuhn, ‘a paradigm is what you use when a theory (with the explicit axioms and 
rules) isn’t there’ (Kindi 2013, p. 94).  Fountain, as emblematic of the gesture of the Readymade, 
perhaps operates as what C.S. Peirce refers to as an abductive inference or ‘hunch’ (an 
explanatory hypothesis) that ‘infers from facts of one kind to facts of another’ (Psillos 2009, 
                                                        
21 That is, the inscription of words in addition to the use of already made object and materials (paint, brush, etc.). 
22 As Duchamp notes himself: ‘Reciprocal Readymade = Use a Rembrandt as an ironing board—’ (Duchamp in 
Sanouillet and Peterson, p. 32)    
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p. 126).  In the case of the Readymade, this refers to the link Duchamp makes between the 
use of ‘non-art’ materials (like industrially made tubes of paint) and the potential use of other 
already made objects in the production of art.  As a speculative hypothesis, the Readymade 
thereby serves as a ‘placeholder’ that attempts to expose and make visible a ‘non-place’ in the 
place of art that may be concealed by a ‘disciplinary matrix’ that always already presupposes 
and privileges a general type of art making that produces a particular kind of art object.  
According to Bosteels (2003, p. 126), a ‘non-place’ refers to a ‘point of articulation between a 
system’s closure and its openness to alterity.  It is the point of immanent excess within the 
structure which is at the same time the site where an event, perhaps, can take place’.  Through 
the inclusion of its exclusion in the place of art, Fountain perhaps acts as an explanatory 
hypothesis in two ways.  Firstly, as an exemplar that, albeit obliquely, follows the ‘rules’ that 
have perhaps always already defined artworks; and secondly, as an exemplum of an approach 
to art that is to come, ‘which allows statement and discursive practices to be gathered into a 
new intelligible ensemble and in a new problematic context’ (Agamben 2009, p. 18).   
 
While Formis (2004) argues that the event of Fountain is a ‘delayed sabotage’ of the place of 
art and may be emblematic of a shift in ‘an artistic configuration initiated by an evental rupture’ 
(which in general renders a prior configuration obsolete)’ (Badiou 2005, p. 12), I consider that 
the ‘event’ of the Readymade does not render prior practices obsolete but rather adds another 
‘dimension’ to the ‘disciplinary matrix’ that is the place and practice of art itself. While the 
‘event’ of Fountain did not immediately cause a seismic shift in the place of art, the gesture of 
the Readymade provides a hypothetical basis for the movement away from an orthodoxy of 
art that always already appears to privilege inter alia the ‘genius’ of the artist, as an autonomous 
and free subject working on a passive material to produce an ‘original’ object.  By questioning 
such assumptions, Fountain exposes the autonomy of the artist and art object as myths (in 
Barthes’ sense) produced solely through an object’s placement in the place of art itself (Barthes 
1972).  
 
 
1.3 Further considerations 
 
The discussion above appears to be supported by Duchamp’s notes (from 1912 onwards) that 
detail the development of The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even (‘Large Glass’).  In The 
1914 Box (1914), Duchamp draws an analogy between ‘art’ and ‘shit’: ‘Arrhe is to art as shitte 
is to shit’ (Sanouillet and Peterson, pp. 22 - 25).  In English, the play of language between the 
terms ‘arrhe’ and ‘art’ is lost in translation.  In the original French, however, it becomes, ‘Arrhe 
est à art ce que merdre est à merde’ (Duchamp in de Duve 1996, p. 101), which allows us to hear 
that the non-word, ‘arrhe’, is phonetically equivalent to the word, ‘art’ (as is merdre to merde, 
assuming the ‘r’ is silent).  If this statement is simply recited without reference to the written 
text, it simply sounds like: ‘Art est à art ce que merde est à merde’ (Art is to art as shit is to shit).  
As both terms are phonetically identical to themselves, the analogy is non-productive (A is to 
A as B is to B).  However, when read and read out aloud, the aural equivalence appears to 
provide a basis upon which the visual difference of the words (e.g. ‘arrhe’ and ‘art’; ‘merdre’ 
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and ‘merde’) can be expressed as a ratio and, then, compared across the four terms.  Duchamp 
expresses this as an algebraic equation: 
 
 
 
Here, ‘arrhe’ is brought into relationship with ‘art’ because it is a phonetic variation of the 
standard spelling.  If ‘r’ is silently added to ‘merde’, then, ‘merdre’ too is a phonetic variation 
of ‘agreed’ spelling.  The analogy thereby becomes productive and can be expressed by the 
formula, ‘a/b = a'/b'’.  While de Duve (1996, pp. 99-143) uses this equation to analyse and 
contrast the acceptance of some ‘art’ by the Society while rejecting Fountain as ‘non-art’, we 
can perhaps use it to show the relationship between non-art (as a non-standard variation) and 
art (as standard form) in regard to the art object itself and also in terms of the relationship it 
has to the place of art.  
 
If we consider the ratio arrhe/art represents the relationship of non-art to art in an artwork, 
‘arrhe’ (or ‘non-art’) is inversely proportional to ‘art’.  Accordingly, decreasing the quantity 
of ‘art’ (as its standard form) would thereby increase the quantity of ‘non-art’ in the work and 
vice versa.  By imposing a limit on painting to the inscription of the signature (R Mutt 1917) 
on the surface of Fountain and to the object’s placement on its back upon a plinth, the gesture 
of the Readymade decreases the art elements (the painting applied to the surface of the 
support) and thereby increases the presence and influence of the ‘non-art’ aspects.  Moreover, 
as the algebraic comparison above suggests that ‘art’ equals ‘shit’ and ‘non-art’ (‘arrhe’) equals 
‘non-shit’ (‘merdre’), increasing the non-art aspects, by corollary, decreases the amount of 
‘shit’ that the work contains.23   
 
In terms of the relationship of the object itself to the place of art, ‘arrhe’ appears to represent 
a paradigm (as an example) or singularity, as it echoes the spoken form of ‘art’ but, due to its 
non-standard spelling or appearance, remains categorically ‘non-art’.  ‘Art’, on the other hand, 
appears to represent the broader notion of the term, paradigm, as being representative of a 
particular standard form produced by a consensus regarding the general rules that govern the 
place of written language.  Such a comparison, appears to show the arbitrary nature of 
‘standard’ forms.      
 
In a note entitled ‘Algebraic Comparison’ from The Green Box (1934), Duchamp identifies and 
defines another ratio and the importance of the ‘sign of the accordance’ between the relative 
terms: 
 
 
                                                        
23 Such a relationship appears to align with Duchamp’s rejection of the ‘expressive mimeticism’ or painting as a 
purely ‘retinal’ art form.  It challenges the traditional and future notion of the prioritization of medium-specific 
art, as seen in formalism, e.g. Greenberg’s views of ‘modern painting’.    
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Duchamp identifies that the function of the ratio does not relate to the product, ‘c’, but rather 
to isolating ‘the Sign of accordance between the extra rapid exposition (capable of all the 
eccentricities) on the one hand and the choice of the possibilities authorized by these laws on the 
other’ (Sanouillet and Peterson, p. 28; original emphasis).  He appears to place priority on this 
‘sign of accordance’ because it exposes the relation between, and incommensurability of, the 
‘eccentricities’ of a placeholder and the limited range of possibilities that the ‘rules’ of place 
traditionally appear to allow.  In terms of ‘arrhe’ and ‘art’, this Sign of accordance is perhaps 
found in the irreducible ‘gap’ between the aural resemblance and visual difference between 
terms.  In regard to the Readymade, it is perhaps located between the simultaneous duality 
that Fountain exposes between ‘art’ and ‘non-art’.  
 
 
1.4 Summary 
 
From the above discussion, we can see that the ‘external’ gesture of the Readymade involves 
the use of apagogic reasoning.  That is, by assuming the truth of given propositions, Duchamp 
with the submission of Fountain challenges the authenticity of the Society’s claim to offer a 
critically unmediated platform for independent artists to exhibit their work.  Fountain is 
rejected because it, by the standards of the day, is not produced by the artist and thereby is not 
an original work of art. 
The gesture of the Readymade elides the ‘essential conditions’ of art by limiting an artist’s 
role to that of ‘anartist’ and the choosing, naming and signing of an already made object.  It serves 
to empty-out the creative act of the artist by subtracting the traditional artistic skill (or techne) 
and labour traditionally expected of artistic production.  By avoiding the technical aspects of 
artistic production, Duchamp appears to limit the praxis of the artist to an action that operates 
externally on, rather than internally to, the composition of a physical object.  This effectively 
serves to efface the retinal qualities of painting and reduce the visual form of a Readymade to 
that of an already made object in order to place priority on the play of language and the 
differences between its status as both a ‘non-art’ and ‘art’ object. 
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The ‘external’ nature of this gesture, however, also relates to how Duchamp abducts and 
introduces a ‘foreign’ non-art object (one that is not previously associated with art) into the 
place of art.  It shows how Fountain acts as a speculative hypothesis (or hunch) that perhaps 
seeks to expose the ‘Sign of accordance’ that exists as the terms upon which the differences 
between the ‘eccentricities’ and ‘possibilities’ of the place of art can be made apparent.   
In the following chapter, I examine Duchamp’s use of visual and verbal language as a means 
of showing the ‘internal’ or intra-relational aspects of the gesture of the Readymade.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
In this chapter, I examine the ‘internal’ gesture of the Readymade in my attempt to 
understand the role language as a contingent material plays in the reproduction of ‘nothing’.  
Firstly, I draw on a literary example, Gilles Deleuze’s analysis of Herman Melville’s Bartleby, 
The Scrivener, to show how the introduction of limit-function serves as an internal ‘foreign’ 
element that displaces the presuppositions and conventions that usually govern the place of 
language.  Secondly, I analyse Duchamp’s early work, The, to identify how he deploys visual 
and verbal language.  Then, I draw upon the work of Molly Nesbit and Naomi Sawlson-
Gorse’s Concept of Nothing: New Notes by Marcel Duchamp and Walter Arensberg to identify and 
suggest that the presence and absence of the abstract and transformational logic of 1 2 → 1 
may operate as an internal limit-function that is expressed, extended, and performed as the 
gesture of the Readymade. 
 
 
2.1 The limit figure: the example of Bartleby, the Scrivener 
 
Like Xanthus, the narrator of Herman Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener thinks himself fair-
minded and reasonable.  He is a Wall Street lawyer who portrays himself as unambitious and 
mild mannered, as having ‘a snug business among rich men’s bonds and mortgages and title-
deeds,’ who ‘seldom loses [his] temper’ nor indulges in ‘dangerous indignation at wrongs and 
outrages’ (Melville 1998, pp. 4-5). This is of course until he employs his new copyist, Bartleby.  
Unlike the ‘portentous monstrosity’ and ‘supremely astute and cunning’ Aesop, Bartleby is 
depicted by the lawyer as the embodiment of passivity: ‘a motionless young man […]—
pallidly neat, pitiably respectable, incurably forlorn’ and ‘sedate’ (ibid., p. 19). Though 
initially impressed by Bartleby’s capacity to copy documents day and night, the lawyer 
despairs over his lack of cheer and how he works: ‘silently, palely, mechanically’ (ibid., p. 20).    
 
Bartleby initially appears to be little more than a human Xerox machine, with a sole function: 
to copy.  However, when the lawyer asks him to check a copy with its original for accuracy, 
Bartleby replies: ‘I would prefer not to’ (ibid., p. 22).  Shocked, the lawyer asks again, only to 
receive the same response.  He then crosses the room and confronts Bartleby: ‘I want you to 
help me compare this sheet here—take it’ (ibid., p. 23).  Bartley remains unmoved and simply 
repeats: ‘I would prefer not to.’  Due to Bartleby showing no signs of ‘impertinence’ or having 
‘any thing ordinarily human about him,’ the lawyer concedes and gets another scrivener to 
perform the task (ibid., p. 23). Over the coming days and weeks, he makes several attempts to 
get Bartleby to do more than just copy: to check documents and run errands.  In turn, Bartleby 
decides to give up copying altogether and, then, appears to prefer not to do anything at all.  
The story continues with the lawyer becoming increasingly frustrated, dismayed, and 
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confounded by Bartleby: by his copyist who refuses to copy! When he discovers that Bartleby 
lives at the office, has no possessions (no pillow, no plate, no bed, etc.), and eats only ginger 
nut biscuits, the lawyer becomes obsessed with moving him on to other employment or 
lodgings.  He tries to get Bartleby to quit, only to be met with, ‘I would prefer not to quit 
you’; he, then, offers Bartleby a golden handshake but, again, to no avail (ibid, p. 65; original 
emphasis).  In desperation to be rid of Bartleby, the lawyer moves office himself, only to have 
the new tenant of his old rooms seek him out so that he will do something about the man who 
continues to haunt the building.  The lawyer returns, only to have Bartleby repeat his 
unwillingness to move or change and subsequently rejects every option put to him: ‘I would 
prefer not to take a clerkship’ (ibid., p. 80).  When asked whether he would travel to Europe, 
‘Not at all […]  I like to be stationary.  But I am not particular’ (ibid. p. 81).  Then, in a last-
ditch attempt to get Bartleby to willingly quit the premises, the lawyer offers to take him in, 
‘No: at present I would prefer not to make any changes at all’ (ibid., p. 82).  The lawyer leaves 
and discovers later that Bartleby has been taken to the ‘Tombs’ (the New York Halls of Justice 
and House of Detention), where he continues to ‘prefer not to’ until, one day, he lies down 
and dies.   
 
According to Deleuze (1997a, p. 68), Melville’s Bartleby is a ‘violently comical text’ that 
‘means only what it says, literally.’  Moreover, he considers Bartleby’s repetition of, and 
reliance on, the phrase, ‘I would prefer not to,’ to operate as a ‘formula’ and ‘limit-function’ 
with its advance (I would prefer) and ‘abrupt termination’ with ‘NOT TO’ [leaving] what it 
rejects undetermined’ (Deleuze 1997a, p. 68).  Furthermore, it is the strangeness of this phrase 
and the way that Bartleby’s passively, yet with absolute conviction, utters it (as though it is a 
fundamental constraint upon his being) that both defeats and intrigues his employer.  
 
Considered generally, this formula appears to disavow the ‘action’ of the verb, ‘prefer’, which 
relates to the notion of ranking, of ‘liking better’ or placing some person or thing ‘in front or 
before’ an other.  It can also mean to promote: to ‘present for acceptance, proffer; introduce 
or recommend;’ to ‘advance in status, rank;’ to ‘further one’s interests or career;’ to ‘advance 
to a position in life, especially settle in marriage;’ or to ‘help forward or promote (a result)’ (The 
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1993, p. 2330).  It would appear, then, that 
Bartleby’s formula may mean that he would prefer not to: rank, move, proffer or advance 
anyone or thing in particular—especially himself—over anything else.  
 
Initially, or prior to the formula’s first utterance, Bartleby appears happy to copy, as though 
copying equates to, or is consistent with, the condition of preferring ‘not to’.  The inference, 
here, is that copying is perhaps consistent with ‘inaction’, with not making ‘any changes at all’ 
and, thereby, performs and produces nothing in ‘particular’.  However, when confronted by 
the prospect of having to examine, check and possibly amend one of his copies, Bartleby is 
confronted with the reality that copying is not consistent with preferring not to, as it signifies 
a preference (to copy one thing over another), it promotes the interests of others (by 
facilitating rich men’s dealings) and gives rise to the possibility of change, etc.  By being 
suspended between affirmation and negation, Deleuze (1997a, p.71) considers Bartleby’s 
READY[UN]MADE: ABSENCE & PRESENCE IN THE INTRA-RELATIONAL OBJECT 
 
41 
formula to be ‘devastating because it eliminates the preferable [to copy] just as mercilessly as 
the nonpreferred [to check and amend]’.  This leads to an ‘ever expanding zone of 
indiscernibility or indetermination’ and to the condition of ‘I would prefer nothing rather 
than something: not a will to nothingness, but the growth of the nothingness of the will’ 
(ibid.). 
 
While Bartleby ‘moves’ towards the passivity of inert matter, we see in the lawyer and others, 
the opposite response: a growing sense of the agitation, frustration, and ‘madness’ (Deleuze 
1997a, p. 70).  If there is ‘movement’ in Bartleby’s condition, it is towards the limit and 
actualization of the formula itself, where he articulates, performs and exhausts it.  As a limit 
function, the formula is a (moral) instruction, an algorithm, that prescribes and pervades all of 
Bartleby’s utterances, silences, gestures, and inactivity that finally culminates in his death.    
 
Deleuze (1997a, p. 73-74) notes that the formula functions by disconnecting not only ‘words 
and things, words and action, but also speech acts and words’.  As language, its words are cut-
off and no longer correspond: they do not refer to some ‘thing’ in particular but, rather, to 
perhaps everything and nothing.  As isolated words, they become literal and have their own 
materiality, inertia and existence in and of themselves.  Moreover, they provide a foundation 
upon which Bartleby’s ‘logic of preference’ undermines and displaces the lawyer’s ‘logic of 
presuppositions’, where—given his position—the lawyer presupposes that his commands will 
be obeyed, his advice listened to, and his generosity and kindness accepted and gratefully 
received (Deleuze 1997a, p. 73; original emphasis).    
 
If Bartleby is a manifestation of the logic of the formula, then, the lawyer represents the logic 
that underlies the already made ‘place’ of language.  In this regard, Melville’s story documents 
the formula’s appearance and disappearance as an event of language, in language, itself.  As a 
limit-function, the formula embodies the contingent materiality of language.  It initiates a 
process that thereby works to undo any attempt to master it.   ‘I would prefer not to’ is a 
placeholder that exposes what perhaps always already remains ‘unsaid’ in and by the place of 
language, where its presuppositions and conventions are premised on an employer/employee 
(or master/slave) dialectic, on membership and non-membership of a category or class. 
 
Aesop and Bartleby cling to and embody their respective formulae in different ways.  Firstly, 
Aesop’s externally adopts and places a strict limit on the ‘logic’ of his master’s (lack of) 
command of language to produce ‘nothing’.  Secondly, Bartleby makes present a ‘foreign’ 
logic (of preference) that is latent within language itself to, thereby, perform ‘nothing’.  For 
Aesop and Bartleby, the imposition and manifestation of an external and internal limit on the 
‘place’ of language guarantees their freedom and survival respectively: Aesop from the 
bondage and tyranny of slavery and, Bartleby, from reference and the particularity of 
language.  The effect of their literal deployment and performance of language is to 
apagogically demonstrate the internal resistance language has—as a contingent material—to 
any form of mastery one may presume to have over it.    
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In the following sections, I examine Duchamp’s use of visual and verbal language in his work, 
The, in terms of the notion of imposing an external visual limit on language, and then, I 
develop a speculative analysis of Duchamp’s and Arensberg’s use of cryptography and 
language games to examine the absence and presence of an internal abstract logic that may 
inform the ‘short sentences’ that Duchamp inscribes on several of his Readymades. 
 
 
2.2 The play of visual and verbal languages as the gesture of the Readymade 
 
When he arrives in New York in 1915, Duchamp cannot speak English and, in learning the 
language, becomes interested in translation and the ‘space’ between languages.  Befriending 
the poet and amateur cryptographer, Walter Arensberg, he embarks on a collaboration and 
conversation of sorts, that explores inter alia an engagement with Mallarmé’s poem, Un Coup 
de Dés Jamais N’Abolira le Hasard24(‘Un Coup de Dés’).  According to Meillassoux (2012, p. 22), 
this poem represents Mallarmé’s attempt to reconcile two poetical forms: the emergence of 
free (or ‘unstructured’) verse with the discipline of the classical French alexandrine25 (which 
is to be ‘reserved for the ‘solemnity’ of ‘grand occasions’’).  This poem, with its revolutionary 
use of typography, displaces the metrical or syllabic structure of the alexandrine26 and replaces 
it with a visual one, where words perform and ‘resound’ the imagery that they may describe.  
In Un Coup de Dés, words do not just speak: they sign and become visual material that is 
scattered both within and across the whiteness of the pages they mark.   
 
Mallarmé’s visualization of the verbal, where saying becomes seen/scene, effectively ‘adds’ 
another ‘dimension’ to the representational repertoire of poetry.  In an attempt perhaps to 
consider the implications of Un Coup de Dés on his broader attempts to represent the fourth 
dimension in painting, Duchamp undertakes a ‘study’ or exercise entitled, Quand Bien Méme 
(Fig. 1).  In it, he extracts (or subtracts) the fully capitalized mid-sized phrases of the poem: 
‘Quand bien même lance des circonstances…un constellation’27 and then adds from the last 
line:  ‘Toute Pensée Coup Dés’. 28   Inscribed upon or over the transcribed text are an 
assortment of marks, dots, lines, rectilinear shapes, scribbles, that appear to trace-out a 
thought process or document the jottings and gesticulations of a conversation.  These 
‘amendments’ tend to both obscure and, in some places, augment or illustrate the implications 
                                                        
24 A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance. 
25 ‘Alexandrine, verse form that is the leading measure in French poetry. It consists of a line of 12 syllables with 
major stresses on the 6th syllable (which precedes the medial caesura [pause]) and on the last syllable, and one 
secondary accent in each half line. Because six syllables is a normal breath group and the secondary stresses can 
be on any other syllables in the line, the alexandrine is a flexible form, adaptable to a wide range of subjects. Its 
structural metrical principle is stress according to sense; the form thus lends itself to the expression of simple or 
complex emotions, narrative description, or grandiose patriotic sentiment (it is known as the heroic line in 
French poetry).’ (The editors, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online.  https://www.britannica.com/art/alexandrine) 
26 Each line has twelve syllables per line which is ‘broken’ in half by a rhythmical pause or caesura. 
27  ‘EVEN WHEN LAUNCHED IN ETERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES FROM THE DEPTHS OF A 
SHIPWRECK THOUGH IT BE THE MASTER AS IF AS IF IT WAS THE NUMBER IT WOULD BE 
NOTHING WILL HAVE TAKEN PLACE BUT THE PLACE EXCEPT PERHAPS A CONSTELLATION’ 
(Mallarmé 1996, pp. 126-145). 
28 ‘ALL THOUGHT THROW DICE’ (Mallarmé 1996, pp. 144-45)  
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of the words.  Two languages—one visual, one verbal—collide in what appears to be an 
attempt to ‘use them as the raw material for a third idea of language, a language that was not 
one yet, but caught between the two’ (Nesbit and Sawelson-Gorse 1996, p. 136). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Marcel Duchamp, Quand Bien Même, 1915. Arensberg Achives, Francis Bacon Library.  (Buskirk & 
Nixon 1996, p. 137) 
 
Perhaps, as part of an attempt to reconcile or find a ‘sign of accordance’ between verbal and 
visual languages, Duchamp in a note from The Green Box identifies the importance of ‘[t]he 
search for ‘prime words’ (‘divisible’ only by themselves and by unity)’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 
1973, p. 31).  Key to this search is identifying what he refers to as ‘abstract’ words ‘which have 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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no concrete reference’29 (ibid., p. 31).  Joselit (1998, p. 73) considers that the Duchampian 
‘prime word’ that is ‘stripped of its function and means of signification’ is reduced to ‘a pure 
materiality’ in an attempt to develop a ‘bilateral relay of identification between the arbitrary 
signifiers of language and their differential counterparts in painting’. 
 
 
The 
 
If you come into ✹ linen, your time is thirsty because ✹ ink saw some wood 
intelligent enough to get giddiness from a sister.  However, even it should be 
smilable to shut ✹ hair whose ✹ water writes always in ✹ plural, they have avoided 
✹ frequency, meaning mother in law; ✹ powder will take a chance; and ✹ road 
could try.  But after somebody brought any multiplication as soon as ✹ stamp was 
out, a great many cords refused to go through.  Around ✹ wire’s people, who will 
be able to sweeten ✹ rug, that is to say, why must every patents look for a wife?  
Pushing four dangers near ✹ listening-place, ✹ vacation had no dug absolutely 
nor this likeness has eaten. 
 
Replace each ✹ with the word: the.   
(Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 175) 
 
 
An example of Duchamp’s attempt to marry the visual and verbal is the short work above. 
Published in 1916,30 The is a grammatically correct but semantically obscure text.  Duchamp’s 
desire to isolate and abstract language from reference to an ‘outside’ world appears 
fundamental to his approach to writing The.  In an interview with Arturo Schwarz, he 
outlines the difficulty and importance of disavowing the text from the development of 
semantic meaning: 
 
[…] The construction was very painful in a way, because the minute I did think 
of a verb to add to the subject, I would very often see a meaning and immediately 
I saw a meaning I would cross out the verb and change it, until, working it out 
for quite a number of hours, the text finally read without any echo of the physical 
world . . . .That was the main point in it.  (Duchamp quoted in Joselit 1998, p. 
74; original emphasis) 
 
Joselit (1998, p. 77) considers the obscurity of The to result from Duchamp ‘simulating 
aphasia’ 31  by placing priority on the ‘materiality of language’ so that signification and 
significance of words are limited to the ‘sensuous medium of sound.’  Nesbit and Sawelson-
                                                        
29 Duchamp may have in mind syncategorematic term which, as a word, has ‘no meaning by itself, but only in 
conjunction with one or more other words or concepts (The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1993, p. 
3187).  These words are ‘internal’ to language and serve as prepositions or logical terms, for example: if, and, 
then, etc. 
30 Rogue (New York), II, No. 1, page 2. 
31  Aphasia is an expressed inability to understand and produce speech. 
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Gorse (1996, p. 137) note that a ‘phonetic’ pattern begins but breaks down and ends abruptly 
halfway through the text.  Words such as ‘time…thirsty’, ‘saw some’, ‘get giddiness’, 
‘smilable…shut’, ‘hair whose’, ‘water writes’, ‘have avoided’, and ‘meaning mother’, appear 
to suggest the development of a rhythmic and repetitive coupling (of sounds) that perhaps 
perform or ‘echo’ some ‘sense’ of meaning.  However, this ‘sense’ does not last, as it is 
disrupted and destabilized by the visual impact of the asterisks interposed throughout the text.  
To understand the interaction of these visual and verbal languages, it is best to turn to a more 
definitive version of The: Duchamp’s handwritten and amended ‘draft’ of 1915 (Fig. 2).   
 
Like the published version and Mallarmé’s Un Coup de Dés,32 the draft begins with ‘the’ and 
ends with ‘the’.  Initially, the word, ‘the’, appears to be excluded from the remainder of the 
text and replaced by a ‘constellation’ of thirteen * signs that cascade down the page.  Such a 
gesture is reminiscent of Mallarme’s poem, where the words appear to mime inter alia the 
actions of a dice throw.  Meillassoux (2012, p. 212) describes the concluding words of Un Coup 
de Dés, ‘Toute Pensée èmet un Coup de Dés’,33 as the ‘moral’, ‘scale model’, or key for its 
decipherment.  Coincidently, inscribed in pencil at the end of The, is the instruction: 
‘remplacer chaque ✶ par le mot: the,’34 that, in a similar way, seems to provide a means to ‘aid’ 
the decipherment of the work.  However, as a simple instruction, this ‘short sentence’ does 
not improve the semantic clarity of the text.  Rather, it appears to serve another purpose: to 
emphasize the relationship between the title of the work, The, its ‘exclusion’ and apparent 
replacement with a visual equivalent, and the play of meaning(s) that are potentially produced 
through the juxtaposition of these visual and verbal languages.   
 
The appears to be a work of translation, to be translated.  The draft contains three languages: 
firstly, English that is grammatically correct yet semantically obscure; secondly, the visual * 
signs interposed throughout the English sentences; and finally, the French instruction to 
equate and ‘replace every ✶ with the word: the.’  As the cipher or formula (✶ = the) is written 
in French, the introduction of the visual signs appears to identify and compensate for an 
irreducible difference between French and English.  In French, ‘the’ is translated into various 
forms both gendered (le, la and l’, for words beginning with a vowel or silent h) and plural 
(les).  In English, however, ‘the’ is singular, universal, and the most frequently used word. As 
the definite article, it operates to ‘designate one or more persons or things already mentioned 
or known, particularized by context or circumstances, inherently unique, familiar or 
otherwise sufficiently known’ (The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1993, p. 3269). 
‘The’ designates: it ‘nominates’, ‘destine[s]’ or ‘devote[s]’ someone or thing ‘to a fate or 
purpose.’ It names, identifies, describes, characterizes (The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
1993, p. 645) and fixes and fixates upon a specific identity: ‘the’ inscribes and, thereby, 
distinguishes the particular from the general. 
                                                        
32 Un Coup de Dés, begins and ends in the same place, with the (short) title:  ‘UN COUP DE DÉS JAMAIS  […] 
Toute Pensée èmet un Coup de Dés’ (Mallarmé 1996, pp. 126-145). 
33 ‘All Thought emits a Throw of the Dice.’ (Mallarmé 1996, pp. 144-145) 
34 ‘replace each ✶ with the word: the’ 
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Figure 2: Marcel Duchamp, The, 1915.  Louise and Walter Arensberg Collection, The 
Philadelphia Museum of Art. (Buskirk & Nixon 1996, p. 137) 
 
Duchamp’s effort to displace and seal-off words from reference to the ‘physical world’ is 
replaced by the imposition of * signs.  Rather than compounding the meaninglessness of the 
English text, they provide a point of difference by way of a visual ‘pun’.  Such a move makes 
a ‘spectator’ of a reader who perhaps starts to ‘see stars’ or read some thing ‘written in ‘the’ 
stars’.  This conclusion, however, relies on the assumption that the * signs are in fact equal to 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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the word, ‘the’.  But, is this the case?  On closer inspection, the cipher does not equate ‘the’ to 
a five-pointed * but to a six-pointed one.  Is this a ‘mistake’?  Does this ‘short sentence’ (which, 
as written in pencil, materially equates to Duchamp’s other rectifications35) actually provide 
a means to translate the thirteen * signs?  Or, is there something more to this visual punning?  
Considered further, the visual symbolism of a (swollen bodied) five-pointed * may suggest 
the pentagram of Venus and the Rose of Venus, as an abstraction of the movement of a 
‘heavenly body’ and as an allusion to the Roman Goddess of Love, respectively.  Moreover, 
if Duchamp’s reference to the untranslatability of ‘the’ into French is translated into the 
double reference of a five pointed * and the six pointed ✶, then, this may suggest the French 
equivalents of ‘la’ and ‘le’, the feminine and masculine, respectively.36   
 
While the English words appear to literally observe the rules of standard syntax, grammar 
alone fails to guarantee or provide any semantic clarity.  It appears that The is lost for, and 
cannot find, the words required to ground and contextualize meaning.  If ‘sense’ develops, it 
takes place by way of the irreducible differences between the visual and the verbal languages 
contained in the work.  The imposition of the external visual reference of the star signs perhaps 
provides a ‘sign of accordance’ that mediates or enables the French and English variations of 
the definite article (‘the’, ‘le’, ‘la’) to be brought into relation with each other.  Moreover, the 
star signs also provide a visual pun (or cliché) that may suggest, among other things, the 
disorientation one may experience from a ‘blow to the head’, of being struck ‘dumb’ by 
something, together with the belief, perhaps, of the inevitability of such an ‘event’ having to 
take place.    
 
In the above example, Duchamp’s textual strategy appears to isolate and de-contextualise 
verbal language from referring to an ‘outside’ world and, by doing so, make it abstract and 
material.  The imposition of the visual element appears to have two functions.  Firstly, it 
provides a ‘sign of accordance’ or equivalence that serves as a visual basis for the play of 
meaning(s) within and across the English and French languages.  Secondly, it illustrates and 
establishes a new visual relation that re-contextualises and re-connects the work to other 
‘senses’ and ways of producing meaning(s) from the work.      
 
 
2.3 Duchamp and Arensberg: towards an abstract language of ‘nothing’ 
 
In Apropos of ‘Readymades’, Duchamp sets out in broad terms some important considerations 
in regard to the development of the ‘Readymade’.  Firstly, he suggests that the word, 
‘Readymade’, is adopted to describe the act or gesture of purchasing an already made object 
and inscribing a ‘short sentence’ upon it.   
                                                        
35 Examples of Duchamp’s rectification of the text in pencil include: amending ‘hair of which’ for ‘hair whose’; 
imposing ‘in *’ between the words ‘always plural’; adding ‘meaning’ before the phrase ‘mother in law’; and 
crossing out the phrase, ‘it means,’ and replacing it with: ‘that is to say’.   
36 One could take this further and suggest that the reference to 13 five-pointed stars—to the star that is not one, 
as designated by its paring with the definite article—perhaps suggests the moon and its 13 appearances 
throughout a year, etc.  
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In New York in 1915 I bought at a hardware store a snow shovel on which I 
wrote ‘In advance of the broken arm’.   
It was around this time that the word ‘Readymade’ came to mind to designate 
this form of manifestation.   
A point which I want very much to establish is that the choice of these 
‘Readymades’ was never dictated by esthetic delectation. 
This choice was based on a reaction of visual indifference with at the same time 
total absence of good and bad taste…in fact a complete anesthesia.  (Sanouillet and 
Peterson 1973, p. 141; emphasis added) 
 
Then, he stresses how the selection of an already made object has nothing to do with the dictates 
of the pleasure or delight one feels in response (or reaction) to the visual appearance of an object.  
By way of a formula, he appears to claim that this selection is ‘grounded’ upon on nullity: as 
a ‘reaction’37 of a disregard for the visual + ‘total absence’ of taste → ‘complete’ lack of feeling 
(for the visual).  As this suggests that Duchamp decides upon an object blindly, what, then, 
serves to dictate this ‘choice’?  He continues: 
 
One important characteristic was the short sentence which I occasionally 
inscribed on the ‘Readymade’. 
That sentence instead of describing the object like a title was meant to carry 
the mind of the spectator towards other regions more verbal.  (ibid, p. 141; emphasis 
added) 
 
According to Duchamp, the ‘short sentence’ appears to provide a means for a ‘spectator’ to go 
‘beyond’ her usual expectations of a certain type of visual aesthetic experience and move 
towards the experience of a reader, as a translator of visual and verbal languages.  If the ‘short 
sentence’ is so important to the reception of the work, then, what role does it perhaps play in 
dictating the selection of the object itself?  
 
In the following speculative analysis, I draw from Molly Nesbit’s and Naomi Sawlson-Gorse’s 
(1996) Concept of Nothing: New Notes by Marcel Duchamp and Walter Arensberg, and Nesbit’s Their 
Common Sense (2000) to examine how Duchamp (with Walter Arensberg) develop some of 
their ‘short sentences’ and how they may contain an internal formula or limit-function that 
structures the overall gesture of the Readymade.  In this regard, it is important to note that 
Duchamp’s overall strategy of setting aside the visual ‘language’ from its usual associations to 
shift a spectator/reader’s response towards more verbal considerations is ‘echoed’ by Mallarmé 
in his Crise de Vers: 
 
The verse which from several vocables remakes a total word, new, foreign to the 
language and as incantatory, achieves this isolation of the word: denying, with 
one sovereign stroke, the chance that stayed its term despite the artifice of being 
                                                        
37 The word, ‘reaction’, refers to: ‘1. Repulsion or resistance exerted in opposition or impact of another body; a 
force equal or opposite to the force giving rise to it; an influence exerted in return on the source of that influence. 
2. A chemical process in which two or more substances act mutually on each other and changed into different 
substances; a chemical change. […] 3. A movement towards the reversal of an existing tendency or state of affairs, 
esp. in politics; advocacy of or preference for a previous state of affairs […]’ (The New Shorter Oxford 
Dictionary 1993, p. 2490) 
READY[UN]MADE: ABSENCE & PRESENCE IN THE INTRA-RELATIONAL OBJECT 
 
49 
redipped alternatively in sense and in sonority, and gives you that surprise of 
never having heard such a fragment of ordinary elocution, at the same time that 
the remembrance of the object named bathes in a new atmosphere.’ (Mallarmé in 
Nesbit and Sawelson-Gorse 1996, p. 140) 
 
In an attempt perhaps to displace ‘personal verbal habits’ and avoid the painstaking work of 
excluding from a text of any ‘echo’ of the physical world, Duchamp, in collaboration with 
Arensberg, develops a cryptographic method to produce word ‘strings’ (or ‘short sentences’) 
from number ‘strings’.38  To achieve this, they use an alphanumeric system where letters are 
given numerical equivalents: a=1, b=2, c=3, etc. (Nesbit and Sawelson-Gorse 1996).  Their 
approach mimes (or is reminiscent of) formal systems in mathematical reasoning,39 where 
Arensberg (and/or Duchamp) identifies the following givens (or axioms): ‘only nouns count 
as words in a string; only numbers present in a string should be used [as nouns]; English and 
French are allowed but not in the same sentence’ (ibid., p. 146), and then, by way of some 
unknown operation, 40  apply these ‘givens’ to generate word phrases that perhaps become 
‘expressions’ or ‘theorems’ of these ‘axioms’.  Each number string (e.g. 1 2) directly 
corresponds to the first letters (a b) of the nouns used in a phrase to generate a series of word 
strings that appear to follow the logic of a progressive yet overlapping series of numerical 
pairs: (1 2), (2 3), (3 4), (4 5), (5 6), (6 7), … (ibid., pp. 146-47).  When Duchamp applies these 
‘givens’, however, they appear to provide more of an informal guide than a strict and 
rigorously observed set of constraints.   
 
The first numerical-string (1 2) in this series generates the word-string: ‘In advance of the 
broken arm.’  At first glance, this phrase appears to be produced by an unknown and arbitrary 
operation.  However, when one translates and compares the numbers (1 2) with the letters (a 
b) of the phrase, ‘In advance of the broken arm,’ we see the curious repetition of the letter ‘a’ 
suggesting an extension of the number string from (1 2) to (1 2 →1).  This suggests perhaps 
that this ‘short sentence’ alludes to a mathematic operation of squaring the number one (12 = 
1) (Nesbit 2000, p. 197), and literally plays on the words in the word-string.  If 1 = advance, 
2 = broken, and 1 = arm, then, the two-fold role the word, ‘broken’, plays appears pivotal: 
firstly, by referring literally to its role of ‘breaking’ a series of ones, in and by two;41 and 
secondly, by being included as an adjective42, it breaks the rule that ‘only nouns will count as 
words in a string’ (Nesbit and Sawelson-Gorse 1996, p. 146).   
                                                        
38 For a list of these sentences, see Nesbit 2000, p. 199 
39 A formal system of reasoning is one where axioms can be used to produce theorems that are logically consistent 
‘expressions’ of these axioms.  For an example and more developed explanation of a formal system in 
mathematics, see ‘The MU Puzzle’ in Douglas Hofstadler’s Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, 1979, 
pp. 33-41. 
40 The relationships between numbers in a string are applied in various ways: multiplication, addition, and 
counting (Nesbit and Sawelson-Gorse 1996).   
41 The extension of this string may be 1 2 1 3 1 (…) where the 1 raised to the power 2 is 1, 1 raised to the power 
3 is 1, etc., where one multiplied by itself, any number of times, remains one.  In this sense, this operation 
produces ‘nothing’ but space itself: firstly, as an area, then, a volume, …      
42 Coincidentally, the word, ‘arm’, when translated into the French begins with the letter, ‘b’: (les) bras [arm, 
branch, ...] or (la) branche [branch, leg, arm, ...] 
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This abstract logic (1 2 →1) appears to also play a pivotal role in Duchamp’s Three Standard 
Stoppages of 1913-14.  In a note (from The 1914 Box) entitled, ‘The Idea of the Fabrication’ [or 
production], he details that: 
 
‘If a straight horizontal thread one meter long falls from a height of one meter 
straight onto a horizontal plane distorting itself as it pleases and creates a new shape 
of the measure of length’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 22; original emphasis).     
 
In the production of the Three Standard Stoppages described above, Duchamp literally performs 
the mathematical operation 12 → 1, where a ‘straight’ one-metre length of string is ‘multiplied’ 
by itself and ‘broken’ by the distance of its fall.  Though altered, it essentially remains the 
same.  However, the string’s ‘new shape’ literally expresses or contains the added dimension 
of space through which it has travelled.  Rather than gravity and ‘coincidence’43 playing the 
transformative role, the number-string (1 2), in a sense, is dropped through and transposed 
into language.  The word-string (‘In advance of the broken arm’) not only contains the 
original number-string, in the form of the words ‘advance’ and ‘broken’, but also includes the 
added dimension of its ‘fall’, by way of the word, ‘arm’.  It follows, then, that the abstract 
logic of the mathematical operation—of ‘doubling’ by passing it through an equivalent verbal 
‘distance’ or ‘space’—is embedded and performed by the ‘short sentence’ itself.   
 
Nesbit and Sawelson-Gorse (1996) identify that the number string (2 3) appears to use addition 
(2+3=5) to arrive at the first letter, ‘e’ (and thereby the second letter, ‘f’).  The word-string 
produced is: ‘Emergency in favor of twice.’  ‘Twice’ is the clue (ibid., p. 147).  Does this phrase 
refer back to the first phrase (In advance of the broken arm), where an ‘emergency’, a break (a 
two), is produced in favour of the repetition of a ‘one’ appearing twice?  Or, is it simpler than 
this, where this word-string perhaps refers to itself?  Note, in this regard, there is a sense of 
doubling in the aural and visual manifestations of the word, ‘Emergency’.  Phonetically, it 
appears to contain two ‘e’ sounds, one at the beginning and one at the end of the word and, 
therefore, appears ‘favoured’ over its (near phonetic) alternative, ‘Emergence’ (where the final 
‘e’ remains silent).  While there an aural sense of doubling, there is also a visual trebling of the 
letter, ‘e’.  When added, the two aural and three visual occurrences of ‘e’ become: (2 + 3 = 5) 
= e (the fifth letter of the alphabet).  In this way, this word-string both mimes the logic of the 
first word-string and adds to it as a formula that literally describes and performs itself.   
 
Duchamp’s and Arensberg’s cryptographical word games appear to use numbers and 
mathematical operations to provide a basis for the development of an ‘abstract’ language that 
further isolates a text and lessens any ‘concrete reference’ to the physical world.  Such words 
no longer simply describe: they perform—a principle, a relation, a ‘moral’.  In this sense, 
Duchamp and Arensberg embed an alternative logic within standard grammatical relations: 
their words mime mathematical ‘ones’, thus making an abstract idea manifest, material.  The 
meaning(s) of these ‘short sentences’ are thereby short-circuited and caught within an intra-
                                                        
43 Under a note on the ‘Regime of Gravity’, Duchamp links the notion and ‘Ministry of gravity’ with the 
‘Regime of Coincidence’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p.33).   
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relational ‘space’ that lies between the abstract logic of the break (1 2) and its re-iteration and 
extension in the ‘new atmosphere’ of language (1 2 →1).   
 
The next step in this process is associated with gesture of choosing, naming and signing an already 
made object.  Such a move removes an object from its unity, consistency and coherence as an 
object of practical utility and re-produces it as an ‘aesthetic’ one.  For example, Duchamp 
abducts a snow shovel44 from its practical context, doubles it by inscribing on it, ‘In advance 
of the broken arm’, and then, re-places it as an object of ‘display’.  This gesture mimes the 
transformation of each one-metre length of string in the work, Three Standard Stoppages.  As a 
standard measure, the snow shovel ‘drops’ from a series of ones (e.g. the production line) and 
‘breaks’ by being ‘doubled’, to form a new ‘one’, as an aesthetic ‘singularity’.    
 
The extension of this logic, as the production of an irreducible distance within and between 
things, { }, then, goes from {1 2} → {1 2 1} → {1 2 1 3 1}, where each one in a series re-
presents a material extension of the one that precedes it.  That is, the first one relates to the 
‘number string’ (that articulates an abstract concept of space: 12), the second is the ‘short 
sentence’ (where the abstract formula of spatial production is repeated and transposed into the 
new material of language), and the third to the Readymade (object) itself (that reproduces an 
irreducible space between the logic of the ‘short sentence’ and its extension by way of the 
gesture of the Readymade).   
 
If, however, we consider Fountain and the extraordinary conditions of its original ‘exhibition’, 
we soon see that this series proliferates beyond the internal or intra-relational ‘contents’ of the 
Readymade to other inter-relational considerations.  This series appears hierarchical where 
the notion of ‘nothing’ is produced by way of ‘doubling’ (12) and, hence, is ‘multiplied’ in its 
‘passage’ through and manifestation in different material ‘dimensions’.  The following table 
shows the production of ‘nothing’ by miming or ‘repeating’ this formula in the appearance, 
disappearance and reappearance of Fountain: 
 
{ }   ‘nothing’ (or unbounded ‘interval’)   
{1 2}  number string (as doubling)  (1 interval) 
{1 2 1} language string     (2 intervals) 
{1 2 1 3 1} Readymade object    (3 intervals) 
{1 2 1 3 1 4 [1]} ‘exhibition’/disappearance [a break] [4 intervals] 
{1 2 1 3 1 4 [1] 5 1} documentation (by Stieglitz)   (5 intervals) 
{1 2 1 3 1 4 [1] 5 1 6 1} public discourse (Blind Mind articles) (6 intervals) 
{1 2 1 3 1 4 [1] 5 1 6 1 7 1} reappearance as handmade replica(s) (7 intervals) 
{…} 
 
 
                                                        
44 In perhaps a similar way to the absence of a singular and universal definite article in French, the American 
snow shovel was unavailable for purchase in France around 1915. 
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An interesting feature of this progression is that once the already made object is inscribed (or 
has its ‘rendezvous’), the relationship between the ‘short sentence’ and the already made object 
predominates over the relationship between the abstract logic expressed in and by the ‘short 
sentence’.  The abstract logic (as the production of space) is subsumed by the extended logic 
of the ‘short sentence’ and though still present remains absent.  This process continues with 
each ‘dimension’ or ‘interval’ added so that the ‘presence’ of the originating concept becomes 
one step ‘farther’ removed with each material extension.  The ‘concept of (the production of) 
nothing’, though multiplied and mimed in each iteration, becomes further embedded.  This 
can be better illustrated by inverting the table above: 
 
{…} 
{1 2 1 3 1 4 [1] 5 1 6 1 7 1} reappearance as handmade replica(s) (7 intervals) 
{1 2 1 3 1 4 [1] 5 1 6 1} public discourse (Blind Mind articles) (6 intervals) 
{1 2 1 3 1 4 [1] 5 1} documentation (by Stieglitz)   (5 intervals) 
{1 2 1 3 1 4 [1]} ‘exhibition’/disappearance [a break] [4 intervals] 
{1 2 1 3 1} Readymade object    (3 intervals) 
{1 2 1} language string     (2 intervals) 
{1 2}  number string (as doubling)  (1 interval) 
{ }   ‘nothing’ (or unbounded ‘interval’) 
 
 
Not only does the logic of the break (of doubling) operate within and between each step of 
the above series, but it is also mimed across the series itself.  Note that the break, by way of 
the non-exhibition and disappearance of Fountain, divides the series in terms of the intra-
relational and inter-relational extensions of the gesture of the Readymade.  Perhaps, such a 
break shows how Fountain’s status as an ‘art’ object does not simply relate to its ‘materiality’ 
(as a physical referent) nor to its ‘immateriality’ (of its presence in discourse, as discourse) but, 
rather, as the operation that it performs by not-taking place in the place of art.  Its disappearance 
and reappearance in documentation and discourse (which includes the production of 
authorized and hand-crafted ‘copies’), further re-presents the logic of the ‘break’, but this time 
not simply as a ‘material’ extension of an ‘originating concept’ (12) but also as an ‘immaterial’ 
extension of the physical object itself.   
 
 
2.4 The abstract logic of doubling as the production of ‘nothing’ 
 
If the principle that underlies the series above involves the production of intra/inter relational 
space, then, what is this ‘nothing’ that this doubling produces?  According to Marjorie Perloff 
(2012, p. 22), John Cage develops his notion of ‘Difference’, as ‘the smallest possible, indeed 
imperceptible, difference between two seemingly identical phenomena or moments’, from 
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Duchamp’s notion of the ‘infrathin’.  Duchamp insists that this term cannot be directly 
defined but only illustrated by way of example45:    
 
The warmth of a seat (which has just been left) is infra-thin. 
 
Infra-thin separation between / the detonations of a gun/(very close) and the 
apparition of a bullet/ hole in the target. 
 
When the tobacco smoke also smells of the mouth that exhales it the two odors / 
marry by the infra thin [sic] (olfactory/ in thin). 
 (Duchamp quoted in Perloff 2012, p. 22)  
 
From the above, it appears that the infrathin is an irreducible distance or ‘limit’ that appears to 
both unify and divide the identical and alludes to the presence (and absence) of two within 
one.  For example, the warmth of a seat just left both links and divides a seat’s identity: as 
something that is used/unused.  Similarly, the appearance and disappearance of a bullet both 
links and divides the event of its aural projection and visual reception.  Finally, the smell of 
the mouth on exhaled smoke marks the change brought about by its passage in to, and out of, 
the body.  The infrathin thereby appears to mark the material extension or ‘product’ of a one-
to-one ‘rendezvous’: as an expression perhaps of the abstract logic of 1 2 → 1.  It, perhaps, 
also provides a ‘sign of accordance’ that dwells on the ‘threshold’ of an ‘event’, where the 
identity of an object is split and doubled by its contact with or passage through an ‘other’ 
material (or dimension).   
 
Luisetti (2010, p. 84), drawing from the work of Henri Bergson, suggests Duchamp ‘inserts a 
mirror into objects’46 and, by doing so, introduces ‘operations of deferral’ that disrupt the 
myth of the ‘instant present’ of the (art) object.  This ‘mirror’, evident perhaps in the ‘material’ 
extension or expression of the infrathin, serves to break (or displace) the ‘instant present’ of an 
already made object in two, so that it appears as an ‘accumulation’ of its subsequent and prior 
identities.  Thus ‘delayed’, the Readymade ‘enters the territory of the Bergsonian durée, 
becoming a continuous multiplicity; a perceptible object and yet something which is no 
longer what we assume an artwork to be’ (Luisetti 2010, 84), by taking place within and across 
its subsequent (‘art’) and prior (‘non-art’) identities. 
 
 
2.5 The internal and external gesture of the Readymade 
 
It appears that, for Duchamp, the role of the ‘short sentence’ (as the material extension of the 
abstract logic of the production of nothing (1 2 → 1)) plays the critical role ‘to carry the mind 
of spectator towards other regions more verbal’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 141).  This 
formula appears to be ‘present’ in the examples that Duchamp provides when attempting to 
                                                        
45 For further examples, see Marjorie Perloff (2003), ‘The Search for ‘Prime Words’: Pound, Duchamp and the 
Nominalist Ethos’.  Available from:  http://marjorieperloff.com/essays/pound-duchamp-nominalism/ 
46 Brought about, for example, by the coupling of the inscription with the visuality of an already made object. 
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articulate his notion of the infrathin as the ‘means’ by which ‘one can pass from the second to 
the third dimension’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 194).   
 
It also appears to provide a basis in the ‘Duchampian canon’ where ‘first comes the inscription 
and only later is this provocative title to be applied to some physical manifestation or 
visualized illumination of the originating concept’ (Moffitt 2003, p. 236).  The ‘short sentence’ 
operates as a cipher that not only contains the ‘originating concept’—of the production of 
‘nothing’—but, also, its potential to be extended into other ‘dimensions’ and material 
manifestations.   
 
Following Duchamp’s propensity for analogy: the formula, ‘I would prefer not to’ is to 
Bartleby as the ‘short sentence’ is to the already made object.  Just as Bartleby performs the 
formula by making its effects manifest, so too does the external gesture of the Readymade 
(embodied in the selection, inscription and placement of an already made object) appear to 
express and extend the internal logic of the short sentence into a ‘new atmosphere’.  The 
overall gesture of the Readymade thereby appears to involve the transposition, passage and 
extension of an abstract idea through various materials (or dimensions).  Firstly, as a 
mathematical operation; secondly, as the verbal language of a ‘short sentence’; and lastly, as 
the visual reference of the ‘manifestation’ (or choosing, naming and signing) of the Readymade 
itself.  As noted above, the proliferation of this ‘concept of nothing’ is not limited to the 
physical object of the Readymade: it continues to be multiplied and extended through new 
‘materials’ or dimensions—in the reactions and responses of ‘spectators’, in the discourses and 
documentation of art and other fields of knowledge, in the derivative works made in response 
to it…and so on—and, by doing so, re-produces itself as its own paradigm and ‘disciplinary 
matrix’.  
 
From the point-of-view of serving the interest of their ‘betters’, Aesop and Bartleby have 
‘nothing’ to offer: as tools, they are both ‘broken’ and ‘useless’.  The imposition of the logic 
of 1 2 → 1 ‘breaks’ both the verbal language of the inscription and the visual language of the 
already made object in, and by, two.  The Readymade, as a ‘transformed’ already made object, 
also becomes a ‘talking tool’ that, perhaps, can only be heard in the interstices within and across 
the language(s) that it ‘speaks’.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
In this chapter, I draw on Giorgio Agamben’s notions of ‘praxis’ and ‘poiesis’ to discuss the 
implications of Duchamp’s The Creative Act and Reza Negarestani’s notion of an ‘ascesis of 
closure’ to discuss the relationship between the ‘creative act’ of the artist, the materials she 
employs, and the outcome that this process produces.   Then, I briefly discuss by way of 
Derrida, Hegel and Badiou, the notion of book and outer writing as a product of the ‘inner 
discourse’ of mind and poetic language may operate as the contingent materiality of 
‘unthinkable’ thought.  Finally, I discuss Bergson’s theory of perception as a means to discuss 
the role of the viewer or reader in the creative act of the ‘transmutation’ of ‘inert matter into 
a work of art’ (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, p. 139-140) 
 
 
3.1 The creativity of praxis and poiesis 
 
A common element in the ‘creative work’ of Aesop, Bartleby and the Duchampian gesture of 
the Readymade appears to be the displacement of the ‘will’ in favour of following the 
‘commands’ of language as a means of producing ‘nothing’.  That is, Aesop disavows his ‘will’ 
by doing exactly what he is told, Bartleby by adhering to the formula, ‘I would prefer not to’, 
and the anartistic gesture of the Readymade, by miming the abstract logic of 1 2 → 1.  Giorgio 
Agamben, in his discussion of the terms ‘poiesis’ and ‘praxis’, identifies that: 
 
[…] central to praxis [is] the idea of the will that finds its immediate expression 
in the act, while, by contrast, central to poiesis [is] the experience of pro-duction 
into presence, the fact that something [passes] from non-being into being, from 
concealment into the full light of the work. (Agamben 1999, p. 68) 
 
Moreover, if praxis is willed action, its ‘goal’ is limited by its movement to actualise itself: as 
‘[it] wants only itself through action; thus it is not pro-ductive, and brings only itself into 
presence’ (Agamben 1999, p. 76).  Poiesis, on the other hand, has ‘its limit, outside itself’ where 
it is the ‘original principle of something other than itself’ (ibid., p.76).  Accordingly, 
  
the essence of poiesis has nothing to do with the expression of the will (with 
respect to art to which art is in no way necessary): this essence is found instead in 
the production of truth and in the subsequent opening of a world for man’s [sic] 
existence and action.  (Agamben 1999, p. 72) 
 
As a ‘mode of truth’, poiesis appears to be a means by which some ‘thing’ moves from non-
being into being and thereby becomes knowable.  In terms of the examples above, the 
[un]willed actions of ‘retrieving an oil flask’, ‘not copying’, or miming the gesture of a 
mathematical operation, then, are not simply a production of ‘nothing’ but rather, perhaps, a 
‘pro-duction’ that reveals an absence of some ‘thing’ that under ‘normal’ conditions remains 
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concealed or hidden.  For Xanthus, this ‘nothing’ becomes knowable within and between the 
language of his instructions and the outcome received; for Bartleby’s employer, in the 
difference between languages founded on a logic of presupposition and logic of preference; and, for 
the Duchampian ‘spectator’, in the differences brought about by the transposition and 
extension of 1 2 → 1 into ‘other’ materials and dimensions.  
 
If, as Agamben suggests, praxis (as production by manual ‘doing’) and poiesis (as pro-duction 
of ‘knowing’) are distinct, then, how do they relate to each other?  If we return to one of our 
examples, we see that Xanthus’ praxis is divided between his commands and Aesop’s actions.  
As the outcome of ‘willed action’, the empty oil flask re-presents the failure of Xanthus to 
action his words so that they are reflected in the outcome produced by his slave.  Aesop, on 
the other hand, blindly follows his master’s instructions and, through his [un]willed action, 
opens the outcome to contingency and whether the instructions marry with the reality of the 
situation (e.g. if the oil flask is empty or not, etc.).  By doing precisely what he is told to do, 
Aesop produces ‘nothing’ (with respect to Xanthus’ expectations) but, by doing so, indirectly 
‘pro-duces’ or makes knowable certain truths to his master. 
 
 
3.2 Duchamp and the creative act  
 
In a lecture of 1957, Duchamp identifies ‘two poles’ in the ‘creation of art’, where ‘The 
Creative Act’ is a process initiated by an artist but completed by a spectator (Sanouillet & 
Peterson 1975, p. 138).  The spectator appears to have a role because ‘the artist acts like a 
mediumistic being’ and is not fully aware of ‘what he [sic] is doing and why he is doing it’ 
(ibid).  Such an approach produces a difference between the artist’s ability to realize her 
intentions and what is actualized in the work.  Duchamp refers to this ‘gap’ as a ‘personal art 
coefficient’ (‘PAC’) which represents the ‘arithmetical’ difference between what an artist 
intends but fails to say—of what remains unsaid—and what she unintentionally expresses in 
its place.  Such a difference appears to result from what is willed (and unrealized) and ‘unwilled’ 
(and realized) by the artist’s interaction with her materials.  For Duchamp, the outcome 
produced remains incomplete and must be ‘refined’ by the spectator whose role is to bring it 
‘into contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications’ 
(Sanouillet & Peterson 1975, p. 140).  Thereby, the creative act takes place as a 
‘transubstantiation’ when a ‘spectator experiences the phenomenon of transmutation; through 
the change from inert matter into a work of art’ (ibid, pp. 139-40; my emphasis).  
 
Duchamp’s model of the creative act appears to suggest that despite an artist’s best intentions 
to control or direct the meaning(s) of materials, the ‘creativity’ of the work always already 
escapes and is thereby transferred to and complemented by the ‘role of the spectator to 
determine the weight of the work on the esthetic scale’ (ibid, p. 140).  Of particular interest, 
in terms of the autonomy of the artist’s intentions, is the ‘gap’ which is represented by 
Duchamp’s notion of the PAC.  What produces this difference between intention and 
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realization?  On the one hand, we may be tempted to attribute it to an artist’s ‘failure’ to 
realize their intentions through a lack of mastery or skill over her materials.  But, on the other, 
it may result from an artist’s ‘efforts’ to limit or force a particular order on materials that 
unintentionally (or indirectly) exposes the process of artistic production and, hence, the 
artwork itself, to the inherent contingency of the ‘inert matter’ of the materials employed.  
According to Reza Negarestani: 
 
[…] the contingency inherent to artist’s materials does not entail any 
commonality with the artist’s intentions; if anything, such contingency bends, 
hijacks and punctures such schemes, sensibilities, and intentions.  In reality, the 
work is not created based on commonalities but on patterns of intrusion, twisting, 
and suspension determined by its contingent materials (during the movement from the 
so-called ideas to physical materials) in the process of artistic production. 
(Negarestani 2011, pp. 13-14; original emphasis). 
  
The spectator’s experience of a ‘transubstantiation’ of ‘inert matter into artwork’ appears to 
reflect—in the example of the Readymades—what Negarestani (2011, p. 11) identifies as 
contingency itself, as ‘the concomitant expression of possibilities […] and no possibility at all’ 
where ‘anything can happen, but equally, nothing might ever happen.’  That is, the gesture 
of the Readymade either always already remains, in the mind of the spectator, an object of 
practical utility and, therefore, does not ‘happen’ as an artwork; or, it is ‘completed’ in the 
mind of the spectator and, thereby, transformed into an object of both practical and aesthetic 
utility. 
 
Taken at face value, Duchamp’s notion of the creative act appears to oppose the autonomy of 
the artist against the autonomy of the materials employed.  That is, a ‘low’ PAC results when 
an artist limits or commands the use of materials in the expressivity of the work, whereas, a 
high PAC occurs, when she takes a more liberal and open approach to experimentation and 
the ‘possibilities’ of materials.  For Negarestani (2011, p.14), however, the opposite is the case 
because ‘the more closed a work, the more radically it is subjected to the intervention of the 
contingent materials’.  Moreover, such an approach is an ‘ascesis of closure’ and a form of 
artistic ‘complicity’ that ‘twists’ an ‘openness to contingent materials [produced by 
‘adventurism’ in experimentation] ‘into a being-opened by contingent materials’ (ibid, p. 15).   
 
In terms of the PAC, it follows, then, that the degree of closure that an artist imposes on 
herself in the production of a work is inversely proportional to the role the contingent materials 
play in producing the work.  Therefore, a high PAC results when an artist practices an ascesis 
of closure and subjects herself to the contingency inherent in the materials employed, whereas, 
a low PAC results, when an artist pays less attention to the contingency of the materials in her 
attempt to will or express herself through adventurism and subjective freedom in 
experimentation.    
 
Considered in terms of the notions of praxis and poiesis, the degree of ‘pro-duction’ (into 
presence) in a work is dependent on the level or the role the subjective will of the artist plays 
in the manipulation of her materials.  An ‘ascesis of closure’, thereby, involves the [un]willed 
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action of the artist, where strict adherence to the command of the contingent materials of 
language (e.g. as evident in Xanthus’ instructions, Bartleby’s formula, or the Duchampian 
‘short sentence’) provides a basis for the ‘pro-duction’ into presence of some ‘thing’ 
(previously absent yet present) taking place.     
 
 
3.3 Poetic language as the materiality of ‘unthinkable’ thought 
 
In The Double Session, Derrida (2004, p. 197) juxtaposes two textual objects, (Mallarmé’s 
Mimique and a fragment from Philebus by Plato) to discuss what ‘goes (on) or doesn’t go (on) 
between literature and truth’.  He suggests that Socrates’ metaphor of the book (as the inner 
or ‘psychic’ writing of the ‘soul’) has four key attributes that, until Mallarmé, ‘have always 
been assigned to the book’ (ibid., p. 199).  Firstly, the book is a dialectic that represents 
‘internalised speech’ or ‘dianoia’, where thinking is ‘the inward dialogue carried on by the 
mind with itself without spoken sound’ (ibid.).  Socrates, however, considers this to be ‘false’ 
or impoverished dialogue, as it is ‘voiceless’ and takes place in the absence of a genuine ‘other’ 
and, thereby, remains disconnected from the ‘living’ logos.  Secondly, the ‘value’ of this 
‘psychic writing’ is decidable once it is written down (or given ‘voice’).  It is only ‘as flattened-
out logos’, that this book (as ‘a function of, in proportion to, in a ratio (also logos) with, its 
truth’) can be measured against ‘the truth of that which is’ to allow ‘one’ to decide whether 
(or to what degree) its account is true (ibid., p. 200).  Thirdly, the ‘value’ of the truth or 
falseness of this account is not ‘intrinsic’ to the ‘book’ itself but only becomes apparent when 
a writer ‘copies into the book [an inner] discourse that has already taken place and stands in a 
certain relation of truth (of similarity) or falsity (dissimilarity) with things in themselves’ 
(ibid.).  Hence, this act of writing involves simply transcribing or copying the dictates of an 
already made discourse where the truth of its account, as mimetic form, either ‘hinders the 
unveiling of the thing itself by substituting a copy or double of what is; or it works in the 
service of truth as the double’s resemblance’ (ibid. p. 201).  Finally, the fourth attribute is the 
notion of resemblance itself, where the ‘silent’ discourse the ‘soul’ has with itself resembles 
the form and ‘stilled’ words of the book vice versa.  That is, ‘logos must indeed be shaped 
according to the model of the eidos’,47 where, by way of copying and the process of doubling, 
‘things (onta), speech, and writing come to repeat and mirror each other’ (ibid.). 
 
The validity of this ‘book’ (measured solely by its truth-value) appears to have nothing to do 
with the content of what is written in and of itself but, rather, of how it is written and how it 
resembles the living discourse of ‘things’, as an expression of some ‘ideal’ formulation.  Such a 
reflection, thereby, appears to be ‘internal’, where the ‘voice’ of this discourse lies within the 
outward expression of the words themselves.  If so, it perhaps follows, then, that this ‘voice’ 
relates to the relation the words have (or do not have) with each other rather than what they 
may or may not specifically say.  It is the words arrangement and formulation that resounds 
                                                        
47 Logos means discourse, account, conversation, whereas ‘eidos’ is Plato’s word for the notion of ideal forms.  
Hence, the truth of this inner ‘conversation’ relates to how it resembles or accords with ‘discourse’ as ‘idea’, as 
ideal form. 
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the living logos and, thereby, predetermines whether or not a given discourse reveals or 
conceals a ‘truth’ (of things).  While it appears that a key part of the decidability of such ‘truth-
value’ involves the transcription (or transposition) of an inner discourse by way of the spoken 
voice or writing, it remains unclear, however, who (or what) writes this discourse and, 
moreover, who arbitrates or decides the ‘value’ of what is (and is not) said.  
 
In Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics (1886/2004) he sets out his assumptions regarding 
the art object and its relationship to the notion of mind or ‘thinking consciousness’.  If its 
‘essence’ is to think, then, mind becomes a ‘thinking consciousness’ by separating or 
distinguishing itself from what it thinks.  As a product of mind, an art object provides a 
feedback mechanism by which mind comes to know not only what it is but, more importantly, 
that it is.  According to Hegel: 
 
[…] even if artistic works are not abstract thought and notion, but are an 
evolution of the notion out of itself, an alienation from itself towards the sensuous, 
still the power of the thinking spirit (mind) lies herein, not merely to grasp itself only 
in its peculiar form of the self-conscious spirit (mind), but just as much to 
recognize itself in its alienation in the shape of feeling and the sensuous, in its 
other form, by transmuting the metamorphosed thought back into definite 
thoughts, and so restoring it to itself.  (Hegel 2004, p. 15; original emphasis) 
 
By way of an art object, mind gives sensual form to itself so that it can come to recognize, 
think and know itself, as an ‘autonomous’ existence that is both separate and separable from 
what Hegel describes as ‘unintelligent nature’.  Hegel uses the opposition of the ‘intelligence’ 
of ‘thinking consciousness’ to the ‘unintelligence’ of nature to construct a hierarchy that, for 
Derrida (1988, p. 23), subordinates ‘all the arts48 to speech, and, if not to poetry, at least to the 
poem, the said, language, speech, nomination’.  For Hegel, poetry is the ‘purest’ form of art 
because it is not tied to and encumbered by the dull matter of nature.  In his attempt to 
demonstrate the ‘superiority’ of poetry over music (the least material of the other arts), Hegel 
suggests that the ‘materiality’ of sound (of speech) gives way to the ‘medium’ of the ‘word’ as 
sign: 
 
For sound, the only external matter which poetry retains, is in it no longer the 
feeling of the sonorous itself, but is a sign, which by itself is void of import.49  And 
it is a sign of the idea which has become concrete in itself and not merely an 
indefinite feeling and of its nuances and grades.  This is how sound develops in 
the Word, as voice articulate in itself, whose import it is to indicate ideas and 
notions.  The merely negative point up to which music had developed now makes 
its appearance as the completely concrete point, the point which is mind, the self-
conscious individual, which, producing out of itself the infinite space of its ideas, 
unites it with the temporal character of sound.  Yet this sensuous element, which 
                                                        
48 Architecture (as the most ‘material’) is the lowest, followed by sculpture, painting, music and, then, finally 
poetry. 
49 Hegel here is making a distinction between words that operate as (aurally) arbitrary signs of what they 
represent.  For example, ‘the sound ‘dog’ has no intrinsic similarity or other relationship to dogs, except in virtue 
of it being used as a sign for dogs’ (Hegel 2004, p. 194).  With that said, some verbal ‘signs’ do reference the 
external sounds they represent, e.g. ‘cuckoo’ and ‘kookaburra’.  
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in music was still immediately one with inward feeling, is in poetry separated 
from the content of consciousness.  In poetry, the mind determines this content 
for its own sake, and apart for all else, into the shape of ideas, and though it 
employs sound to express them, treats them as a symbol without values or import.  
Thus considered, sound may just as well be reduced to a mere letter, for the 
audible, like the visible, is thus depressed into a mere indication of mind.  For this 
reason, the proper medium of poetical representation is the poetical imagination 
and intellectual portrayal itself.  (Hegel 2004, pp. 95-96; original emphasis)  
 
As a system of arbitrary signs, words are not materially bound to the inertia of dull matter.  
By being ‘free’ of the ‘import’ and obfuscation of ‘unintelligent nature’, language appears to 
be conceived as ‘immaterial’ or ‘transparent’ and thereby lends itself more readily to convey 
what ‘the mind determines’ in its portrayal of itself.  If, for Hegel, the essence of mind is to 
think, then, the mind (in terms of an ‘I’ that ‘thinks’) produces a poetical image of itself to 
itself as itself.  The poem thereby re-presents a ‘mirrored’ and ‘immaterial’ other that provides 
a means by which thought can re-cognise itself and, by doing so, both will and confirm its 
own existence.   
 
From this, however, it remains unclear whether Hegel’s ‘poetical representation’ (as the 
embodiment of thought) involves praxis or a ‘pro-duction into presence’.  Does poetical 
representation result from a ‘willed action’ of ‘mind’ (as the agency of ‘poetical imagination’ 
and ‘intellectual portrayal’) that sets out to realize its own limit and actualize itself?  Or, does 
it ‘operate’ to bring some ‘thing’—other than itself—from concealment into presence?  If we 
consider that the thinking subject precedes the poem, then, its role is the realization and 
actualization of itself.  Nothing is thereby ‘pro-duced’ but the imprint of mind as poetical 
representation.  On the other hand, if we consider that the poem ‘exists’ prior to mind, then, 
the role of the thinking subject operates beyond itself by bringing the latency of the poem 
(inherent to the contingent materiality of language itself) from concealment into presence.  
Given this, it is not ‘I’ that speaks and deploys language but rather, perhaps, language that 
utters ‘I’.  For Heidegger: ‘Only language is that which, to speak properly, speaks; and its 
speaks on its own (quoted in Lecercle 1990, p. 110; original emphasis).   
 
When considering the relationship between poetry and philosophy, Badiou (2005, p. 17) 
citing Plato, questions whether a poet in fact ‘thinks’, as ‘what poetry forbids is discursive 
thought, dianoia’.  In doing so, Badiou goes further than Derrida when he suggests that Plato’s 
notion of dianoia does not simply represent ‘inner discourse’ but, rather, is the thought ‘that 
traverses, […] links and deduces’ (ibid.).  Moreover, poetic language (like sophistry) is 
‘nonthought that presents itself via the linguistic power of a possible thought’ (ibid., p. 18).  
It represents ‘nonthought’ because it ‘is inseparable from the sensible’ and cannot be reduced 
to a ‘pure’ or abstract thought that is separate from an external form50 (ibid., p. 19).  As the 
                                                        
50 This observation appears to be echoed by Lecercle (1990, p. 105) in his ‘theory of the remainder’ of language, 
where he argues that ‘there is an inescapable materiality to language’ because ‘words are always threatening to 
revert to screams, because they carry the violent effects of the speaker’s body, [and] can be inscribed on it, and 
generally mingle with it […]’. 
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role of philosophy is ‘to identify thought as the thinking of thought itself’, Badiou considers 
the poem thereby embodies ‘unthinkable thought’ and that only mathematics (which can be 
separated from the sensible) is a form of thought that ‘exists precisely only inasmuch as it is 
thinkable’ (Badiou 2005, p. 19).    
 
By opposing poetry (as ‘false’ or nonthought brought about by the power of language) to the 
‘true’ thought of mathematics (as the thought of thinking itself), Badiou appears to go a step 
beyond Hegel’s privileging of poetry as a means by which mind can determine what it is and 
that it is.  If poetry is inextricably linked to the sensible and exists only as the appearance of a 
‘possible thought’, it perhaps follows, then, that language—as a product of mind—contains 
within it an ‘unintelligent nature’ and capacity for ‘nonthought’ that has a power to [un]think 
the thought that would think itself.  If the poem is a ‘lawless proposition’ that ‘dwells on a 
threshold’ (Badiou 2005, p. 17), it takes place at the limit of language’s capacity to name and, 
by doing so, re-presents its power as an incompleteness and [un]decidability that lies within 
it.  For Badiou (ibid., p. 27), ‘the infinite power of language is the unnamable of the poem’ 
and that a ‘truth’, which any interpretation of it may reveal, ‘will never ground the capacity 
for meaning itself’, as ‘the meaning of meaning, the sense of sense’ (ibid.; my emphasis).   
 
From the above, it appears that the infinite power of language is associated with the 
contingent materiality of language itself.  For Badiou, the poem re-presents the unthinkable 
because it is bound to ‘sensual’ or material things and, thereby, is not abstract and ‘transparent’ 
like the operation of mathematical thought.  However, as unnamable, the poem has the 
capacity to both exceed and, thereby, confound discursive thought.  If, as ‘true’ thought, 
dianoia reflects the ‘ideal’ formulation of the ‘living’ logos, then, how does one apply it to name 
or measure the (truth) ‘value’ of the ‘inner discourse’ that is copied into the ‘outer’ discourse 
of the poem?  To do so, discursive thought, as the thought that ‘traverses, links and deduces’, 
needs to transpose the unthinkability of the poem into the unity, consistency and coherence 
of ‘thinkable’ thought.  Being abstract and ‘transparent’, however, discursive thought remains 
[un]pro-ductive in and of itself.  Like praxis, it is a mode of operation that sets out to re-
cognise itself by attempting to reduce what is ‘unthinkable’ into an image of itself to itself as 
itself.  It perhaps follows, then, that the decidability or ‘truth-value’ of a poem relies on a reader 
being able to perceive the discursive thought (of ‘living’ logos) within it, as the ‘logic’ that 
underlies the appearing of poetic language itself.  With that said, however, the ‘pro-duction 
into presence’ of poiesis appears to take place at the point where any ‘reading’ carried-out by 
way of discursive thought fails.  That is, if discursive thought simply ‘links and deduces’, it 
must rely on generality and particularity in its attempt to name and place a poetic object.  As 
a result, the appearance of a ‘singularity’ (or placeholder) takes place beyond its remit, where 
an object seems to conform yet cannot be reduced to any given ‘place’ in particular and, 
thereby, remains ‘unthinkable’.  
    
If praxis is associated with the operation of the willed intentions of an artist, who seeks to 
express herself in the ‘object’ she produces, then, poiesis appears to relate to the role contingent 
materials in diverting, frustrating and subverting such aims.  If praxis is abstract ‘intelligence’ 
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as the ‘I’ that thinks in order to impose itself on an ‘other’ and, by doing so, realize its own 
possibility, then, poiesis, is to be ‘found’ in the inertia and contingency of ‘dull’ matter itself.  
As Duchamp notes in The Creative Act, the spectator or ‘reader’ is just as (or possibly more) 
important than the artist because it is the role of the spectator to determine whether, in fact, 
‘the change from inert matter to work of art’ takes place (Sanouillet & Peterson 1973, p. 139-
140).  To better appreciate the challenge Duchamp poses to a spectator or reader, requires 
another brief detour, this time, by way of Henri Bergson’s theory of perception.  
 
 
3.4 Bergson’s theory of perception   
 
In Matter and Memory (1988), Henri Bergson displaces the traditional dualism of matter and 
mind by focusing on the relationship between the two that is mediated by memory.  He 
considers the vibrations of matter to be ‘images’ that bridge the separation between material 
elements or ‘things’ (realism) and ‘representations’ (idealism) (Guerlac 2006).  Images are 
thereby conceived as both matter and perceptions that provide a means of communication by 
which the thing-in-itself is cognizable or knowable to thought (Meillassoux 2007).  For 
Bergson,  
 
these images act and react upon one another in all their elementary parts 
according to constant laws … yet there is one of them which is distinct from the 
others, in that I do not know it from without by perceptions, but from within by 
affections: it is my body.  (Bergson 1988, p. 17) 
 
The body is a ‘center of action’ (ibid., p. 20) that ‘appears to choose, within certain limits, the 
manner in which it restores what it receives’ (ibid., p 19). This involves a two-step process.  
Firstly, the body ‘unfreely’ selects what it can receive from the infinitude of images (of matter); 
and secondly, the mind (by way of memory) ‘chooses’ what is of interest to it from the finite 
set of images that the body has been able to receive.  This ‘choosing’, however, does not add 
to, embellish or alter what it perceives: it subtracts its perception from the finite set of images 
which pass through the body.  Therefore, what is perceived does not differ in kind but rather 
in quantity from ‘that which is actually given’ (Bergson 1988, p. 71).   
 
Meillassoux (2007, p. 75) considers Bergson’s theory to be anti-Kantian because perception is 
an ascesis and not a synthesis:  
 
‘Perception does not, as in Kant, submit sensible matter to a subjective form, 
because the link, the connection, the form, belongs wholly to matter.  Perception 
does not connect, it disconnects.  It does not inform a content but incises an order.  
It does not enrich matter, but on the contrary impoverishes it’.  (Meillassoux 2007, 
p. 75) 
 
Moreover, as an ascesis, perception excludes what the order it incises cannot include, such that 
a living being ‘conquers infinitude through the power of refusal’ and thereby embodies a 
‘barricade erected by a formidable power of disinterest for that which communicates’ 
(Meillassoux 2007, p. 74, original emphasis).  The mind, thereby, does not illuminate an object 
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(by bringing it from darkness to light as a whole) but, rather, ‘darkens’ it by disregarding those 
aspects that are not of interest to it (Ansell-Pearson 2005).  
  
Deleuze identifies two types of memory in Bergson’s theory: recollection memory and 
contraction memory, the former ‘orientated and dilated towards the past’ and the latter 
‘contracted, contracting towards the future’ (Deleuze 1988, p. 52).  Bergson considers the past 
to be co-existent with the present.  Both exist or are conjoined in each instant. The past is 
thought to be ‘useless, passive and inactive’ and is ‘identical with being in itself’ (ibid., p. 55).  
Whereas, the present ‘is not’ and is rather an active ‘pure becoming, always outside itself’ 
(ibid.).  The past therefore does not disappear with each passing instant but accumulates as a 
‘virtuality’ of all pasts: ‘it preserves itself in itself (while the present passes), it is the whole, 
integral past; it is all our past, which coexists with each present’ (Deleuze 1998, p. 59).   
 
Bergson’s key insight is his insistence ‘that recollection is created alongside actual perception’, 
where memory only appears to follow perception because practical consciousness is not 
directed toward the past but solely towards the future (Ansell-Pearson 2005, p. 1119).  Due 
to its preoccupation with the ‘life of praxis’, the practical consciousness (in its capacity to guide 
and resist present action) ‘only admits legally’ the recollections of memory that are relevant 
to what it [pre]conceives to be the practical concerns of a situation (ibid., p. 1120).  If 
recollection memory (or ‘attentive recognition’) serves to delay automatic recognition (or 
habit) from being precipitated immediately into consciousness and then action, utility still 
provides the basis for determining action.  That is, attentive recognition selects or jumps to a 
particular ‘plane’ of memory and finds within it the specific recollections that are most 
relevant to its reading of, and response to, a given situation.  By doing so, it disregards (or 
forgets) the other planes or levels of memory available that involve ‘other configurations or 
pastness or voices that convey the past differently’ (Al Saji 2004, p. 224).  In terms of a specific 
object, recognition selects only the relevant aspects that apply to a future action, which 
‘ignores the entanglement of the object with the whole of the material universe and reduces 
the multitude of perspectives […] to a single perspective’ (Al Saji 2004, p. 224).  The reduction 
of what can be represented in consciousness to utility, means that the ‘virtuality’ of memory 
is excluded and superfluous to the ‘forward-looking’ interests or needs of practical 
consciousness.  Memory is, thereby, ‘freed’ to ‘reveal itself as a disruptive and creative power’ 
that has the potential to circumvent the ‘laws’ (or place) of consciousness itself (Ansell-Pearson 
2005, p. 1119). 
 
Bergson opposes the notion of intuition to that of recognition.  Deleuze (1988, p. 13-14) notes 
that, for Bergson, intuition is not ‘a feeling, an inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy, but a 
fully developed method’ that takes into account a ‘plurality of meanings and irreducible 
multiple aspects’.  It involves a scientific approach that is not directed towards ‘discovery’ but, 
rather, towards the notion of invention that ‘gives being to what [does] not exist, it might 
never happen’ (ibid., p. 15).  Moreover, invention consists of ‘raising the problem, in creating 
terms in which it can be stated’ (ibid.) and, by doing so, it sets out the ‘ground’ by which such 
a ‘problem’ may be made actual by way of the ‘solution’ it anticipates.  For Al Saji (2004), 
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Bergson’s notion of intuition involves a ‘leap’ away from one’s normative way of thinking 
and responding by becoming aware of other planes of memory, to the virtual or ‘pure’ 
memory of the present, that coexists with all memories, all pasts.  It involves being open to a 
‘polyphony’ of other memory ‘that records dissonant, and dissenting, voices and inscribes 
discordant histories’ (Al Saji 2004, p. 227). The ‘virtuality’ of memory, then, contains within 
it the potential to disrupt practical consciousness and to challenge or fracture it with ‘unlikely 
combinations’, where a ‘leap’ of intuition—as an explanatory hypothesis or hunch—has the 
potential to expose the limit or the lack of applicability of practical consciousness to any ‘thing’ 
other than what it presupposes to be useful and beneficial to the furthering of itself as a ‘truth’ 
procedure.  
 
Given the above, if we return to the notion of Duchamp’s spectator, it appears that for an 
‘actual transmutation’ from inert matter to aesthetic object to take place, a ‘spectator’ needs 
to both see and be open to the contingent materiality of the Readymade as an object of both 
practical and aesthetic utility.  By presenting Fountain, Duchamp raises the problem of nonart-
as-art and, thereby, shifts the ‘appreciation’ of an ‘art’ object away from a subjective visual 
experience (that may simply seek to ‘will’ and confirm itself in the way it reads and responds 
to phenomena) and towards a confrontation with a placeholder or ‘other’ that appears to bear 
no relation to the ‘place’ in which it takes place.  To see the ‘dull matter’ of nonart-as-art as 
more than simply ‘nothing’, requires a spectator to undergo her own form of poiesis, so that 
she may begin to ‘read’ the gesture of this object beyond the limit of her own ‘life of praxis’.  
However, such a ‘pro-duction into presence’ of this ‘new’ reader, requires her to forego and 
[un]will herself in the act of ‘reading’ itself.  This involves an attitude to reading where one 
no longer seeks to realise and recognise oneself in one’s ‘reading’ (as a means to will and confirm 
one’s own existence) but, rather, as a means of looking beyond the notion of ‘one’ and, by 
doing so, becoming aware of the presence and absence of ‘voices’ other than one’s own. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I initially outline my relevant previous research to contextualize the 
development of this research project’s aims and objectives.  Then, I briefly discuss the work 
of Samuel Beckett (as filtered through the writing of Deleuze and Badiou) to identify an 
overall framework to initiate the practical research of this project.  By appropriating Bergson’s 
theory of perception inter alia, I develop a range of material and process investigations that 
aim to subtract a textual object from itself or to use a part (or ‘subject’) of a text to investigate 
what it may have in common with another.  Through a series of word ‘painting’ studies, I 
develop a means to decompose already made texts and their individual words into elementary 
parts.  My term for these ‘first’ words is urword and I ‘define’ them as the 124 two-letter 
Collins Scrabble Words.  By considering words to be constructible (and hence de-
constructible) accordingly the elementary parts they contain and share, these urwords provide 
a common internal limit or boundary that can be used to examine the relationship within and 
between words and texts.  By misappropriating Cantor’s idea of counting primes to align a 
set with a subset, I attempt to develop a means by which urwords can be used to transpose or 
pass one textual object through another.  
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4.1 Relevant previous projects 51 
 
To provide context of my practice, this section shows how my art practice investigates inter 
alia the relationship between the visual and verbal language after the Readymade.  One of 
Duchamp’s key insights is [un]grounding the ‘neutrality’ of a painting support and re-
grounding it with an already made object that has a more explicit ‘history’.  The object is 
thereby re-produced and becomes a referent of itself.   In this section, I briefly discuss the 
background of the current project and how its grows out from my previous research and 
material investigations. 
 
Figure 3: Tabula Rasa, 2000. Video installation, dimensions variable.   
 
In Tabula Rasa (2000; Fig. 3) I explore the relationship between the ‘site’ (or mise en scène) of a 
social ‘event’ and its video documentation.  This work seeks to open-up a ‘space’ between two 
representations so that a viewer can interact and re-position the objects with or against the 
‘choreography’ or narrative of the film.  The footage documents the visual remains of a social 
encounter (in the tradition of Andy Warhol’s single point-of-view films—e.g. Sleep 1963, 
                                                        
51 For the avoidance of doubt, the previous works presented and discussed in this section were all completed 
prior to the commencement of the current research project and, therefore, do not form any part whatsoever of the 
research, material investigations undertaken or outcomes.  They are only included to provide a broader 
contextual basis, so that a reader is aware of the artistic practice from which this project arises.  
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Empire 1964, etc.) between four people conversing over coffee and cigarettes.  Positioned 
directly above, the camera records the ‘events’ that occur on the tabletop.  The sound and 
verbal content of the conversation are subtracted, so that the social exchange is limited to the 
action of the hands as they remove and replace cups, ash cigarettes, pour coffee and milk, add 
sugar, etc.  The tabletop and other already made objects are painted white so that video footage 
can be projected (or superimposed) back onto the site in which the event took place. By 
imposing a series of limits on the filming and re-presentation of the narrative of this event, 
the work subverts the stability of the narrative content by re-framing the social exchange 
solely in visual and material terms.   The fixed and passive ground that a two-dimensional 
screen provides is replaced by an ‘active’, unstable and unfixed three-dimensional field of 
surfaces that distort and disrupt the visual performance and repetition of ‘events’ it records.  
The viewer can thereby participate by rearranging, recomposing and shifting the ground 
upon which the narrative takes place.    
 
Following on from Tabula Rasa, a series of ‘portrait’ studies titled Self (2002; Fig. 4) involves 
the superimposition of two representations—one three-dimensional, the other, two-
dimensional—where the two representations interact, distort and displace the stability of each 
other’s portrayal of ‘self’.  Whereas Duchamp uses a verbal inscription to destablise and ‘split’ 
an already made object between practical and aesthetic utility, both Tabula Rasa and the Self 
series involve the conflation of two-dimensional and three-dimensional images to show how 
the displacement of a stable ‘ground’ plays in distorting and subverting the continuity and 
consistency of each representation.  Such works produce an irreducible ‘space’ within and 
across visual languages of each presentation that destabilizes and may show inter alia the limit 
of any one representation. 
 
 
Figure 4: Self, 2002.  Video projection on fiberglass bust, dimensions variable. 
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Figure 5: Remember, 2002. Video still.  Video on repetitive loop, 59 secs. 
 
 
The video work Remember (2002; Fig. 5) is an attempt to apply the rationale of the news media 
paradigm (to ‘visualize deviance’ by selecting, editing and re-framing ‘events’ to re-present 
the atypical as typical) to the presentation of the news itself. Video footage of a newsreader is 
reframed and edited to elide and empty-out the particularities of individual stories to reveal 
the repetitive and clichéd nature of a universal language of what is constructed as new(s) or as 
a noteworthy event.   Drawing on literary strategies such as parataxis, of removing that which 
connects statements, generic phrases are placed together to reveal a ‘story’ that may or may 
not exist within and across stories.  For example, phrases such as ‘code of silence’, ‘further 
reducing hope’, ‘life saving surgery’, ‘zero tolerance’, ‘constant supervision’, etc., were 
montaged to create the sense of a narrative punctuated by the frequent imposition of the 
word: ‘remember’.  By applying strict limitations, the content is reframed, impoverished and 
re-presented as a looped 59 second segment. The work reframes a newsreader as a mouth of a 
‘drill instructor’ who robotically fires statements/commands to inspire learning by rote.  Key 
influences for this work include Bruce Nauman’s video works (e.g. Good Boy, Bad Boy, 1985) 
and neon works (e.g. One Hundred Live and Die, 1984), in addition to, the use of parataxis in 
Samuel Beckett’s later works, such as Not I (1971).
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The work, Undercovered (2002; Fig. 6), is a minimal work that involves the projection of live 
security camera footage of the rear of a retail shop onto its front window.  The contents or 
internal space of the shop is elided and emptied out, so that the front-of-house reveals (rather 
than conceals) the back-of-house operations, with the screen recording the movements, 
goings-on of the undercover car park behind the store.  During the duration of the installation, 
this rear space is used as an impromptu ‘performance space’ by some or, more simply, by 
workers from the adjacent businesses sheltering from the elements to a have a ‘smoko’ (see Fig. 
6, top centre).  Among other things, this work engages with Duchamp’s ‘Large Glass’, Andy 
Warhol’s films in its attempt to link notions of window shopping with surveillance, security, 
consumerism, with a screen-based experience of life.    
 
 
   
 
Figure 6: In collaboration with Mark Christian, Undercovered, 2002.  Live-feed video projection 400 x 300 cm, 
security camera, data projector. (as part of the exhibition Screen, BEAP Perth 2002).   
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Figure 7: To remember to forget, 2002. 7,128 printed catalogue cards (100 x 152 mm).  
 
 
 
To Remember to Forget is a body of research that aims to catalogue or exhaust the language of 
remembering and forgetting: to exhaust the ‘place’ of remembering and forgetting in 
language.  To map this language, the four pronouns (I, you, we, they) are used to conjugate, 
in all eleven tenses of the English language, a series of 81 transitive verbs (e.g. agree, aim, 
appear, apply, ask, assume, battle, …, wait, want, wish, write) which are then combined with 
either of the infinitive verbs, ‘to remember’ or ‘to forget’.  For example, with the pairing of 
the verb ‘dare’ and the infinitive ‘forget’, the permutations are as follows: I dare to forget; I have 
dared to forget; I am daring to forget; I have been daring to forget; I dared to forget; I had dared to forget; 
I was daring to forget; I shall dare to forget; I shall have dared to forget; I shall be daring to forget; and I 
shall have been daring to forget.  This sequence is repeated with the pronouns: you, we and they, 
and then, again, with the opposite infinitive, to remember.  This produces 3,564 ‘to remember’ 
and 3,564 ‘to forget’, making a total of 7,128 generic statements that describe an ‘attitude’ or 
relationship with the remembering or forgetting, with any ‘content’ of what is to be 
remembered or forgotten excluded from these statements.   
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Figures 8 & 9: Examples from the To remember to forget, Polaroid series, 2002.  Images sourced from West 
Australian Newspapers, 2002. 
 
 
Following the logic of Duchamp’s inscription of the Readymades, this catalogue of 
remembering and forgetting is used a means of investigating how generic language phrases 
name, frame and influence our reading and interpretation of already made ‘objects’.  In the first 
instance, these generic statements are randomly paired with ‘found’ images (sourced from 
newspaper articles) and reformatted to reference Polaroid photographs.  The work marries an 
image and a generic phrase to produce a catalogue of remembering and forgetting.  In another 
derivative work, several readers are asked to randomly select cards from the To remember to 
forget catalogue (or database) and, then, are asked to read them as each reader sees fit.   In this 
way, the generic phrases are randomly paired with each voice, whose identity is limited to 
aural cues associated with gender, age, and accent.  Presented as an eight-channel sound 
installation, these isolated voices ‘call-out’ across the darkness of an installation space to create 
a cacophony of isolated subjects articulating generic statements about remembering and 
forgetting.  In a similar way to the way Duchamp’s use of an abstract ‘short sentence’ to bring 
forward the already made object as its visual and concrete reference, the ‘materiality’ and aural 
particularities of each reader’s voice (and, hence, body) provides a concrete reference and, 
thereby, ‘grounds’ the ambiguity of the generic phrases.  For a ‘viewer’, the meaning(s) of 
what is being said is placed between the abstract ‘content’ of the ‘narrative’ of the generic 
statements and the ‘veiled’ identity of who is speaking and how these words are said. 
 
A further project aims to investigate the intra-relationship between a seat (or chair) and itself, 
where the chair is required to be ‘self-supporting’, by being forced into a relationship with its 
other: an absent sitter.  How can the function or utility of the chair be superimposed or 
translated into its physical form to, in a sense, apply its own functionality to itself?   
 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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Figure 10: Bending over backwards, 2010.   
 
 
To respond to this question, the ‘relationship’ between clichéd word phrases (or constructions) 
and an already made form of a chair is explored.  This involves attempting to ‘pass’ a word 
‘construction’ through a material object to give material and sensual form to language.  By 
using a clichéd phrase as an instruction or peremptory command a chair—as physical 
support—is unmade by the language of the phrase.  Through a series of cuts, folds, fixings, 
un-fixings, and re-fixings, the chair’s standard form undergoes a series of transitions that 
slowly transpose language of the word phrase into the materiality of the chair.   In Fig. 10, a 
balsa wood marquette (modeled on an Ikea children’s chair) undergoes a physical 
deconstruction by being forced to follow the command: ‘bend over backwards’.  However, 
rather than embodying the material form of this instruction or command, the outcome of this 
process reduces the chair to an incongruous and ambiguous ruin of its former ‘self’.  The ‘logic’ 
of the phrase, to ‘bend over backwards’, is ‘expressed’ in the outcome, however, it remains 
concealed by the materiality of what remains of the chair (e.g. as seen in the bottom right-
hand side of the image in Fig. 10).  Accordingly, the ‘logic’ (as the process or gesture that the 
phrase describes) can only glimpsed when the transition is documented as a series of discrete 
steps.  Moreover, without including the instruction as a title, it is very difficult to ascertain 
the process of the words (as an instruction) from the outcome itself.  The question, then, 
becomes: how can the ‘logic’ of the instruction that transforms the object remain visually 
present in and as the endpoint of the process itself?   
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Figure 11: [34 + 88 = 1, 2, 3 …] after Nietzsche and Creed, 2010.  Ready[un]made chair, dimensions variable.  
Photo: Curtin University. 
 
 
The work, [34 + 88 = 1, 2, 3 …] (Fig. 11), combines a language ‘object’ and a physical object, 
so that the outcome resounds the combination of these ‘objects’.  The language ‘object’ is 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘Maxim 34’ from The Twilight of the Idols where he accuses Flaubert of 
nihilism when he associates thinking (and writing) with sitting.52  The physical ‘object’ is 
Martin Creed’s Work No. 88: A Sheet of A4 paper crumpled into a Ball (1994).  In a sense, this 
work involves the superimposition of two ideas or two acts of abandonment: a ‘chair’ 
abandoned by an idea born of ‘walking’ and the gesture of the rejection of writing by a ‘writer’ 
who sculpts. 
 
A subsequent range of studies sort to simplify the instruction so that the endpoint of the 
transposition (as a static form) did not overly conceal the logic of the process that produced it.   
In this way, the product would embody the logic of the instruction that its physical ‘unfolding’ 
                                                        
52  ‘On ne peut penser et ecrie qu’assis’ * (G Flaubert). – Now I have you, nihilist!  Assiduity ** is the sin 
against the holy spirit.  Only ideas won by walking have any value.’  Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Maxim 34’, Twilight 
of the Idols, translated by R J Hollingdale, p 36, Penguin Books, London, 1968.  Translator’s notes as follows: 
‘*  One can only think and write when sitting down.   
** das Sitzfleisch: etymologically ‘the posterior’ (sitting-flesh). ‘Assiduity, from sedere = to sit, is cognate.  
Hence the contrast with ‘walking’ ideas.’ 
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documents.  The example below (Fig. 12) follows on from Roland Barthes’ observation that 
‘language is irreversible’ where ‘what has been said cannot be unsaid, except by adding to it: 
to correct, here, is, oddly enough, to continue’ (Barthes 1989, p. 76).  The simple instruction 
that drives the transposition in this work parallels what Barthes calls erasure or ‘annulation-
by-addition’ where the act of doing, of imposing change, is immediately countered by an 
attempt to reverse or annul this change (ibid.). Erasure, as an attempt to return to the original 
form of the chair, in this sense never takes place—the act of doing (of addition) is further 
compounded by the act of undoing, where there is no going back, no prospect of avoiding 
the change once initiated.  Fig. 12 explores the idea of movement and counter-movement, to 
effect a change and, then, attempt to reverse it.  This process of moving forward then 
backward, of lacking a definitive direction or ‘place’ to go, produces a split and destabilized 
object that takes place between coming and going, as a movement that has no particular place 
to go.    
 
    
 
Figure 12: Untitled, 2010.  Ready[un]made chair, dimensions variable.  Photographs: Curtin University. 
 
 
Whereas Duchamp inscribes readymade objects with the punning play of language phrases, 
this body of research sought to incise the object with language by ‘passing’ a word phrase (as 
instruction) through the object, to in a sense, re-ground the logic of its appearing (as a ‘chair) 
into the ‘translation’ of the object as a function of a language instruction itself.  The transposed 
object is a material expression of instructions.  As a physical ‘deconstruction’, this process 
becomes re-constructive, where doing is always already [un]doing as documented in the shift 
from one logic (that produces the standard form of the chair) to another that expresses the 
transformative alternative logic of disarrangement.  In this sense, the language of the 
instructions literally redefines the chair so that it reflects and becomes an expression of this 
language itself.  
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4.2 A rudimentary point of departure 
 
Following on from the previous projects briefly discussed above, the point of departure for 
the current research project involves a rudimentary attempt to develop means by which to 
combine the words of two ‘readymade’ artworks by way of a language ‘bridge’.  The initial 
idea is to develop a language ‘machine’ which uses chance to produce [un]authored and 
ambiguous sentences that reference or mime Descartes’ iconic statement: ‘I think therefore I 
am’.   This ‘short sentence’ is broken down into three parts: the ‘I’ that thinks, the ‘I’ that 
exists, and the ‘mechanism’ that mediates or marks the relationship between the two.  The 
component that re-presents the ‘I’ that thinks is developed from the subtracted and 
disorganized vocabulary of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho (‘WH’).  The ‘I’ that ‘exists’ is 
drawn from On Kawara’s phrase: ‘I AM STILL ALIVE’ from his Telegrams series (from 1969).  
Finally, the means of bridging these two works is drawn from my previous research involving 
the exhaustion of memory, in the form of the infinitive verbs, To remember to forget studies 
(2002).   
 
To develop the randomized ‘thinking’ part of the work, the vocabulary of WH is subtracted 
and re-sorted into word categories (adjectives, adverbs, nouns, pronouns, verbs, etc.).  Then, 
by a ‘random’ or chance procedure, words are selected to form a ‘grammatical’ sentence 
fragment.  The intention is to exhaust (as much as possible) the vocabulary of WH by 
combining it into as many sentence fragments as possible.  These completely randomized 
fragments are then added to either the infinitive, to remember or to forget.  Finally, the fixed 
or unchanged part (that ‘exists’) is On Kawara’s: ‘I AM STILL ALIVE’.  The formula is: the 
randomized vocabulary of WH + an infinitive verb (to remember or to forget) + the fixed 
phrase, ‘I AM STILL ALIVE’.  Some examples of the phrases generated include:   
 
They add naught to remember I AM STILL ALIVE 
They bare change to forget I AM STILL ALIVE 
They bare naught to remember I AM STILL ALIVE 
They care less to forget I AM STILL ALIVE 
 
While this line of inquiry provides a basic sketch of the method developed below (for passing 
an artwork or object through another), this attempt is abandoned.  Firstly, the selection of 
words relies on chance and, with WH containing 447 individual words, there is no practical 
way to exhaust its language.  The permutations are too large and too complex.  Secondly, this 
method inscribes and modifies the fixed phrase, with the three components juxtaposed and 
not superimposed.  Finally, the variation and alteration of On Kawara’s phrase (via Beckett’s 
vocabulary and the infinitives, to remember and to forget) remain ‘external’ to this ‘object’: 
each part may extend to the other but, the parts overall, do not alter or distort each other 
‘internally’. 
 
From this brief investigation, it becomes clear that one needs to limit this process to exhaust 
it.  Without such a limitation, I find myself subjectively selecting some phrases over others.  
Such an approach has the potential to affect the outcome, where authorial intentions may 
direct and undermine the interactions between the language of the respective 
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artworks/textual objects. To develop a more manageable and controllable approach, I 
automate the process by passing a language phrase through an already made translation 
algorithm, Google Translate.  The idea here is to use the algorithm to strip away the arbitrary 
and selective characteristics of a phrase, by translating it through several languages.  In a 
similar way to a Chinese Whisper, a phrase is passed through the French, German, Polish, 
Russian, Romanian, Serbian, Croatian, Italian and French languages before returning back to 
English.    
 
They change nothing to forget I AM STILL ALIVE 
 
Ils changent rien à oublier que je suis encore en vie   (French) 
Sie ändern nichts daran, dass ich noch lebe    (German) 
Możesz zmienić faktu, że jeszcze żyję     (Polish) Вы можете изменить то, что я все еще жив  (Russian) 
Aveți posibilitatea să modificați faptul că sunt încă în viață  (Romanian) Можете променити чињеницу да су живи   (Serbian) 
Možete promijeniti činjenicu da su živi     (Croatian) 
Si può cambiare il fatto che sono vivi     (Italian) 
Vous pouvez changer le fait qu'ils sont en vie    (French) 
 
You can change the fact that They are ALIVE 
 
This process is reminiscent of Duchamp’s Three Standard Stoppages, where the phrase (or ‘word 
string’) drops through the translation algorithm.  Unlike Duchamp’s work, however, the 
phrase does not simply change its shape ‘as it pleases’; it is [un]authored and re-authored as it 
‘descends’ each step.  In this regard, this word-string is materially changed by this process, 
where words are subtracted, added and re-ordered.  However, it would be premature to 
assume that the transformed phrase, ‘you can change the fact that they are alive’, has reached 
the ‘ground’.  To exhaust this process, I repeat it to see whether the phrase can be reduced to 
one that it is ‘universally’ translatable and, thereby, immune to the distorting effects of the 
translation algorithm.  When the process is repeated, the passage and changes of the English 
phrases are as follows: 
 
[Un]original phrase:  They change nothing to forget I AM STILL ALIVE 
After first cycle:  You can change the fact that They are ALIVE 
After second cycle:   I can change the fact that I'm ALIVE 
After third cycle:    I can change that I'm alive 
After fourth cycle:   I can change that I'm alive 
 
Once the process has been repeated three times, the phrase reaches the ‘ground’ where further 
repetitions reproduce the same result.  Duchamp’s Three Standard Stoppages produces three 
variations of a standard form.  This process also produces three variations, but they are 
contracted, twisted and altered ‘transpositions’ of a non-standard sentence that results in a 
homogenized or standardized form.  In a sense the sentence, ‘I can change that I’m alive’, is a 
ready[un]made expression that is an [un]authored product of the translation algorithm itself.   
By applying this process to more phrases, it may be possible to map-out a set of ‘universal’ 
utterances, that share a common ‘ground’, where the disjunctions and differences between 
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languages are annulled and brought into direct correspondence with each other.  Subjecting a 
whole text to such a process may thereby produce a ‘universal’ translation of it.  However, 
such a product would not be a ‘faithful’ rendition of the original text but, rather, one that 
perhaps reflects the interaction between the contingent materiality of languages and the 
algorithm itself.   
 
While this approach may have potential and produce some interesting results, the ‘logic’ of its 
process, due to the already made translation algorithm, remains hidden and inaccessible.  
Therefore, it is not possible (especially within the context of this project) to identify a 
common logic that is driving the translation across languages.  To understand that a shift has 
taken place, one needs to juxtapose the input with the output.  A question therefore arises: 
what steps are required to pass a language ‘object’ through a translation process, so one can 
know, control and make visible the logic of this process in the product itself?   
 
 
4.3 Samuel Beckett and the ‘unwording’ of  literature 
 
To respond to the question above and to find a mechanism by which a ‘readymade’ artwork 
or textual object can be passed through another object, I turn to the work of Samuel Beckett 
and his attempt of some 50 years to ‘unword’ literature.  Anthony Uhlmann (1996, p. 152) 
suggests that Beckett’s principal artistic concern (and ideal) is to produce ‘a non-relational art’.  
That is, an art that attempts to minimize the ability of practical consciousness to ‘fix’ an 
object’s signification and significance by way of its context.  For example, Uhlmann identifies 
that Beckett (in his novel Molloy, 1950/1955) takes two approaches: firstly, he attempts to 
isolate an object and remove it from its usual context and, secondly, he tries to draw the 
experience of the simultaneity of everything-at-once.  In this regard, Uhlmann quotes from 
Beckett’s Proust: 
 
when the object is perceived as particular and unique and not merely the member 
of a family, when it appears independent of any general notion and detached from 
the sanity of cause, isolated and inexplicable in the light of ignorance, then and 
then only may it be a source of enchantment. (Beckett quoted in Uhlmann 1996, 
p. 152) 
 
What gives an object a specific meaning is the identification of its context (by practical 
consciousness) which facilitates the decoding of a situation and thereby enables our response 
to it to be ‘readymade’ (ibid.).  In this regard, the recognition of context is inescapable and the 
‘forerunner of action’—for being able to identify a situation, to read it, is surely the precursor 
of how one responds to it.  For Badiou (2006, p. 121), Beckett’s work involves an ‘ascesis’ and 
a ‘vigilance’; it is an art of ‘subtraction as a patient, disciplined, vigilant elimination of doxa’.53 
By subtracting language from its usual context, Beckett’s work serves to displace the power 
of language to name and, by doing so, exposes it as a contingent material that has the capacity 
to be other than that which it is presupposed to be.  If, as Badiou contends, ‘the event is 
subtracted from any and every regime of sense, it has no name’ (ibid., p. 127), then, an ‘event’ 
cannot be named in the language of ‘good’ or standardized speech.  If it occurs at all, it takes 
                                                        
53 Doxa is the Greek word for ‘common belief’ or ‘popular opinion’. 
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place by way of ‘improper’ and ‘[un]willed’ speech that is perhaps receptive to the appearance 
within language of poiesis, as the pro-duction of ‘originary naming’ (ibid.).    
 
Deleuze (1997b, p. 154) suggests that Beckett’s ‘entire oeuvre is pervaded by exhaustive series’.  
If ‘language states the possible’, then, Beckett’s strategy is to exhaust the possible: to ‘combine 
the set of variables of a situation, on the condition that one renounce any order of preference, 
any organization in relation to a goal, any signification’ (ibid., p. 153).   For Deleuze (ibid.), 
Beckett’s notion of exhaustion must be differentiated from tiredness, where one ‘is tired of 
something but exhausted by nothing’; one however remains ‘active’—not passive—‘but for 
nothing’.  Therefore, to exhaust the possible of a situation or ‘place’ is to ‘prefer not to’ realize 
it, by passing over, ignoring or misapplying its normative and preconceived purpose, its telos 
or final cause.  It is, perhaps, to follow Aesop’s and Bartleby’s example of [un]willing and 
[un]realizing what is presupposed to be the situation of the place itself.  Perhaps, to do so, is 
an attempt to ‘pro-duce’ what counts as ‘nothing’ other than an apagogical demonstration of 
the finitude of the place itself; of its own impossibility.  Andrew Gibson, in his discussion of 
Badiou’s reading of Beckett, identifies and defines apagogic reason as follows: 
 
a form of pseudo-deduction in an incoherent universe, installing itself in a 
situation it supposes to be incoherent until this incoherence manifests itself. […]  
It begins with nullity and is extremely uncertain of the criteria for the connection 
it forges.  It does not know where it is going.  […] It is, at one and the same time, 
an assured and prudent experiment in order, and an ‘adventurous pilgrimage in 
disorder’. (Gibson 2006, p. 63) 
 
To try to [un]will my relationship to language, literature and reading in particular, I draw on 
Deleuze’s (1997b, pp. 152-174) essay, The Exhausted, to identify three strategies or ‘languages’ 
that Beckett employs in his attempt to exhaust and un-word literature: 
 
•  A ‘language of voices’ which aims ‘to exhaust words themselves’ [and] ‘dries up their 
flows’ through the use of strategies such as subtraction (e.g. via parataxis); 
 
• A ‘language of names’ that involves the substitution of one logic of naming for another 
(e.g. ‘the combinatorial for the syntactic’);   
 
• A ‘language of images’ that incorporates a paradoxical condition of something 
appearing indefinite yet being completely determined.   
(Deleuze 1997b, pp. 156-60) 
 
Through the series of material investigations that follow, I attempt to develop a method (or 
algorithm) to pass an artwork or (textual) object through another.  To do so, I adapt these 
three languages to form the key operations of the algorithm: subtraction, decomposition and 
transposition. 
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4.4 Subtraction 
 
In this section I discuss Beckett’s strategy of isolating or decontextualizing language, to 
develop a means of identifying commonalities within and between texts by way of subtraction. 
To achieve this, I select perhaps his most minimal and difficult work, Worstward Ho (‘WH’).  
For Badiou (2005, p. 90), WH is concerned with ‘the question of being’ and ‘is a recapitulatory 
text, that is, one that takes stock of the whole of Samuel Beckett’s intellectual enterprise.’   
 
Initially, the pared back language of WH is devastatingly ‘simple’.  Such ‘simplicity’ makes it 
a difficult text to read silently.  It begins with the words: ‘On. Say on.  Be said on. […]’ 
(Beckett 1983, p. 7).  To go on reading, however, I find myself having to say these words, to 
hear them.  When read aloud, any sense of what they ‘say’ does not appear to be carried by 
the words themselves but, rather, by how they resound a sense of sense.  That is, one first hears 
these ‘words’ as sounds before listening to and re-cognizing them as words that convey 
‘meaning’.  The sheer ‘brevity’ of the text forces a shift in one’s relationship and response to 
a language that is both familiar and unfamiliar.  By saying and hearing it, one perhaps re-
experiences language as ‘other’ by somehow stepping ‘outside’ of it so that one can hear it 
again as a rhythmic repetition of its unfolding as sound.   
 
Badiou (2005, p. 90) rightly notes that WH is a work which has ‘an extreme attention to 
rhythm.’  The first paragraph reads: ‘On. Say on.  Be said on. Somehow on.  Till nohow on.  
Said nohow on.’ (Beckett 1983, p. 7).  Note, in this regard, the repetition of ‘on’ in each of 
these six steps.  For Teo (2013, p. 36; original emphasis), ‘‘on’ sustains, repeats, and even 
mobilizes itself but for the pauses that stand in its way’.  As an isolated word, ‘on’ may connote 
many meanings, but when paired with the cessation of a full-stop (‘on.’), it perhaps suggests a 
‘movement’ arrested that language after repeated attempts fails to reproduce.   
 
If we add emphasis to the words of the first paragraph, we can perhaps see how the appearance 
of ‘on.’—as perhaps an already made ‘object’ of thought—initiates a series of attempts to 
inscribe and make it possible as language itself.     
 
On.  Say on.  Be said on.  Somehow on.  Till nohow on.  Said nohow on. 
(Beckett 1983, p. 7; emphasis added).   
 
‘On.’, however, appears to be unmoved by these successive attempts.  The ‘inscriptions’, ‘Say’, 
‘Be said’, ‘Somehow’, ‘Till nohow’, ‘Said nohow’, appear to document the progression of a 
failure to inscribe ‘on.’ into existence.  If we consider ‘on.’ to be a placeholder for the ‘event’ 
of the [un]thinking of thought, then, this short paragraph perhaps marks Beckett’s attempt to 
name and hold on to this ‘event’ in language, as language.   
 
For Perloff (2010, p. 218-219), the ‘underlying sense of fracture’ in Beckett’s work, ‘of [the] 
dislocation and dissolution of the speaking subject’, is not to be found in the ‘rhythmic and 
recurrent phrasing’ of verse nor in the syntactical orthodoxy of prose.  One finds it rather in 
what Northrop Frye describes as an ‘associative rhythm’, a ‘thought breath or phrase’, that 
relates to ‘ordinary speech, or at least to soliloquy and inner speech’ (Frye quoted in Perloff 
2010, p. 218).    
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If, as Badiou contends (2005, p. 90), WH is a ‘recapitulatory text’, then, to initiate these 
studies in subtraction, I consider the language of the first paragraph above as a (textual) 
‘subject’ or ‘formula’ that reflects Beckett’s overall artistic gesture and resounds the rhythm or 
‘thought breath’ of his ‘speaking subject’.  To use this ‘subject’, I draw from and misapply 
Bergson’s theory of perception where what is perceived in consciousness results from a double 
subtraction of that which communicates.  Fig. 13 illustrates how the body receives only the 
images it is capable of receiving and, then, the mind (by way of memory) selects those images 
that are of interest and useful to it in terms of guiding future action.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: A simplified model of Bergson’s 
theory of perception.   
 
S1: Unfreely selected images or what the body 
can receive or sense. 
 
S2: Mind chooses the images of interest to it—
by incising an order on what is sensed by the 
body.  Interest (and hence disinterest), by way 
of the filter of memory, forms a barricade 
against and discounts that which is not ‘known’ 
to be useful. 
 
 
 
 
In Fig. 14, I adapt this model by substituting, firstly, the ‘Infinitude of Images’ for the 
‘Infinitude of Texts’, then secondly, the ‘Selection of the Body’ for the ‘Body as textual object’ 
(e.g. the already made body of text that is WH), and finally, the selection of the ‘Mind’ for the 
‘Subject’ of WH that initiates and perhaps operates as a cipher for the overall gesture of the 
text itself.  To achieve this, the words contained in the ‘subject’ are used to filter or subtract 
only those words that visually correspond to them.  However, rather than simply use the 
actual words of the subject itself: {‘on, say, be, said, somehow, till, nohow’}—where words 
exactly match these seven words—I simplify them further to better show how these ‘source’ 
words take place throughout the overall text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Infinitude of all Images
S1: ‘Selection’ of the Body
S2:
Mind
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Figure 14: Bergson’s theory of perception, 
rectified, where text is the matter that is 
read/received, etc. 
 
S1: Unfree selection of the ‘body’ as an already 
made text (e.g. Worstward Ho). 
 
S2: Selection of the ‘Mind’ as the subject of 
WH as the ‘formula’ that initiates and 
embodies the overall ‘interest’ or orientation 
of the text.   
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, I follow the instruction: erase or subtract all words that do not correspond or 
contain the following words: {on, say, be, id, so, me, how, ill, no}.  When applied, only the 
words from the wider text that visually resemble or contain one of these ‘subject’ words are 
permitted to ‘pass through’ this filter.  The words that don’t correspond are subtracted or 
erased by way of a corrector ribbon.  Fig. 15 provides an example of how the subject words 
take place throughout the text, as a material extension or expansion of the subject words that 
literally reveal both the presence and absence of a text with the main text.  While this text is 
impoverished by the ‘rectification’ of the instruction, it is more ‘unified’ and repetitious than 
the whole text but, also, more fragmented and semantically obscure.  With that said, it is not 
only the non-corresponding words that are subtracted.  With each erasure, the standard order 
of words is elided by the ‘addition’ of the white space between the words, between the lines 
and across the pages of the text itself.  Therefore, the standard convention of reading a text 
(in English) from left to right, top to bottom, is subverted.  The page starts to resemble a screen, 
where a reader is also a viewer and may thereby read this ‘text’ in many ways: vertically, 
horizontally, diagonally, in patterns, or any particular way she may choose. 
 
Infinitude of all Texts
S1:  Body as textual object
S2:
subject
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Figure 15: Subtraction study #1: Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho, rectified on a theme of its first paragraph, 2013.  
Detail, pp. 8-9.  (Beckett 1983, pp. 8–9) 
 
 
The next step in these subtraction studies is to test how the subject from WH can be used to 
locate commonalities between works by the same author.  As WH is the third part of what is 
commonly known as Beckett’s ‘second trilogy’ (i.e. Company, Ill Seen Ill Said, Worstward Ho), 
I select the corresponding work from his first trilogy, The Unnamable (‘TU’), and ‘perform’ a 
subtractive ‘reading’ of it.  Again, the instruction applied is: subtract or erase all the words 
that do not correspond or contain the following words: {on, say, be, id, so, me, how, ill, no}.    
 
Fig. 16 shows that the WH subject provides a similar reduction in the quantity of text 
remaining.  This suggests that these ‘subject’ words provide a reasonably strong common basis 
within Beckett’s oeuvre.  As is evident in Fig. 15, the subtraction of text opens the work to 
alternative readings and highlight the high degree of repetition in the work itself.     
 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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Figure 16: Subtraction study #2: Samuel Beckett’s, The Unnamable, rectified on a theme of Samuel Beckett’s 
Worstward Ho, 2013.  Detail, pp. 2-3.  (Beckett 2010, pp. 2–3) 
 
The reduction of TU so that it corresponds to the language of the subject of WH, provides a 
material link between the two texts.  In a sense, the instruction [un]authors and re-authors 
TU, where the ‘addition’ of space reveals the presence (and absence) of ‘multi-dimensional’ 
aspects of the text that are usually suppressed or concealed by the serial presentation and 
reading of words one after the other.  At some 134 pages, TU is significantly longer than 
WH’s 40 pages. Therefore, the task of applying this instruction is significantly more difficult, 
time consuming and monotonous.  Interestingly, when ‘reading’ is task driven, I notice that 
I’m not in fact processing and understanding the words of a narrative but, rather, scanning, 
looking for and recognizing the subject words.  Words no longer refer to some ‘thing’ else, 
but become visual material, signs that mark and refer to themselves. 
 
To test how the words of WH correspond to other texts by other authors, I apply the same 
instructions to Shakespeare’s play, Hamlet, as those applied to WH and TU.   As can be seen 
from Figs. 17 & 18 below, the degree of commonality between the WH words and the text 
of Hamlet is not as significance as that between WH and TU.  However, an interesting effect 
that is produced by the re-presentation of Hamlet in the words associated with the subject of 
WH, is the homogenization and apparent negation of the dialogue of different players.  They 
appear to now speak in ‘one voice’, where a conversation appears transformed into the 
‘thought breath’ of a soliloquy.  The radical loss of detail, in a sense, renders all parts ‘equal’ 
and inter-changeable.  
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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Figure 17: Subtraction 
study #3a: William 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
rectified on a theme of 
Samuel Beckett’s 
Worstward Ho, 2013. 
Detail, pp. 42–43. 
(Gordon 1924, pp. 42-43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Subtraction 
study #3b: William 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
rectified on a theme of 
Samuel Beckett’s 
Worstward Ho, 2013. 
Detail, pp. 44–45. 
(Gordon 1924, pp. 42-43)   
 
 
 
To test other forms of art objects, I look for other already made materials to filter or pass 
through the subtractive filter of the WH subject.  As John Baldessari (like Duchamp) quits 
painting to explore the relationship between text and language, I apply the WH ‘subject’ to 
some of his works.  Again, the aim is to determine how the ‘language’ of the subject of WH 
operates within and connects to other works.  In Fig. 19, Baldessari’s ‘painting’, I will not make 
any more boring art (1971), appears, on face value, to be a self-imposed instruction which aims 
to purge any ‘temptation’ to make boring art, in addition to being a commitment towards a 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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future direction or practice.  Applying the same instruction as above, Baldessari’s work is 
filtered through the ‘subject’ of WH.  The only words that remain are: ‘will not’ (see Fig. 20).  
The effacement of the context exposes a potential link between the I (that speaks to express 
itself), the act of making and adding (‘more’), and the category of ‘boring’ art.  Being cut-off 
from its context, the phrase, ‘will not’, is open to further potential readings.  In one sense, the 
repetition of ‘will not’ may be a tit-for-tat response to a tacitly repeated, ‘will so’.  Or, it may 
suggest, an instruction to ‘will not’ or refrain from willing.  When, considered in the context 
of art (as a painting), not making boring art requires one to ‘will not’ or not will.  Given my 
previous discussion of the relationship between praxis (as willed-action) and poiesis (as pro-
duction into presence), this assertion appears to suggest that ‘non-boring’ art involves 
[un]making and [unwilling], of perhaps the pro-duction of ‘nothing’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: John Baldessari, I Will Not Make Any More Boring Art, 1971.  
Lithograph, composition: 22 3/8 x 29 9/16" (56.8 x 75.1 cm); sheet: 22 7/16 
x 30 1/16" (57 x 76.4 cm).  Available from The Museum of Modern Art. 
https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/john-baldessari-i-will-not-
make-any-more-boring-art-1971 
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Figure 20: Subtraction study #4: After John Baldessari’s I Will Not Make Any More 
Boring Art, rectified on a theme of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho, 2013.  
Original work: Lithograph, composition: 22 3/8 x 29 9/16" (56.8 x 75.1 cm); 
sheet: 22 7/16 x 30 1/16" (57 x 76.4 cm).  Available from The Museum of 
Modern Art. https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/john-baldessari-i-
will-not-make-any-more-boring-art-1971 
 
 
 
Applying the instruction to another of Baldassari’s work, Blood (Fig. 21), I investigate the 
relationship between text and an image.  Again, through the effacement of most words, the 
contextualization of the descriptive aspects of the narrative text are subtracted and, as a result, 
the correspondence between the rectified text and the juxtaposed image change.  The selected 
words no longer appear to simply describe an ‘event’ as a means of interpreting the image and 
vice versa.  Rather, in Fig. 21 (RHS), the de-contextualised words appear to visually 
correspond, mime and perform the drama of the image.  Note, the upper arrangement of 
words suggests the shape of the ‘nose’, whereas the lower words (‘me? time, So’), appear to 
‘echo’ the flow of ‘blood’ across the upper lip and onto the lower lip, respectively.  Moreover, 
these words when read appear to echo the moment of realization (of the sudden rupture of 
blood from the nose) that the original text describes: ‘not … me … on … said … Come on 
… moment, … nose, … me? … time, … So’.  Rather than being a fluid and uninterrupted 
flow of events and understanding, the fragmented text appears to only report or mark the 
moments of realization in response to some unseen occurrence.   
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Figure 21: Subtraction study #5: After John Baldessari’s Blood, rectified on a theme of Samuel Beckett’s 
Worstward Ho, 2013.  Photograph, 127 x 203 cm.  Available from artnet:  
http://www.artnet.com/artists/john-baldessari/blood-for-raymond-carver-XuJizllTKuKnVsVOKGh3HA2 
 
 
Contrary to any sense of an all-seeing and all-knowing account (Fig. 21, LHS), the authorial 
position of the rectified text is partially ‘blind’ or blinded.  The rectified text appears to 
perform an experience as it is experienced, without any prior knowledge of what is happening 
and what will happen.  These rectified words thereby appear to unfold in ‘real time’ rather 
than in retrospect, as the recounting of a series of facts that are fixed, certain, and knowable 
through language.  By way of the ‘subject’ of WH, the rectified text negates and circumscribes 
the authority of Baldessari’s narrator.  With this voice falling ‘silent’, perhaps, the subtracted 
words begin to resound the ‘thought breath’ of Beckett’s writing (e.g. Not I, 1971), as the 
sound and rhythm of the thinking of thought itself. 
 
To test the potential to apply the subject of WH to other ‘materials’, I use it as a guide for 
walking the streets of Brighton (UK) and London.  The aim is to link walking with reading 
the urban environment as if it is a text.  Following the subject words (on, say, be, id, so, me, 
how, ill, no), I walk and document these words where they may appear in street and parking 
signs, roadside ‘furniture’, graffiti, etc.  However, the aim is not (after Situationist International) 
to dérive or map-out the psychogeography of the city, but rather to use this subject as a means 
of investigating the relationship between the verbal and visual languages present within urban 
space.  Fig. 22 (bottom) shows a densely worded ‘warning’ (in the original) to those not 
permitted to park on private land.  This is a double warning, designed perhaps to make it none 
too clear to the reader that she has already been warned twice!  When rectified, the unity, 
consistency and coherence of the authority of this ‘voice’ is broken.  While it still stutters-out 
some sense, the message ‘within’ this message (as a ‘thought breath’) appears to perform (or 
anticipate in ‘advance’) the ‘event’ of this claim to authority being ignored.  With that said, 
there is something that is potentially more interesting at work in this study.  In the upper 
right-hand side corner, note my misapplication of the instruction (i.e. to include the words 
that ‘contain’: on, say, …), where the word ‘ONLY’ is mistakenly reduced to the word, ‘ON’.  
While the inclusion of the word, ‘ON’, doesn’t appear to significantly alter the reading of text 
as text within the sign, it does, however, have the potential to operate as wordplay in terms of 
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how it literally references the internal and external spatiality and placement of the sign itself.  
That is, the notion of ‘ON’ unfolds within and across the signs and their placement in the 
following ways: as ink or paint, it is printed on the material support of the sign; as text, it sits 
on the other text both spatially and semantically (e.g. On times…); it is located on the upper 
sign that is placed on the lower sign; it sits on the sign(s) on the wall; and so on …54   
 
 
 
Figure 22: Subtraction study #6: Warning sign, rectified on a theme of Samuel 
Beckett’s Worstward Ho, 2013. 
                                                        
54 Taken further outside the frame or ‘contents’ of the image: the wall on the foundations of the building; the 
foundations on the ground; etc.  It’s important, of course, to also remember what this ‘on’ refers to in terms of 
the place of language and art. 
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Figure 23: Matt Siber, Untitled #1, 2002. Available from Siberart.com. 
http://siberart.com/projects/untitled-project/north-america/untitled-1-2002/ 
 
 
The error of misapplying the instruction shows the potential of the outcome to provide the 
basis of a new instruction to further link and articulate the relationship of verbal and visual 
languages.  To further develop how the contingent materiality of the word, ‘on’, can be used 
as a basis to extend and develop these studies, I draw on the work of Matt Siber and Martin 
Creed.  In Untitled #1 (Fig. 23), Siber re-presents an urban streetscape by splitting an image 
into its visual and verbal languages.  By way of subtraction, he effectively takes the text ‘off’ 
the image so that it names ‘nothing’.   Though un-grounded, the displaced text retains traces 
of the ‘visuality’ of place, by way of its typography and its spatial ‘grammar’.  As a discrete 
text in and of itself, however, it is fragmented and incoherent.  The de-textualised image, on 
the other hand, appears ‘silenced’ by this gesture of [un]naming and is thereby ‘marked’ by 
absence, of having been turned ‘off’ by the removal of text.  In a similar way to Siber’s work, 
Martin Creed’s The lights in a street going on and off (2002; Fig. 24) appears to follow a basic 
instruction of splitting a place, by the presence and absence of artificial light.  However, rather 
than play directly with the spatial connotations of the word, ‘on’, Creed’s work plays on the 
notion of time, where the daily occurrence of the lights going on and off is contracted into a 
two-second cycle.  This work subtracts ‘time’ (along with everything else that will have taken 
place) and reduces this place to a metronymic alternation of what is ‘going on’ and ‘going off’.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Martin Creed, Work No. 276: The lights in a street going on and off, 2002. Dimensions 
variable; 1 second on / 1 second off (Creed 2010, p. 276). 
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Figure 25: Double subtraction study #1, 
rectified on a theme of Samuel Beckett’s 
Worstward Ho, 2013.  Digital image. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Double subtraction study #2, 
rectified on a theme of Samuel Beckett’s 
Worstward Ho, 2013.  Digital image. 
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Figure 27: Double subtraction study #3, 
rectified on a theme of Samuel Beckett’s 
Worstward Ho, 2013.  Digital image. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Double subtraction study #4, 
rectified on a theme of Samuel Beckett’s 
Worstward Ho, 2013.  Digital image. 
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In Figs. 25 – 28 (inclusive), I draw on the spatial and temporal connotations of the word ‘on’, 
to investigate how the contingent material of the rectified text can be used to force a literal 
correspondence between the visual and verbal languages of an image.  For example, in Fig. 
25, the original source text on the traffic sign is: ‘Priority over oncoming vehicles’.  Applying 
the ‘subject’ of WH reduces the text to the solitary word, ‘on’.  Responding to the 
implications of this word—as an instruction—the background of the image is desaturated and 
turned ‘off’.  Such an approach is more observable in Fig. 26, where the original text, 
‘OZONE Coffee Roasters’, is rectified/decomposed to produce the solitary word, ‘on’.  The 
elements of the images that don’t formally or conceptually correspond to the word, ‘on’, are 
thereby desaturated and turned ‘off’.  Such an approach is also applied to the studies on Figs. 
27 & 28. 
 
The use of the strategy of subtraction helped me to identify how the reduction of verbal 
language can be used to subvert the authority of the text, to fragment and displace it, to 
identify the contingent materiality of language and how it can be used as an instruction to 
[un]author and [re]author the relationship between visual and verbal languages.  The 
extension of subtraction in the Warning Sign study (Fig. 22) where the word ‘only’ is 
mistakenly reduced to the work, ‘on’, led to the possibility of developing another means of 
reducing a text or individual word into its elementary parts: decomposition.   
 
 
4.5 Subtraction → Decomposition 
 
To investigate the notion of the decomposition, I turn to philosophy and appropriate some of 
La Rochefoucauld’s Maxims 55 as an already made source of texts to be rectified by the subject 
of WH.  The Maxims (1665/1959) provide a range of short philosophical truisms that express 
a particular point-of-view.  As can be seen from Figs. 29 – 32 (inclusive), these statements 
have been ‘composed’ into two-dimensional works that reference—albeit superficially—John 
Baldessari’s and Christopher Wool’s word-paintings.   
 
The aim of these studies is to test the difference between the subtraction of the WH subject 
versus the decomposition of words into their simplest elements.  In Fig. 29, I first subtract the 
words that correspond with the subject words and, then, decompose these words. The effect 
of the decomposition is to further de-contextualise and isolate the words from the source text.  
The difference between the two approaches, however, appears to be marginal.  In the next 
study (Fig. 30), I test subtraction and decomposition separately.  Subtraction reduces Maxim 
271, ‘Youth is one long intoxication: it is reason in a fever’, to the phrase ‘one long 
intoxication reason’.   The subtraction of the key words ‘youth’ and ‘fever’ subverts the 
meaning of the original sentence by linking ‘intoxication’ with ‘reason’ itself.  However, 
when the sentence is decomposed into two and three letter words, it produces an unusual 
                                                        
55 La Rochefoucauld (1613 – 1680) was a French philosopher of the 17th century.  According to translator, 
Leonard Tancock, the Maxims ‘not only has a point of view, but it is one of the most deeply felt, most intensely 
lived texts in French literature.  It is one man’s experience, his likes and dislikes, sufferings and petty spites, self-
revelations and self-betrayals, regrets for past foolishness and wisdom after the event, crystallised into absolute 
truths.’ (La Rochefoucauld 1959, p. 14). 
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‘utterance’ that can be read in various ways.  Read conventionally (downwards from left to 
right), produces the series: ‘OUT … IS… ON … ON … IN … AT… ON … IT … IS … 
AS… ON … IN’.  While the subtracted text subverts the meaning of the original sentence, 
the decomposed text appears to perform it.  With the grammatical order displaced and each 
word isolated, the phrase seems to be either a ‘febrile’ attempt to reason or, perhaps, a parody 
of reason itself.    
 
   
 
Figure 29: Decomposition study #1:  Left: After La Rochefoucauld, Maxim 198; Centre: Maxim 198, rectified; 
and Right: Maxim 198, rectified and decomposed, 2013. (La Rochefoucauld 1959, p. 62). 
 
   
 
Figure 30: Decomposition study #2:  Left: After La Rochefoucauld, Maxim 271; Centre: Maxim 271, rectified; 
and Right: Maxim 271, rectified and decomposed, 2013. (La Rochefoucauld 1959, p. 73). 
 
 
Figs. 29 & 30 start to suggest that an alternative logic may underlie the principle of 
decomposition.  While subtraction tends to maintain some form of contextual link to the 
words of the original text, decomposition tends to produce a more decontextualized result.  
It is stripped-bare of the context of the specific words of the original text and, thereby, ‘free’ 
to link to other contexts. With that said, a decomposed text still appears to perform or ‘echo’ 
the source text in some way.  To investigate the potential of decomposition further, I select a 
longer text to break it down into its simplest words.  In Fig. 31, I recompose La 
Rochefoucauld’s Maxim 504 into a ‘word-painting’ or block of text.  Rather than applying 
the ‘subject’ of WH as a ‘filter’, I perform a series of decompositions where the text is reduced 
into two-letter word subsets.  Fig. 32 reveals the results of decomposing the text into the 
words, ‘IN, ON, SO, NO, ME, BE’.  In each part of the study, the entire text is decomposed, 
to show the distribution of the each two-letter word throughout the ‘space’ of the picture 
plane.  Each word-set becomes an isolated ‘voice’ that resounds itself.  Words, in this regard, 
are reduced to the materiality of a data set. 
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Figure 31: Study: After La Rochefoucauld, Maxim 504, 2013.  (La Rochefoucauld 1959, pp. 101-103)  
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Figure 32: Decomposition study #3: After La Rochefoucauld, Maxim 504, decomposed into 
two-letter words, 2013.  Detail, clockwise from top right: IN; ON; SO; NO; ME; BE.  (La 
Rochefoucauld 1959, pp. 101-103) 
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The decomposition of the La Rochefoucauld maxims lead me to the work of Stéphane 
Mallarmé and his use of visual and verbal language to reconcile the development of ‘free verse’ 
with the classical alexandrine.  For Meillassoux (2012), he achieves this by no longer counting 
syllables but rather by counting words. His poem, A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance 
(‘ATOTD’), introduces a radical shift away from the syllable, as the structural basis of a poem, 
to a visual and spatial structure that scatters the text across the page.  This strategy sets aside 
the ‘authority’ of a given word order and, thus, invites a reader/viewer to respond to the work 
in a number of ways.  With multiple possibilities available, the fragmented nature of the text 
suggests that more than one poem may exist within the overall work itself.   To explore this 
possibility, I apply the ‘subject’ of WH to investigate the commonalities that may (or may 
not) exist between the language of the subject of WH and Mallarmé’s poem. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Subtraction study #7: After Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw of a Dice Will Never Abolish Chance, rectified 
on a theme of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho: {on, say, be, id, me, ho, ill, no}, 2014.  (Mallarmé 1996, pp. 124-
145) 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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In Fig. 33, a double subtraction takes place. Firstly, prior to subtracting the words that do not 
correspond to the WH subject, the typographical layout is subtracted reducing the poem to a 
linear progression. Secondly, the subject of WH is applied, reducing the original 759 words 
of the poem56 to 102. With that said, when re-presented in three equal columns above (to suit 
the format of this document), the rectified text still retains the potential for a variety of 
readings (e.g. vertically, horizontally, etc.).  In Fig. 34, these words are further reduced to two 
and three-letter words that take place in both the subject of WH and ATOTD.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Decomposition study #4: After Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw of a Dice Will Never 
Abolish Chance, rectified and decomposed on a theme of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho: {on, 
say, be, id, me, ho, ill, no}, 2014.  (Mallarmé 1996, pp. 124-145) 
                                                        
56 The version of ATOTD used was translated into English by Henry Weinfield in Stéphane Mallarmé Collected 
Poems, 1994, University of California Press, pp. 124 – 145.  According to Meillassoux (2012), the original French 
version is 707 words + 7 words (the cipher of the poem) = 714 words. 
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This further subtraction to the most common elements of each textual ‘object’ may provide 
an alternative logic for managing and structuring language and provide a means of exchanging 
words within and across texts.  To develop this potential, I carry-out further studies to reduce 
ATOTD into elementary ‘poems’ that correspond to individual two-letter and three-letter 
words contained in the poem itself.  In the two examples below, the words that contain the 
words, ‘all’ and ‘ill’, are subtracted to show how these individual ‘root’ words take place in 
ATOTD:   
 
Fallen  
Fall  
Small  
Hallucination  
Falls  
all 
all 
All 
WILL  
Illusion  
will  
will  
scintillates  
ILLUMINE  
WILL  
 
 
To make the resemblance and connection between words more apparent, I centre the 
‘common’ word and subtract the typography of the original poem:  
 
 
 
                               
 
 
This process of reducing ATOTD to a simple word-list, however, does not constitute 
decomposition.  It is simply just another level of subtraction, which can be expressed by a 
formula: ATOTD minus the words that do not contain the word, ‘all’, equals the ‘all’ words 
(in ATOTD).  To develop a means of decomposing words to their constituent elements, a 
different process is required.  In this regard, I draw on (and misapply) the properties of prime 
numbers (as ‘the atoms of arithmetic’57) to displace standard word-to-word relations and 
replace them with an alternative logic that may serve as a ‘new’ means to order and manage 
individual words and texts.   A number is prime when it is only divisible by the number one, 
and itself.  In this sense, a prime number is a serial extension or accumulation of ones: it is an 
expression of unity itself.  For example, the number 11 can only be broken down into units: 
11 x 1, as a multiple of unity.  Whereas, non-prime numbers are divisible in various ways 
where, for example, the number 12 can be divided by 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 12.   As indivisible 
expressions of unity, prime numbers provide a means to build and break-down all non-prime 
                                                        
57 For a discussion and history of prime numbers see Marcus Du Sautoy’s, The Music of the Primes, 2003, and 
Vicky Neale’s, Closing the Gap: The Quest to Understand Prime Numbers, 2017. 
hallucination
small
fall
fallen
falls
all
all
all
will
scintillates
illumine
will
will
will
illusion
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or ‘composite’ numbers.  The table below provides an example of how each composite 
number can be re-expressed as, or factorized into, a unique multiple of primes:   
 
 
 
Composite 
number 
Multiple of primes 
4 2 x 2 
6 3 x 2 
8 2 x 2 x 2 
9 3 x 3 
10 5 x 2 
12 3 x 2 x 2  
14 7 x 2 
15 5 x 3 
16 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 
18 3 x 3 x 2 
20 5 x 2 x 2  
[…] […] 
 
 
 
By considering words to be constructible and de-constructible matter, I misapply this 
principle of prime numbers to identify a common or universal basis ‘within’ language that 
may allow for the exchangeability of words within and across texts.  For example, if we 
consider the word, ‘hallucination’, to be a ‘composite’ word and decompose it, we find it 
contains fourteen distinct words: 
 
hallucination  → nation   (six letters) 
 → hall  (four letters) 
 → all, ion (three letters) 
 → ha, al, in, na, at, ti, io, on (two letters) 
 → a, I (one letter) 
 
Unlike prime numbers, however, the above ‘divisions’ do not divide evenly and, thereby, do 
not use or exhaust all thirteen letters of the word.  The ‘best fit’ occurs at the level of two-
letter words, where the only combinations (reading left to right) not included are the non-
English words: ‘lu’, ‘uc’ and ‘ci’.  This is not to say, however, that there are no words that can 
be exhausted by two-letter words.  For example, ‘somehow’ decomposes ‘evenly’ into the 
words: so, om, me, eh, ho, ow.    
 
While two-letter words may not serve to completely decompose and express ‘composite’ 
words, they do provide a least common ‘denominator’ and the smallest possible remainder.   
As a result, we cannot consider two-letter words to be representative of the ‘prime words’ 
that Duchamp sort to identify in The Green Box as being abstract and, hence, containing no 
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‘concrete’ reference outside of language (Sanouillet and Peterson 1973, pp. 31-32).  However, 
if we conceive language as constructible and some ‘thing’ that can be built from the material 
base of the alphabet, then, we can literally consider two-letter words to be the ‘first’ words 
formed by the coupling of letters.  Therefore, I refer to these words as ‘urwords’58 and use, for 
the purposes of this project, the list below of 124 two-letter Collins Scrabble words to define 
them.59    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table removed due to copyright restrictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Cooper, Ferguson & Higgleton 2004, p. 1) 
 
To investigate the relationship of these urwords to ATOTD, I repeat the double subtraction 
instruction used to produce the word-list Fig. 33 but, this time, using each of the 124 two-
letter words.   
 
In Fig. 35, by alignment and repetition, the urwords, ‘as’ and ‘if’, become more visually present 
within the individual words of their respective lists.  For example, one no longer simply reads 
                                                        
58 ‘Ur-’ is used to form words ‘with the sense ‘primitive, original, earliest’ (The New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary, 1993, p 3527).  For example, an ‘urtext’ is ‘the original or earliest version of a text’ (ibid., p. 3530). 
59 It should be noted that this notion of an urword is not necessarily confined to two-letter words.  There are 
three-letter, four-letter, etc., urwords that do not contain a two-letter urword (or a two-letter and three-letter 
urword, respectively.  For example, ‘old’, ‘quip’, etc. 
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the word, ‘master’, as a discrete ‘entity’ but rather sees it as a composite word that is inhabited 
by ‘as’.  The identity of ‘master’ is thereby split, where one reads/sees it ‘as/master’ or 
‘master/as’.  In terms of visual or ‘familial’ appearances, ‘master’ is literally connected to the 
other ‘as’ words in the list: ‘grasp, clasp, cast, pass, washed, reason, flash, was, cease, last, 
disaster, splashing, aside’.  However, these connections are not limited to this specific word 
list.  As ‘master’ can be also be decomposed into other words: ‘ma, st, te, er’, it also appears in 
and, hence, connects to these lists and the context of the ‘ma’, ‘st’, ‘te’ and ‘er’ words that they 
respectively contain. 
 
        
Figure 35: Subtraction study #8:  After Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw of a Dice Will Never Abolish Chance, rectified 
on a theme of 124 two-letter Collins Scrabble Words, 2014.  Detail, as, if.  (Mallarmé 1996, pp. 124-145) 
 
 
4.6 Subtraction → Decomposition → Transposition 
 
The above studies in subtraction and decomposition involve a reconsideration of the 
organization logic of the poem, ATOTD.   Subtraction appears to be an intra-textual de-
contextualisation (of the removal of a broader text to expose a given set of words), whereas, 
decomposition is a de-contextualisation of an urword from its composite word.  Both processes 
thereby involve exposing the intra-relational content of (textual) objects, whether they are 
words from a text or urwords from an individual word.  Such an approach increases the degree 
was
flash
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as
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cast
as
master
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cease
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last
as
disaster
splashing
as
as
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grasp
diffused
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of connectivity of words be freeing them from the syntax of a given word order or the identity 
of a particular word.  While poetry relies on homophonic semblance to create aural and visual 
wordplay, these reductions (text to word) and extensions (word to urwords) are based on 
‘homographic’ semblance that reconceives language as a set of material objects that can be 
[un]made and re-made so that words and their constituent urwords can shift within and across 
different textual ‘bodies’.    
 
The next task for the research is to identify a mechanism for passing one textual object 
through another.  To achieve this, I again draw on the principle of prime numbers and their 
relationship to non-primes.   To understand how this project attempts this, I draw on and 
misapply George Cantor’s Set Theory (1874) as discussed by Badiou (2009, pp. 10–16).  Of 
particular interest here, is how Cantor compares two infinite sets to produce an apparent 
paradox by forcing an equivalence between them.  All that is required to compare the infinite 
set of whole numbers with the infinite set of prime numbers is to count the primes.  This 
effectively forces a one-to-one correspondence between the two sets of numbers, which 
suggests that these two infinite sets are ‘equivalent’ in size or number.   From the point-of-
view of a finite understanding of numbers, however, this conclusion appears impossible: how 
can a subset of whole numbers (primes) be equivalent to the set of all whole numbers (i.e. non-
prime and prime numbers)? 
 
 
Whole Numbers Prime Numbers 
1 2 
2 3 
3 5 
4 7 
5 11 
6 13 
7 17 
8 19 
9 23 
10 29 
[…] […] 
 
 
Prime numbers have a double function/double identity.  Whereas, one might assume that 
whole numbers are the basis of arithmetic, the uniqueness of prime numbers show another 
‘ground’ within this ground.  Although urwords do not exhaust composite words without 
remainder, they play or mime a similar role.  They can [un]ground typical word-to-word 
relations (based on the grammatical roles they play in the construction of sense, etc.) and re-
ground them based on different logic and sets of relations.    
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Figure 36: Adriano Spatola, 1966.  (Williams 
2013, n.p.)       
Figure 37: Erica Baum, Mad, 2010.  (Bean & 
McCabe 2015, p. 32) 
 
To explore the notion of transposition based on the visual effects that repetition produces in 
Fig. 35, I examine the connectivity of urwords by drawing on concrete and visual poetry.  By 
way of folding and reflection, Figs. 36 & 37 show the potential basis for transposing word-to-
word or page-to-page, respectively.  Spatola’s work (Fig. 36), shows how the formal 
characteristics of words (e.g. of the same length, beginning and ending with the same letter) 
can provide a basis for showing how they reflect, shadow, and may perhaps change into one 
another.  Baum’s work (Fig. 37) suggests other modes of reading and the intra-relational 
possibilities that exist within a printed text.  By folding, squaring, reframing the page(s), the 
formal repetition forces a correspondence between the words on one page with the words that 
occupy the equivalent place on the opposing page.  The elision of text that the material 
intervention provides, allows the text to not only convey a ‘sense’ of meaning itself, but also 
to perform it in the way the text ‘falls’ (from page 32 to page 33). 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Transposition study #1:  Losenger, 2014.  
Image removed due to copyright restrictions Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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Fig. 38 is a study that explores how the formal characteristics of a common urword can be used 
to group, link and transition words from one to another.   Unlike standard portmanteau words 
(e.g. ‘Brexit’ and ‘brunch’), this process does not involve splicing and blending word-parts.  
Each ‘new’ word is produced by a ‘false’ one-to-one relationship formed by conjoining two 
words of equal length that begin and end with the same urword.  While both words remain 
present, the symmetry of this ‘losenger’ and the repetition of ‘id’ appears to visually break 
each new word in two.  Therefore, before reading any of these conjoined words as discrete 
words in and of themselves, one sees the visual repetition of ‘id’ as perhaps that which provides 
the basis and the product of each ‘coupling’. In terms of transposition, however, the symmetry 
and ‘distorted’ reflection within each word listed may suggest a transition (e.g. from ‘fored’ 
to ‘iotic’ in ‘foredidiotic’, etc.), but the ‘logic’ that underlies or produces this shift remains 
obscure.  Accordingly, to make ‘sense’ of this work, a viewer may be tempted to fall back on 
the definitions of individual word-couplings rather than on seeing the word as one where ‘id’, 
in its ‘fall’ down the page, is literally the ‘beginning’, ‘middle’ and ‘end’ of the work. 
 
The instruction, to combine two words of equal length based on a shared urword, has 
significant potential as a means for re-thinking and re-writing language according to the logic 
of the urword.  Within the scope of this project, however, such a mechanism appears limited.  
While the placement and repetition of ‘id’ suggests its traversal down the series, when this 
study is ‘read’ horizontally, it simply bridges and juxtaposes two ‘objects’.  This outcome is 
reminiscent of the statements generated above, where the randomised words of WH are 
linked by way of the infinitives, to remember or to forget and, then, to On Kawara’s iconic 
statement (e.g. They care less to forget I AM STILL ALIVE).   
 
 
 
Figure 39: Transposition study #2:  Somehow, 2014. 
 
Fig. 39, on the other hand, uses a more direct correspondence where the decomposition and 
doubling of the word, ‘somehow’, is reflected.  Of interest here, is the reflection of the urwords 
so that ‘ow’ is transposed into ‘wo’; ‘ho’ into ‘oh’; ‘eh’ into ‘he’; etc.  When compared to the 
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somewhat arbitrary shift between the ‘pre-id’ and ‘post-id’ components of the conjoined 
words in Fig. 38, the logic underlying this ‘reflection’ is literal and thereby appears to be 
‘truer’.  However, the potential of using a simple reversal as a means of transposing an object 
through another may not be a viable option because not all the 124 Collins Scrabble Words 
are reversible.60  Moreover, as the effect produced occurs by way of decomposition (from 
word to urwords), the transposition appears limited to the interiority of the word, which raises 
the question: what will provide the basis for the link not only within words but between 
them?   
 
 
 
Figure 40: Transposition study #3:  So some shade shadows shade some so, 2014. 
 
Fig. 40 illustrates an attempt to examine the potential of this process by linking a series of 
words61 that begin with and return to the same letter.  While the transition across words 
produces some visually interesting effects in terms of a visual progression and regression, each 
word remains isolated.  The logic that drives the progression across words is not driven by the 
interiority of the words but rather by the ‘exteriority’ (i.e. the first letter) of each word.  Hence, 
a ‘sense’ of transposition is visually and formally implied but does not operate at the level of 
the urwords themselves. 
 
In this regard, the ‘character’ of transposition in the above studies appears to be limited to the 
visual play of language.  The following studies in Figs. 41 – 43 (inclusive) investigate how 
related words (of similar length and composition) can comingle to produce a visual sense of 
transposition.  To achieve this, I borrow from Rudyard Kipling’s I Keep Six Honest Serving 
Men 62  (1902) and combine them with the word, ‘soever’,63  to investigate transpositions 
between the words (and non-words) of ‘whysoever’, ‘howsoever’, ‘whatsoever’, ‘whensoever’, 
‘whosesoever’, ‘wheresoever’.  These words are selected to allow the pairing of nine-letter, 
ten-letter and eleven letter words. 
                                                        
60 Sixty-four (64) words are reversible (e.g. no ⟷ on), fifty-six (56) are non-reversible (e.g. li ⇹ [‘il’]), with the 
remaining four (4) palindromes (i.e. aa, ee, mm, oo).     
61 The words selected are drawn from the vocabulary of ATOTD. 
62  ‘Their names are What and Why and When and How and Where and Who’, quoted from 
https://allpoetry.com/I-Keep-Six-Honest-Serving-Men 
63 ‘soever: of whatever kind, to whatever extent; at all’ (The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary 1993, p. 2934). 
 
 
 
 
                                            s 
                                          w s w 
                        e               o w   w o               e 
          e           d e d           d o       o d           d e d           e 
        m e m       a d   d a       a d           d a       a d   d a       m e m 
  o   o m   m o   h a       a h   h a               a h   h a       a h   o m   m o   o 
s o s o       o s h           h s h                   h s h           h s o       o s o s  
  o   o m   m o   h a       a h   h a               a h   h a       a h   o m   m o   o 
        m e m       a d   d a       a d           d a       a d   d a       m e m 
          e           d e d           d o       o d           d e d           e 
                        e               o w   w o               e 
                                          w s w     
                                            s                                          
 David Christian  
 
106 
 
 
Figure 41: Transposition study #4:  Whatsoever, whensoever, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Transposition study #5:  Whysoever, howsoever, whosesoever, wheresoever, 2014. 
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While these series of studies do not resolve any issues regarding how to bridge urwords and 
words within and across textual objects, they do provide a means of showing how the 
dominance of verbal language can be lessened by adding intra-relational and inter-relational 
‘space’ within and between words.  As a result, shifting the logic to one that reconceives and 
re-organises language in terms of visual and ‘familial’ resemblances, provides a basis for the 
material and visual qualities of language to take place.  Similar to Mallarmé’s and Duchamp’s 
use visual language to provide a concrete reference to abstracted language, these studies 
operate within and across the differences between languages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Transposition study #6:  Whatsoever, whysoever, whensoever, howsoever, wheresoever, whosesoever, 2014.  
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h  o  w  s  o  e  v  e  r  h  w e h w h e w  h  r  e  v  e  o  s  w  o  h 
h  o  w  s  o  e  v  e  e  h  w a h w h a w  h  e  e  v  e  o  s  w  o  h 
h  o  w  s  o  e  v  r  e  h  r e h w h e r  h  e  r  v  e  o  s  w  o  h 
h  o  w  s  o  e  e  r  e  e  r a h w h a r  e  e  r  e  e  o  s  w  o  h 
h  o  w  s  o  s  e  r  v  e  r e h w h e r  e  v  r  e  s  o  s  w  o  h 
h  o  w  s  o  s  e  e  v  e  r a h w h a r  e  v  e  e  s  o  s  w  o  h 
h  o  w  e  o  s  o  e  v  e  r e h w h e r  e  v  e  o  s  o  e  w  o  h 
h  o  v  e  o  s  o  e  v  e  r a h w h a r  e  v  e  o  s  o  e  v  o  h 
h  e  v  e  y  s  o  e  v  e  r e h w h e r  e  v  e  o  s  y  e  v  e  h 
r  e  v  h  y  s  o  e  v  e  r a h w h a r  e  v  e  o  s  y  h  v  e  r 
r  e  w  h  y  s  o  e  v  e  r e h w h e r  e  v  e  o  s  y  h  w  e  r 
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To further work through how the urwords can provide a means of passing one object through 
another, I examine the possibility of transposing Mallarmé’s ATOTD into another medium, 
music.  Accordingly, rather than using the Collins Scrabble Words as a definition of urwords, 
I use the Sofège syllables for singing musical notes.   
 
 
 
 
 
Major scale 
degree 
Mova. do solfège 
syllable 
No. of half steps from 
Do 
1 Do 0 
Raised 1 Di 1 
Lowered 2 Ra 1 
2 Re 2 
Raised 2 Ri 3 
Lowered 3 Me (or Ma) 3 
3 Mi 4 
4 Fa 5 
Raised 4 Fi 6 
Lowered 5 Se 6 
5 So[l] 7 
Raised 5 Si 8 
Lowered 6 Le (or Lo) 8 
6 La 9 
Raised 6 Li 10 
Lowered 7 Te (or Ta) 10 
7 Ti 11 
 
Figure 44: Table of Solfège syllables.  Adapted from Wikipedia:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solfège 
 
 
 
 
The idea is to use the Solfège syllables as a means of producing a ‘poem’ that includes only 
words that contain these syllables.  However, rather than use all the notes of the chromatic 
scale, the poem undergoes a double subtraction.  Firstly, it is reduced to the chromatic scale 
(Do, Di, Ra, Re, Ri, Me, Mi, Fa, Fi, Se, So(l), Si, La, Li, Te, and Ti) to subtract the words that 
do not ‘sing’.  Secondly, as the first ‘note’ of the poem is ‘di’ (or C#), it is assumed the scale of 
ATOTD is C# major (Di, Ri, Fa, Fi, Si, Li, and Do), which is subsequently applied to produce 
an urword list poem of ATOTD on a theme of C# major.   
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Figure 45: Transposition study #7: After Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw of a Dice Will 
Never Abolish Chance, rectified and decomposed on a theme of C# Major (with Solfège 
syllables in bold), 2014. (Mallarmé 1996, pp. 124-145) 
 
In a sense, the poem above, is a poem within a poem within another poem.  The typography 
of the font has been retained whereas the spatiality of the text has been subtracted.  The 
‘musical’ quality of the typography is suggested in the variations in size and emphasis (e.g. the 
use of capitalization and italics) of the text.  To bring a sense of time and musical structure to 
the work, this textual ‘object’ is passed through the musical score of JS Bach’s Fuga III (BWV 
872).  The effect of this is to subtract and reduce the fugue to the order of appearance of the 
notes in the C# variation of the poem above.   
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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Figure 46: Transposition study #8: After JS Bach’s Fuga III (BWV 872), rectified on a theme of Stéphane 
Mallarmé’s A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance, 2014. (Bach 1950/1978, pp. 14-15). 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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This study shows that using Solfège conventions to force a one-to-one correspondence 
between poetical and musical objects is limited.  There is no passage of the ‘musicality’ of the 
poem through the edifice of the fugue.  There is not even a ‘collision’ or exchange of material, 
where a ‘new’ object is formed from two objects attempting to simultaneously occupy the 
same place.  Rather, what appears to occur is the material reduction of both objects to their 
shared intra and inter-relational points of contact.  While a ‘rendezvous’ does appear to occur, 
both objects remain divided by that which brings them together.  Therefore, nothing comes 
of this other than the potential for some ‘thing’ to take place.   
 
This ‘failure’ seems to result from a disjunction that operates on two levels.  Firstly, the urwords 
of the poem do not visually marry with their equivalent notes of the musical notation so that 
any ‘connection’ between words and notes remains implicit and thereby absent.  Secondly, 
the alignment of commonalities between objects operates across different ‘levels’.  That is, a 
word (e.g. ‘Dice’) from the poem corresponds with its equivalent ‘urword’ (e.g. the first C# as 
‘di’) from the musical score.  For the poem to ‘pass’ through the music, the word needs to not 
only connect to the urword but to displace or become it.   
 
To overcome this constraint, one might argue that simply singing the ‘poem|fugue’ displaces 
or conjoins the ‘urwords’ of the fugue with the words of the poem.  However, this may pose 
problems in terms of being able to ‘see’ the logic that produces this ‘new’ object in or as the 
work itself.  That is, due to the shift from seeing text/music to singing, it is unlikely the 
presence of the Solfège syllables within the words sung will be discernable.  Therefore, to 
maintain the visibility of urwords in the outcome, it appears that using textual objects is the 
most plausible approach for ‘passing’ one object through another.  In this regard, using the 
Collins Scrabble Words as urwords is the most expedient way to both link and transition one 
object though the structure of another.  Such an approach may leave the structure of the 
second object sufficiently intact to allow for the presence of the urwords to be present in the 
transposed object itself.     
 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
From the above studies in subtraction, decomposition and transposition, the basic steps that 
an algorithm requires for passing one object through another can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Subtraction. Textual Object 1 is [un]authored by being reorganized and reduced into 
124 urword lists (as defined by the list of two-letter Collins Scrabble words).  Though 
contracted, each list retains the word order of the original text.  However, the overall 
length of the text is expanded due to the words containing more than one urword being 
represented in more than one list.  For example, each occurrence of the word, ‘some’, 
appears in the lists of ‘so’, ‘om’ and ‘me’. 
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2.  Decomposition.  Textual Object 2 is [un]authored by being decomposed into a series 
of urwords.  For example, the word, ‘somehow’, unfolds into and is replaced by: so, 
om, me, eh, ho, ow.  Though significantly unpacked and extended, the original text 
retains the overall ‘flow’ of its word order and ‘structure’.  
   
3. Transposition.  The vocabulary of the subtracted and contracted urword lists of 
Textual Object 1 are transposed or passed through the decomposed and expanded 
urword text of Textual Object 2.   The product of this process involves the re-
production of Textual Object 1 having been ‘passed through’ and, hence, re-authored 
by the structure of Textual Object 2.   
 
Returning to Deleuze’s three languages that he identifies as characteristic of Beckett’s 
unwording of literature, it appears that subtraction is an attempt to exhaust the ‘voice’ by 
identifying the various ‘voices’ or poems within the poem.  Decomposition involves the 
displacement of syntactic relations in favour of ‘combinatorial’ ones, where each word as a 
name is [un]named and [re]named by the combination of its constituent urwords.  Finally, 
transposition as a process of re-authoring is ‘completely determined’ with the outcome being 
‘indefinite’ and potentially unknowable or irreducible to anything other than the logic of the 
process that produces it.     
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CHAPTER 5 
 
In this chapter, I summarise the assumptions and decisions that led to the development of the 
algorithm in order to analyse its ‘autonomy’, as a limit-function and means of passing one object 
‘through’ another.   I, then, identify and detail the steps of the algorithm and outline the 
process and difficulties of implementing it.  Finally, I briefly discuss the principle outcome 
and set out the key issue that drives the development of the practical outcome of this project.   
 
 
5.1 Summary of the method 
 
The [un]creative work of this project relies on the hypostatization of language.  Rather than 
being an immaterial and ‘transparent’ medium that simply facilitates communication, 
language is a ‘substance’, with its own visual and material qualities (and quantities).  It is some 
‘thing’ that not only enables communication but also obscures, ‘taints’ and hinders it.  As an 
already made material, language has its own ‘voice’ and embodies or ‘hosts’ a set of histories, 
conventions, agreements, habits, uses, and associations that not only affect the way we name 
but also how we navigate, more broadly, the everyday itself.  As ‘code’, it also operates as the 
material ‘ground’ of the digital world of appearances and provides the ‘genetic’ means to store, 
locate, construct and deconstruct that which takes place upon the screen.  In this ‘world’, there 
is no place for ambiguity or a ‘sense’ of meaning: language as code is an expression of 
exactitude.  As such, it is a completely predetermined ‘place’ that, to operate effectively, must 
exhaust possibility so that nothing is left to chance.  This is perhaps most clearly apparent in 
the demand for the accurate spelling and ordering of the ‘words’ that make up email or web 
addresses. Without this precision, computers are ‘blind’ and fail to connect to and 
communicate with each other.   
 
In Chapter 4, I set out a range of studies that limit the way language is read and organized.  
Rather than consider a text to be the embodiment and expression of a semantic content, this 
project conceives it more superficially as an assemblage or ‘set’ of material parts (or subsets) 
with some parts also having smaller parts (subsets of subsets).   Considered in this way, the 
textual object of a book is composed of chapters, chapters are comprised of paragraphs, 
paragraphs are made up of sentences, sentences consist of words and individual words are 
combinations of the letters of the alphabet.   These parts are typically organised according to 
prescribed grammatical categories and practices that, if adhered to, provide a ‘guaranteed’ 
means by which the semblance of meaning can be produced and communicated to an audience 
that subscribes to and is conversant with these conventions.   
 
Given the above, an atomistic structure already appears to operate within the logic that 
underscores the composition and presentation of a text.  In Chapter 4 the research identifies 
the absence and presence of an alternative logic that ‘dwells’ within language and may provide 
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a means to set aside ‘meaning’ (and its reliance on a given way of ordering words) by limiting 
the constructability and de-constructability of language to that of physical appearances or 
‘familial’ relations of urwords.64  Analogous to prime numbers as the ‘atoms’ of all whole 
numbers, urwords can be used to [un]ground and re-ground textual objects by way of 
subtraction and/or decomposition so that they can be reduced to their lowest common 
‘denominators’ and, then, transposed or passed within or across each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47: Schematic illustration of three steps to pass one textual object through another. 
 
 
To develop a mean of passing one artwork or textual object through another, the research 
identifies the following three basic steps: 
 
1. For each of the 124 urwords, subtract all non-urwords from the material of textual 
object 1 (‘M1’) to produce an urword subset of M1.  
2. From the material of textual object 2 (‘M2’) decompose each word into its 
constituent urwords. 
3. Replace or transpose each urword from Step 2 into its corresponding word from the 
urword lists from Step 1. 
 
The outcome of this process is the [un]authoring and re-authoring of each text by the other.  
That is, by way of transposition, the vocabulary (or ‘knowledge’) of M1 displaces and replaces 
the words of M2, whereas by way of subtraction of M1 (into urword categories) and the 
                                                        
64 It’s important to note here that this project doesn’t consider the possibility of letters to resemble or reflect each 
other as individual objects or in combination with another letter.  For example, see the analysis of the words ‘red 
circle’ by Goldsmith (2011, p. 69), where, he observes that the ‘d’ is ‘mimicked’ or echoed by the combination 
‘ci’ and ‘cl’.   
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decomposition of M2 into urwords, the word-order of M1 is displaced and replaced by word-
order of M2. 
 
The overall intention in developing and applying this process is to re-produce a literary ‘non-
event’: to [un]author a ‘third text’ (M3) that is derived from the impact and interaction of 
two independent texts.  As Fig. 47 illustrates, rather than the objects ‘bouncing off’ and failing 
to surpass each other’s external limit, they connect ‘internally’ so that the vocabulary (or 
‘knowledge’) of one textual object is coupled with and passed onto the decomposed structure 
of another.  In a sense, the product of this ‘encounter’ results from ‘weaving’ these two texts 
together: the vocabulary of the M1 becomes the visible ‘weft’, whereas, the urwords of M2 
operate as the ‘warp’ or underlying structure that ‘prescribes’ the rhythm of the ‘new’ text.   
 
As M3 results from an [un]creative process of [un]authoring, it raises several questions.  As a 
re-production of ‘language’ by language, how does one read and respond to the product of 
this ‘encounter’?  Does such a text have a voice?  And, if so, who is in fact speaking?  Is it 
language itself or the text’s ‘author’? But how can authorship be ascribed to such a text?  Does 
it lie with the authors of M1 and M2 or can it be reduced to the [un]authoring function of the 
algorithm itself?  Moreover, as the algorithm is derived from an amalgam of other ideas, can 
they also be a source of its ‘originality’?  If we look ‘behind’ the algorithm, we may be tempted 
to conclude that the author of this ‘new’ text is the ‘one’ who identifies, compiles and ‘invents’ 
it.  However, such a conclusion appears premature, as the algorithm may simply provide a 
means by which some ‘thing’ that already ‘exists’—yet remains concealed—can be observed 
and, hence, revealed.  Perhaps, in this regard, the algorithm is an ‘optical’ tool that, by 
producing ‘nothing’ in and of itself, offers an ‘other’ view of what authorship and language 
can—and cannot—be. 
 
To address such issues, one must carry-out the steps of the algorithm and produce an example.  
However, before doing so, it is important to outline how the development and application of 
the algorithm involves an ‘ascesis of closure’ that seeks to be ‘complicit’ with the contingent 
materials of language.  According to Reza Negarestani, 
 
[…] the more closed a work, the more radically it is subjected to the interventions 
of its contingent materials, the wider it is broadened and butchered open to the 
outside.  Therefore, we can say that closure realizes openness in its radical sense: 
not as openness toward the possibility of contingencies for the outside, but as a 
‘being open’ by contingent materials that form the work.  This is why complicity 
is a twisted form of embracing contingency, because it has an inverse mechanism: 
through closure, complicity seeks to twist the soft dogma of ‘openness toward 
contingent materials’ into a ‘being-opened by contingent materials’ (Negarestani 
2011, p. 14) 
  
Within the context of Duchamp’s personal art coefficient, being ‘complicit with contingent 
materials’ requires one to abandon (as much as possible) a ‘will’ that seeks to (intentionally or 
unintentionally) impose and express itself through the work.  An ‘ascesis of closure’ is 
therefore an artistic attitude that does not seek to master but rather subjects itself to being 
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‘mastered’ by the materials and their ‘will’ to be other-than what they are always already taken 
to be.   
 
Accordingly, I attempt to [un]will the work by practicing an ‘ethics of deferral’.  As Chapter 
4 documents, ‘aesthetic’ decisions are made by taking direction from language itself or by 
referring to some other ‘authority’.  For example, urwords—as a hypothetical ‘[un]grounding’ 
and ‘re-grounding’ of language—are identified not by presupposing their existence but by 
being receptive to their ‘appearance’ and the possibility of them being other than what they 
will have always already been.  Moreover, when deciding how to define specific urwords, 
rather than set my own definition, I defer to the ‘authority’ of Collins Scrabble words.  
Therefore, the decision-making that ‘drives’ the research is externalized and anartistic.  The 
algorithm thereby develops through a process of displacement and deferment, where the 
‘response’ and ‘play’ of materials have the power to nullify, amend and ‘will’ their own re-
invention.  
 
The development of the algorithm involves a decentering of artistic subjectivity in favour of 
the contingency of materials.  In the spirit of détournement, the algorithm is a surrogate and 
parody of authorship.  Its function is to hijack, distort and [un]tangle our relationship to the 
art of ‘self-expression’ and the place of language itself.   To be able to see only the ‘work’ of 
the algorithm in the product it produces, its authority must be considered absolute.  Therefore, 
an ‘ascesis of closure’ is no longer appropriate in terms of adapting to the contingency of the 
algorithm’s outputs.  Rather, this ‘ascesis’ takes place by reducing the productive role of the 
artist to the ‘dumb’ labour of an ‘ideal’ slave, whose sole function is to follow its master’s 
instruction regardless of the outcome it may produce.   
 
Such an approach not only follows the examples of Aesop and Bartleby but also conforms to 
what Walter Benjamin requires of ‘good’ translation.  As Sandbank (2015, p. 215) notes, 
Benjamin’s translator reduces the literary ‘event’ from ‘writer, work, world and audience’ to 
simply ‘writer and work’.  That is, the act of translation—as literary ‘event’—has no 
destination or point of arrival: its ‘utility’ has little to do with the wholesale transmission of 
‘meaning’ from one language to another but, rather, aims to realise or expose a ‘pure language’ 
that may be glimpsed in the interstices (and differences) that exist across languages.  Friedrich 
Hölderlin’s translations of Sophocles’ plays, Oedipus and Antigone, are Benjamin’s exemplars 
of such an approach, where translation is carried out ‘literally, disregarding German syntax 
and forfeiting clear comprehensibility’ so that the ‘destruction of intelligible meaning […] 
reveals the inherent difference between languages’ (Liska 2014, p. 221).  While the task of 
Benjamin’s translator is to translate a single work across languages, the algorithm sets out to 
‘translate’ the (decomposed) language of one literary work into the words of another, within 
the same language.   Rather than expose the differences across languages, the algorithm has 
the potential to make present the differences that may lie within and across literary works and 
language itself.   
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As ‘authorship’, the algorithm is split in two parts.  Firstly, in its development of an 
[un]authoring function, and secondly, in its application, as a process of ‘passing’ one textual 
object through another.  Such an approach reflects Sol LeWitt’s division of artistic ‘labour’ 
between the ‘idea’ and the ‘process’ of conceptual artworks.  In his Paragraphs on Conceptual 
Art (1967), he asserts: 
 
In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work.  
When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and 
decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair.  The idea 
becomes a machine that makes the art.  (LeWitt 1992a, p. 834). 
 
While LeWitt appears to suggest that the notion of the ‘concept’ and ‘idea’ of a work are 
interchangeable, in Sentences on Conceptual Art (1969), he makes the following distinction:  
 
9. The concept and the idea are different.  The former implies a general direction 
while the latter is the component.  Ideas implement the concept. 
(LeWitt 1992b, p. 838). 
 
The ‘concept’ of a work is conceived as a generality, whereas, it is the role of the ‘idea(s)’ to 
implement and particularize the concept.  The ‘idea’ of a work, thereby, forms the instructions 
or ‘machinery’ that produces the outward appearance of the ‘concept’.  When the ‘idea’ is 
completed, it contains all that is required to produce a work’s ‘final form’.  The ‘process’, then, 
simply provides a means to translate the idea into action.  Therefore, the labour required to 
give the concept (via the idea) its specific physical form has no ‘creative’ (or artistic) value in 
and of itself.  It is ‘dumb’ and ideally remains silent by not adding to or subtracting from the 
task(s) it is required to perform.   In this regard, LeWitt suggests that:  
 
28. Once the idea of the piece is established in the artist's mind and the final form 
is decided, the process is carried out blindly.  There are many side-effects that the 
artist cannot imagine.  These can be used as ideas for new works.   
 
29. The process is mechanical and should not be tampered with. It should run its 
course.  
(LeWitt 1992, pp. 838) 
 
This front-loading of the creative ‘thinking’ of a work into the idea—as instruction—is 
reminiscent of Xanthus’ ‘model’ of ideal slavery, where the master’s role is to think and 
command and the slave’s, to act and obey.   As LeWitt’s ‘process’ is [un]productive in and of 
itself, the only thing that matters is whether the outcome is a true reflection of the concept by 
way of the idea.  It perhaps follows that, if the process is true yet yields a ‘side-effect’ that does 
not reflect the ‘concept’, then, the artist has failed in the ‘process’ of translating or formulating 
the particularities of the idea from the generalities of the concept.  According to Sentence 28 
(above), such an outcome may re-present to the artist Aesop’s ‘empty oil flask’ that shows how 
the ‘idea’ fails to produce the (desired) outcome.  If so, this may suggest that the ‘origin’ of the 
‘concept’ derives from the artist’s inability to represent the ‘concept’ in the language of the 
‘idea’.   
 
 David Christian  
 
118 
Applied to this project, the algorithm is what LeWitt describes as the ‘idea’ of the work.  It 
re-presents the steps required to realise the intention (or will) of the concept, to pass one 
artwork through another and, thereby, to simulate an ‘event’ in literature of an [un]authored 
and [un]original object.  To realise this ‘concept’, it is important to ensure that the steps of the 
algorithm are carried-out faithfully, so that the outcome is not corrupted by the intended or 
unintended actions of an artist that acts as an ‘author’.  To achieve this, I draw from Badiou’s 
notion of the subject and fidelity as discussed by Peter Hallward:  
 
Fidelity is by definition, ex-centric, directed toward, beyond the limits of a 
merely personal integrity.  To be faithful to an evental implication always means 
to abandon oneself, rigorously, to the unfolding of its consequences.  Fidelity 
implies that, if there is a truth, it can be only cruelly indifferent to the private as 
such. […] In truth, ‘I’ matter only insofar as I am subsumed by the impersonal 
vector of truth […]. (Hallward 2003, p. 129; original emphasis)   
 
If the algorithm is a ‘placeholder’ of [un]authorship and, thereby, marks the presence and 
absence of an ‘(non)event’ of literature, then, the act of implementing it must be carried-out 
‘mechanically’ to reveal its ‘truth’.  Accordingly, any ‘I’ that would (intentionally or 
unintentionally) seek to write or express itself must be rigorously countered and replaced by 
an ‘I’ that reads, [un]writes and re-writes in accordance with the steps of the algorithm.   
 
Following Duchamp’s notion of anartist, as one that perhaps ‘makes works that are not works 
of ‘art’’ (Sanouillet & Peterson 1973, p. 74), the notion of artist-as-author (as originator and 
authority over the work) thereby becomes artist-as-anauthor.  The historical model(s) of 
‘authorship’ that may best describe the approach I take to develop and implement the 
algorithm, is that of the medieval ‘compilator’ and ‘scriptor’ respectively.  According to 
Bennett (2005, pp. 38-39), the ‘compilator or compiler […] puts together passages’ from 
other texts which are ‘not his own’, whereas, the ‘scriptor’ is the ‘scribe [or] copyist [that] 
‘adds nothing and changes nothing’.  Firstly, the algorithm is ‘compiled’ from other ‘texts’ or 
sources to identify the individual steps of subtraction, decomposition and transposition.65  Secondly, 
when implemented, the artist-as-anauthor manually applies the instructions of the algorithm 
to not simply copy a text but to [un]write and re-write the language of one text onto the 
(urword) structure of another.  This is not to say, however, that the notion ‘authorship’ can be 
completely [un]made and impersonal.  The object is to minimize wherever possible the 
‘personal’ aspects of authorship by way of an ‘ethics of deferral’.  One still makes ‘authorial’ 
decisions by selecting, compiling and re-arranging source materials but, in doing so, the aim 
is to displace and externalize this process so that any choice is not simply made on the basis of 
taste or personal preference.   
 
To apply the algorithm, I select Mallarmé’s ATOTD and Beckett’s WH as the already made 
textual objects for a number of reasons.  Firstly, in terms of the notion of the ‘author’, 
                                                        
65  The notion of subtraction is drawn from Bergson’s theory of perception and Beckett’s ‘unwording’ of 
literature as described by theorists such as Deleuze, Badiou and Uhlmann.  Decomposition is drawn from the 
properties of prime numbers and transposition is sourced from the use of prime numbers by Cantor and the task 
of the translator which Benjamin identifies in Hölderlin.   
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‘Mallarmé’ and ‘Beckett’ are paragons of twentieth century literature whose work exemplifies 
what Foucault (Foucault 1991, p. 102-104) identifies as the movement in writing away from 
‘the dimension of expression’ and embraces ‘voluntary effacement’ and the ‘death’ of the 
individual that writes in favour of the work and the practice of writing itself.  Moreover, 
Foucault’s argues that the living person that writes is displaced and replaced by the ‘proper 
name’ of the ‘Author’ that ‘serves to characterize a certain mode of being of discourse’ and 
that represents ‘a speech that must be received in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, 
must receive a certain status’ (ibid., p. 107).  Secondly, the textual objects ATOTD and WH 
are exemplars of their author’s respective creative outputs and, thereby, may stand for or be 
representative of the ‘authoritative’ voice or ‘mode of being’ of literary discourse itself.   
Thirdly, both ATOTD and WH appear to result from an ‘openness’ to language as a 
contingent material which has the capacity to simultaneously ‘speak’ in and across different 
‘languages’, both verbal and visual.  Finally, as the algorithm sets out to subvert and parody 
the notion of ‘authorship’, its aim is to counter the myth that the ‘author’ precedes, originates, 
and thereby predetermines and limits what a text can—and cannot—mean.  As Foucault notes, 
the ‘author’ is:  
 
a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and 
chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free 
manipulation, the free composition, decomposition and recomposition of fiction.’ 
(Foucault 1991, p. 119) 
 
In what follows, I set out a specific version of the algorithm adapted to accommodate the 
specific qualities of ATOTD and WH before outlining the process of applying these steps to 
produce the textual object, Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (‘WOCIT’). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48: Schematic illustration of the algorithm for the transposition of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho 
into the vocabulary of Henry Weinfield’s translation of Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw of the Dice Will Never 
Abolish Chance. 
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5.2 The algorithm  
 
Step 1:  Reduce M1 to a linear reading to form S1. 
 
Step 2:  Reduce S1 and list the corresponding words according to the subsets of 
S2 to form the 124 urword lists to form S3. 
 
Step 3:  Decompose M2 into its constituent urwords to form S4. 
 
Step 4:  Replace each urword from S4 with the corresponding word from subsets 
of S3 to produce the outcome M3. 
 
Where:  
M1 →  Henry Weinfield’s translation of Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw of the 
Dice Will Never Abolish Chance (1994) (‘ATOTD’) 
M2 → Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho, 1983 (‘WH’)  
S1 →  ATOTD as a de-spatialised or linear text.  
S2 →  the 124 urword categories, as defined by Collins Scrabble words. 
S3 →  the 124 urword lists of ATOTD. 
S4 →  The set of the decomposed words of WH. 
M3 →  The set of words from S3 that have replaced the words of S4 or the 
product of the algorithm: Would of Circumstances Inwardly Though. 
 
 
STEP 1: The reduction of ATOTD into a linear text. 
 
The first step of the algorithm is to subtract or efface Mallarmé’s ground-breaking use of 
typography and the spacing, placement and relationship of words with the blank spaces of the 
page.  To reduce this work to its bare ‘poetry’, to a set of ‘data’, the words of the poem are 
read following a ‘standard’ or conventional reading66 and listed in order of appearance.  Such 
a strategy is perhaps the opposite of the one taken by Marcel Broodthaers in his appropriation, 
Un Coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hazard (1969), where he blackens out the words to emphasize 
their placement and dispersal across the page.  Broodthaers rectifies the poem by his censorship 
and disavowal of its ‘poetry’ (as the product of the poet’s literary skill and labour and 
participation in the tradition and canon of French literature) and thereby reduces it to the 
structure and visibility of its spatiality, of that which perhaps exceeds the ‘poetry’ and word-
work of the poem and hence remains an irreducible and ‘essential’ element of the work itself.  
                                                        
66 As the source of Mallarmé’s ATOTD is drawn from a bilingual edition, Weinfield’s translation sets out what 
were originally published as double-page spreads as single plates (Mallarme 1996).  Accordingly, and in keeping 
with this format, the reading of the poem for the purposes of this study departs from what may be considered a 
‘conventional’ page-by-page reading of the poem by treating each double-page spread as though it were a single 
page.  This conforms with Mallarmé’s instructions and the eventual publishing of this format in 1914 
(Meillassoux 2012).  Such an approach necessarily disrupts what might be considered a ‘standard’ reading or 
serialization of the text.  Mallarmé’s approach to the typographical layout of the poem may have encouraged 
alternative strategies for reading the poem both vertically and horizontally (including across the cleft dividing 
facing pages created by the spine of the book). 
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Figure 49: Marcel Broodthaers, Un Coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hazard, 1969.  Edition of ten on twelve anodized 
aluminum plates, 32 x 50 cm each.  Available from MOMA: https://www.moma.org/collection/works/146983 
 
 
 
STEP 2: Reduction of ATOTD into 124 urword subsets 
 
After ATOTD has been de-visualized or reduced from a configuration to a serialization of 
words, this process is extended by subtracting the poem from each of the 124 urword subsets.  
Accordingly, it is read 124 times where each ‘reading’ involves the subtraction of the words 
that do not contain a given urword.  For example, the subtraction of the words that do not 
contain the urword, ‘Ab’, reduces a poem of 759 words67 to a subset of 11 words: {abyss, unable, 
about, probability, abolish, about, abyss, abyss, memorable, absence, abruptly}.  Of the 124 
urword categories, 105 contain words from ATOTD and 19 remain empty: {Aa, Ae, Ah, Ax, 
Fy, Ja, Jo, Ka, Oh, Ox, Oy, Qi, Uh, Xu, Ya, Ye, Yu, Za, Zo}.  Unpacking and dispersing the 
poem into a series of subsets both contracts each list spatially but expands the total number of 
words from 759 to 1,598, which effectively doubles the size of the text. 
 
                                                        
67 This is the count of Henry Weinstein’s translation (Mallarmé 1996, pp. 124-145).  In the original French, the 
count is 707 words, although there is some uncertainty attached to this number—see Meillassoux (2012) for a 
detailed discussion. 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
 David Christian  
 
122 
 
 
Figure 50: Example of urword subsets (Aa to Am) from Henry Weinfield’s translation of Stéphane Mallarmé’s 
A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance.  (Mallarmé 1996, pp. 124-145) 
 
 
 
 
STEP 3: Decomposition of WH into its constituent urwords 
 
Each word of WH is decomposed into its constituent urwords.  As some words contain urwords 
that share letters, it is necessary to unpack and exhaust the decomposition of each word to 
avoid exercising a preference for one word over another (e.g. the first over the second). For 
example, the word, ‘somehow’ contains several two-letter words that share letters—so/om, 
om/me, me/eh, eh/ho, ho/ow—and, thereby, when decomposed becomes six words:  so, om, 
me, eh, ho, ow.  This increases the number of words and expands the text.  For example, the 
opening paragraph of 14 words68 when decomposed expands to 20 urwords: {on, ay, on, be, 
ai, id, on, so, om, me, eh, ho, ow, on, ti, no, oh, ho, ow, on}. However, when the entire text 
of WH of 4,434 words is decomposed it expands to 8,653 urwords, which is effectively a 
doubling of the text. 
                                                        
68 ‘On. Say On. Be said on. Somehow on. Till nohow on.  Said nohow on.’ (Beckett 1983, p. 7) 
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WH2 
(decomposed into urwords) 
WOCIT 
(WH urwords → ATOTD words) 
wo or st ar ho Would or circumstances inwardly 
though 
on On. 
ay on Play beyond. 
be ai id on Be sail amid reckonings. 
so om me eh ho ow on Someone from formerly falsehood 
horizon throw conflagration. 
ti no oh ho ow on Spurtings cannot withholds own 
horizon. 
ai id no oh ho ow on Pertaining idle another hoary shadow 
one. 
 
Figure 51: Transposition of the title and paragraph 1 of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho into the language of 
Henry Weinfield’s translation of Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance. (Beckett 
1983, pp. 5-7; Mallarme 1996; pp. 124–145) 
 
 
STEP 4: The transposition of the urword of WH into the vocabulary of ATOTD 
 
In the final step of the process, the urwords contained in WH are replaced by (or hidden or 
encrypted within) the words from ATOTD.   This step involves ‘reading’ the stripped and 
laid bare text of WH and then replacing each two-letter word with the corresponding word 
from the appropriate urword list drawn from the decomposition of ATOTD.  For example, 
the title, Worstward Ho, when decomposed becomes: wo, or, st, ar, ho.  These words are then 
replaced or enveloped by the corresponding word from the urword lists from ATOTD.  For 
example, the word ‘wo’ is replaced by the first word of the ‘wo’ list, ‘would’; ‘or’ is replaced 
by first word of the ‘or’ list, ‘or’, and so on.  Worstward Ho, when transposed into the language 
of ATOTD, becomes the title of the ‘new’ work: Would or Circumstances Inwardly 
Though (‘WOCIT’).   
 
 
5.3 The application of the algorithm 
 
A first attempt 
 
To realise the ‘promise’ of the algorithm requires a commitment and fidelity to the ‘idea’ that 
its accurate completion will produce an outcome that not only reflects the materials used but 
also contains within it the logic of the process itself.   Therefore, only by literally and faithfully 
observing these steps will this process produce the unique ‘form’ that it prescribes.   
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While the algorithm sets out the simple steps required to pass one object through another, it 
does not detail how it can be practically implemented.  It may be reasonable to assume that 
applying these basic steps is relatively straight forward.  The skill level required to substitute 
one word for another is not exactly ‘rocket science’.  Programmed correctly, a desktop 
computer would carry-out these tasks with ease and produce the result instantaneously.  The 
prospect of manually ‘walking’ these steps some 8,653 times promises to be a truly Sisyphean 
exercise in futility.  Failure to produce an accurate result, however, would mean that the 
outcome would be tainted and become not simply a product of the algorithm (of its ‘idea’ or 
promise of a ‘final form’) but rather of the [un]willed and ‘subjective’ actions of its ‘writer’. 
 
When transposing words from the urword subsets of ATOTD to the decomposed words of 
WH, my first attempt involves working, list by list, starting from ‘aa’, then, ‘ab’, etc., so that 
the decomposed text of WH is slowly re-populated with the words of ATOTD.  Initially, I 
thought working down each list (and not across them) would be more efficient and perhaps 
less prone to error.  While this approach appears to be ‘faster’, there is a significant trade-off 
in accuracy.   Firstly, searching the decomposed structure of WH for each urword across the 
whole decomposed text, rather than working sequentially (i.e. word-by-word, sentence-by-
sentence) lead to words being missed, especially when urwords are repeated in a single word or 
appear several times across a long sentence.  Secondly, when working down the list itself, 
using a method of simply checking-off each word as it is placed, makes it difficult to locate 
and correct any errors.  This means that when an error is discovered, one often needs to return 
to the beginning of the list and repeat the entire process to establish where the error 
specifically took place.  Thirdly, as the individual tasks are highly repetitive and monotonous, 
the potential for making ‘parallax’ errors both within and across data sets, due to lapses in 
concentration, day-dreaming, interruptions, etc., is reasonably high.  Finally, as this strategy 
involves ‘writing’ the transposed text in a non-sequential and fragmentary way, the task tends 
to be more monotonous.  That is, the motivation to keep writing and sustain one’s 
concentration is compromised by the lack of a ‘feedback loop’.  There is no sense of ‘progress’, 
so it is impossible to gain even the slightest inkling of how the text is developing in regard to 
what will ‘happen’ next. 
 
A further complication is that errors have a ‘butterfly’ or a knock-on effect.  A carelessly 
placed word displaces the next word and the next and thereby affects the placement of all the 
words that follow in a given sequence.  Unfortunately, this type of error is most likely to 
occur when working through high frequency urword subsets such as the word, ‘he’, which 
appears some 455 times in the decomposed text of WH.  Therefore, the consequences of a 
small number of errors made across several high frequency urword lists has the potential to 
cause large deviations from the true ‘form’ that the algorithm prescribes.  Minor slips in 
concentration and other ‘infidelities’ can therefore significantly ‘taint’ the transposed text, 
insofar as its ‘appearance’ may start to reflect something other than, and in addition to, the 
‘logic’ of the algorithm that produces it. 
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After making many of these errors and struggling with the process of checking and correcting 
this ‘draft’, I abandoned it.  To show greater fidelity to the ‘form’ that the algorithm promises, 
emphasis needs to be placed on accuracy and working (to paraphrase Mallarmé) to defeat (and 
eliminate) chance word-by-word, sentence-by-sentence.  Here ‘chance’ manifests itself via the 
infidelities of boredom, inattention, distraction, disruption, fatigue, etc.  Only vigilance, rigor 
and a slavish and literal performance of the steps of the algorithm can guarantee the 
‘authenticity’ of its outcome. 
 
 
A second attempt 
 
To address the problems of the first draft, I follow Mallarmé and adopt a word-by-word, line-
by-line, from beginning to end, approach.  Not only does this have the benefit of combining 
the re-writing and reading to provide further motivation to go on with the process, it also 
reduces the problem of locating the individual urwords across the 8,653 words of the text and, 
hence, reduces the potential for transcription errors.  Due to the length of the text and the 
time taken to transpose and work across data sets, it becomes clear that a strategy for quickly 
identifying and correcting errors is required.  Rather than checking-off the progression down 
each word list, each urword list word from ATOTD is indexed and coded to identify the 
specific place its occupies in the transposed text, WOCIT.  To achieve this, a six (6) digit code 
is used, where the first four numbers identify the sentence number (from the title, 0000, to 
1,147) and the final two digits signify the word number within a given sentence.  For example, 
the word ‘on’ from the first sentence is indexed with the number 000101.   
 
Fig. 52 illustrates the impact these revisions have on the level of accuracy between the first 
and second drafts.  The incorrectly placed words are highlighted in red and show how a lack 
of rigor can produce significant levels of error.  Of the 98 words, 49 words are incorrectly 
placed, resulting in an accuracy rate of 50%!  Such an outcome clearly undermines the 
integrity of the process, where the unintentional ‘will’ of the artist—as implementer of the 
algorithm—significantly impacts on the quality of any conclusions one may draw. 
 
 
Figure 52: Comparison of paragraphs 96 and 97 of Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though, Drafts 1 and 2 
Ancient cannot out enough.  Latitudes forgotten arisen 
another encounters though.  Indeterminate ancient all 
false starboard.  No most and aside open reality falls 
larboard.  General head as ghost.  Shipwreck keeping 
spirit against.  Someone nearby expiatory tempting 
though.  Against the meditating immediately unanimous 
opposition gesture dice.  As mystery impatient arisen.  
Delicate about ridiculous sprung of bones anxious 
haunting ancestor heroic aside.  The clenched not 
falsehood arm the water.  Pubescent ancestor strewing 
would immemorial not far separated the disperse.  
Enough horizon own gesture.  Manor withholds shadow 
would born.  No hoary flows indeterminate through.  Nor 
without toward demon. 
  
Pertaining amid nothing ghost howled regions.   
 
Last 2 paragraphs of Draft 1 
Ancient nothing out enough.  Latitudes open clenched 
north encounters though.  Indeterminate rendered 
general false starboard.  Not most than aside silence 
total falls larboard.  Halt head master against.  
Shipwreck been spirit tempting.  Regions illumine 
expiatory against shock.  Haunting the meditating 
immediately unanimous imposed against dice.  Clasp 
ghost impatient arisen.  Delicate about ridiculous sprung 
of bones anxious haunting ancestor heroic aside.  The 
enrolled cannot falsehood arm the withered.  Somber 
ancestor gesture would born another far separated the 
water.  No thought shadow gesture.  Not though flows 
would ancestor.  Not horizon toward indeterminate 
through.  Enough without howled conjunction. 
  
Certain amid manor hoary brow one.   
 
Last 2 paragraphs of Draft 2 
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A third attempt 
 
With the development of a more rigorous approach in the second attempt, my confidence in 
the accuracy of the outcome increases.  However, this confidence is short-lived when, to my 
horror, I discover a simple error when attempting to carrying-out a reverse transposition of 
the two texts (see Work 2 below, where ATOTD is transposed into the vocabulary of WH).  
My original attempt to implement Step 1 misses—somewhat ironically—the following six 
words: ‘formerly he would grasp the helm’ (Mallarmé, 1996, p. 130).  Such an oversight 
adversely affects the placement of the words from seven urword subsets: {As, Er, He, Me, Or, 
Ou, Wo}.  Fig. 53 below shows how a simple error significantly reduces the overall accuracy 
of the transposed text: of 98 words, 11 are incorrect, reducing the accuracy of this section of 
Draft 2 to less than 90%.  While I cannot be sure that the Third Draft is one hundred percent 
accurate, I am reasonably confident that any errors are minimal, and that this outcome is a 
product of the algorithm and its materials and not an ‘expression’ of my failure to perform to 
Aesop’s and Bartleby’s standards.   
 
 
 
Figure 53: Comparison of paragraphs 96 and 97 of Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though, Drafts 2 and 3. 
 
 
After nine months of toil, I finally manage to successfully apply the algorithm and produce 
the [un]authored and re-authored text, WOCIT.  The next task is to examine this ‘work’ and 
to look for evidence of the process of the algorithm in the work itself.  When read, the first 
few paragraphs reveal an odd text, one that is perhaps familiar yet does not convey or perform 
what one may commonly come to expect from written language.  The first three paragraphs 
read as follows:  
 
On.  Play beyond.  Be sail amid reckonings.  Someone from formerly falsehood 
horizon throw conflagration.  Spurtings cannot withholds own horizon. 
Pertaining idle another hoary shadow one. 
 
Spray forgotten beneath vain midnight.  Mixed this against rigid.  From no flows 
way formerly being submissive listing against ridiculous. 
Ancient nothing about enough.  Latitudes open clenched 
north without though.  Indeterminate rendered general 
false starboard.  Not most than aside silence total falls 
larboard.  Halt head as against.  Shipwreck been spirit 
tempting.  Regions illumine expiatory against shock.  
Haunting the meditating immediately unanimous imposed 
against dice.  Aside ghost impatient arisen.  Delicate 
about out sprung of bones encounters haunting ancestor 
heroic aside.  Whence enrolled cannot falsehood arm 
withered indifferently.  Somber ancestor gesture would 
superior another far separated the feather.  No thought 
shadow gesture.  Not though flows would before.  Not 
horizon toward indeterminate through.  Enough without 
howled conjunction. 
  
Certain amid manor hoary brow one.   
Ancient nothing out enough.  Latitudes open clenched 
north encounters though.  Indeterminate rendered 
general false starboard.  Not most than aside silence total 
falls larboard.  Halt head master against.  Shipwreck 
been spirit tempting.  Regions illumine expiatory against 
shock.  Haunting the meditating immediately unanimous 
imposed against dice.  Clasp ghost impatient arisen.  
Delicate about ridiculous sprung of bones anxious 
haunting ancestor heroic aside.  The enrolled cannot 
falsehood arm the withered.  Somber ancestor gesture 
would born another far separated the water.  No thought 
shadow gesture.  Not though flows would ancestor.  Not 
horizon toward indeterminate through.  Enough without 
howled conjunction. 
  
Certain amid manor hoary brow one.   
Last 2 paragraphs of Draft 2 Last 2 paragraphs of Draft 3 
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Play a starboard falsehood.  The never shipwreck not one’s never.  Not amid in.  
When eternal spread enough division beneath.  That that beneath spread master 
most.  A launched.  Launched desperately dress manor on incline.  Horizon the 
larboard falsehood.  To beyond incline.  Most wing.  Though cutting of.  Back in 
to.  No.  Nor about furious.  One being.  Listing circumstances spray covering.  
Beyond spurtings.  Starboard cutting. 
 
[…] 
 
While ATOTD does not physically pass through and reappear on the ‘other’ side of WH 
unscathed, it appears to be suspended halfway, as though the two works are melded together.  
The outcome of the algorithm, WOCIT, thereby, appears to result from the ‘union’ and 
‘intersection’ of ATOTD and WH.  Like Hölderlin’s translations, this ‘new’ text conjoins or 
straddles the ‘languages’ of the source materials.  However, when simply reading the text, it 
is almost impossible to discern, from the text itself, how it is produced or what forms the basis 
of its ‘authoring’.  As a result, a reader without any prior knowledge of the source materials 
of ATOTD and WH and the algorithm itself, may simply dismiss this text as absurd nonsense 
that says and means ‘nothing’.  In its ‘appearing’ as an ‘unframed’ text, WOCIT is perhaps no 
different than any other text, with the urwords being ‘present’ yet absent from any 
conventional reading.  As a result, the logic or process of the algorithm that produces this text 
is ‘present’ yet remains absent.  This leads to the question of how to re-present WOCIT so 
that the logic that produces or ‘authors’ it becomes present within or as the ‘work’ itself. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
In this chapter, I set out the key ‘creative’ outcomes of this project and briefly discuss the 
issues each work addresses in the attempt to show how the logic that forms the basis of the 
algorithm and its product can become the ‘appearing’ of the work itself.  Work 1 involves the 
representation of the product of the algorithm as a work of ‘literature’.  In Work 2 the 
algorithm is reversed so that ATOTD is transposed into the vocabulary of WH and, then, 
represented as a work of ‘art’.  Work 3 attempts to shift the focus in Work 1 on its ‘content’ 
towards the presence and absence of the relationship between urword and word that forms the 
means by which the algorithm [un]authors and reauthors.  Work 4 repeats Step 3 of the 
algorithm and decomposes WOCIT into urwords and re-presents it as a ‘ready[un]read’ 
reading of a visual-audio ‘book’.  Finally, Work 5 sets out to transpose the visuality of urwords 
into their aural forms and by doing so attempt to show the intra-relational play of urwords as 
the logic and appearing of the work itself.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 54: Marcel Broodthaers, Pense-Bête, 1964.  Books, paper, plaster, plastic ball, and wood, 30 x 84 x 43 cm.  
Base 98 x 84 x 43 cm. (Haidu 2010, p. 48) 
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6.1 Work 1: Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Abridged) 
 
After the production of the ‘new’ text, WOCIT, the question arises of how to present it so 
that it reflects its materials and/or the process that processes?  While WOCIT may resound—
by way of urwords—a ‘structure’ inherent to (yet absent from) WH, it does not in and of itself 
‘resemble’ the text that it echoes. Left unframed, it may simply remain as an ‘unreadable’ or 
‘indecipherable’ text.  To further parody the original texts and, more generally, the act of 
authorship itself, it requires a concrete visual reference.  To give WOCIT the ‘airs and graces’ 
of a work of art, I draw from the visual language and conventions of the publishing industry, 
as the ‘place’ where literature takes place.  Therefore, I lay out WOCIT so that it mimes the 
format or presentational ‘style’ of the 1983 John Calder’s first edition of WH. 
 
               
 
Figure 55: Left, Samuel Beckett, Worstward Ho, 1983, p. 3; Right, Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly 
Though (Abridged), 2014-2018, p. 3.  
 
Fig. 55 shows how the page size, layout, typeface and even the publishers logo69 mime or 
parody the form within which WH takes place as a work of literature.  Like the original first 
edition, it is case-bound, with the same dimensions.  When compared to Beckett’s text of 47 
pages, WOCIT in this format runs to 97 pages or just over double the ‘volume’ of the original.  
To mime Duchamp’s subtraction of the ‘essential’ conditions of art making to the ‘choosing’, 
‘naming’ and ‘signing’ of an already made object (de Duve 1991), WOCIT’s authorship is 
                                                        
69 The publisher’s name and location, John Calder London, is also decomposed {jo, al de, er, lo, on, do, on} and 
transposed into the language of ATOTD so that it reads: ‘ETERNAL DEPTHS NEVER FLOW ON 
SHADOW BEYOND’. 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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assigned to ‘Anon.’ and the additional title of ‘Abridged’ is inscribed because this text is 
literally the ‘abridged’ version of a larger work.70     
 
                  
 
Figure 56: Left, Samuel Beckett, Worstward Ho, 1983, p. 7; Right, Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly 
Though (Abridged), 2014-2018, p. 7.  
 
Re-presented in the form of an [un]published book, Fig. 56 shows that WOCIT uses a similar 
typeface, 16 pt. Bembo Book (compared to the 16 pt. Bembo of the original), paragraphing 
(indent), leading, and overall lay-out of the page.  A word-for-word comparison of these texts 
shows how WOCIT begins from the same point but soon parts company.  As a text, WOCIT 
echoes the rhythm of WH but extends and repeats it in the ‘foreign’ vocabulary or language 
of ATOTD.  While this framing of WOCIT, may further parody the notion of authorship 
and the place of literature, it does not show the connection that it forges between ATOTD 
and WH.  Moreover, it fails to reveal the ‘logic’ that facilitates this ‘new’ relation, as the 
urwords common to both ATOTD and WH remain ‘concealed’.  The evidence of this logic is 
thereby limited to the exchange of vocabulary, the rearrangement of word order and the 
doubling of the word count.  In regard to the presence of the role of the urwords in the process 
of [un]authoring and re-authoring, there is no material difference between WOCIT, 
ATOTD and WH.  As a result, the question of how the ‘logic’ of the algorithm can become 
apparent in and as the ‘appearing’ of the work, remains unanswered by this outcome.  
Therefore, in a series of attempts to make this ‘absence’ into a ‘presence’, I carry out three 
derivative works that seek to lessen the material impact of WOCIT and the prospect that, as 
a ‘new’ text, it may be dismissed as absurd and unreadable.  To undertake this, I reverse the 
                                                        
70 See the discussion of Work 3 below for the ‘unabridged’ version(s) of WOCIT. 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
 David Christian  
 
132 
algorithm by attempting to pass the vocabulary of WH through the structure of ATOTD to 
produce another ‘new’ text, A Somehow of Where Dim (‘ASOWD’).  Then, by repeating the 
individual steps of the algorithm on WOCIT itself, I manipulate the intra-relational space 
between words, between the text and the page and between urwords, in my attempt to make 
the logic (or the basis) of the algorithm present as the appearing of the work itself. 
 
 
6.2 Work 2: A Somehow of Where Dim 
 
A key test of the reliability of the algorithm is whether it can be reversed.  In terms of the 
production of WOCIT above, this means that working backwards should, if carried out 
accurately, reproduce the source texts of ATOTD and WH.  Another aspect of the algorithm 
as a formula or limit function is its potential ‘universality’.  That is, the ‘effect’ it produces 
should be consistent across its outputs regardless of the input materials.  To ascertain the 
impact the urword structure of ATOTD has on the vocabulary from WH, I thereby ‘reverse’ 
the process and adapt the steps of the algorithm as required.   
 
Fig. 57 shows the adjustments required to accommodate the typography or spatiality of 
ATOTD.  Step 1 now involves the subtraction and allocation of the words of WH into their 
respective urword lists.  Step 2 contracts ATOTD into a linear text so that in Step 3 the words 
of that text can be decomposed and expanded into a serial extension of urwords.  Finally, in 
Step 4, the urwords from Step 3 are displaced and replaced with the corresponding words from 
the 124 urword lists of WH.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 57: Schematic illustration of the algorithm for the transposition of Henry Weinfield’s translation of 
Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance into the vocabulary of Samuel Beckett’s 
Worstward Ho. 
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Fig. 58 shows a summary of this process where the (shortened) title, A Throw of the Dice, is 
transposed into the title of the ‘new’ text, A Somehow of Where Dim (‘ASOWD’).  The 759 
word ATOTD thus expands to become a 1,650 word work, which like WOCIT effectively 
‘doubles’ the decomposed text that it replaces.  As we see in WOCIT, the ‘character’ and 
‘voice’ of ASOWD changes radically when the vocabulary of WH replaces the words of 
ATOTD.  As a serial or linear text, however, we encounter the same issues with Work 1 
above. 
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ATOTD 
(decomposed into urwords) 
ASOWD 
(ATOTD urwords → WH words) 
[a], ow, of, he, di [A] SOMEHOW OF WHERE DIM  
[will], ne, er [WILL] NONE WHERE 
en, he, en, la, un, ch, he, 
ed, in, et, te, er, na, al 
END WHERE WHEN PLACE 
GROUND CHOICE WHERE TIRED 
MIND BETTER MATTER WHERE 
NARROW ALL 
um, st, ta, an, es MINIMUM WORSTWARD STAY 
AND YES 
om, he, de, of, [a], sh, hi, 
re 
SOMEHOW THE SHADE OF [A] 
SHADE NOTHING WHERE 
ho, ou, ug, it, be HO OUT ENOUGH EITHER BE 
ha, at that that 
he, ab, by the unnullable by 
 
Figure 58: Transposition of the first eight lines of Henry Weinfield’s translation of Stéphane Mallarmé’s A 
Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance into the vocabulary of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho. (Beckett 1983, 
pp. 5-47; Mallarme 1996; pp. 124–128) 
 
To visually contextualise ASOWD and to show how it parodies and resounds Mallarmé’s 
work, I use the original 1914 typographical structure of Mallarmé’s work.  However, unlike 
the approach I take with WOCIT (where the text simply expands and doubles the original of 
WH), the words of ASOWD are placed directly on the page so that they physically 
correspond with the urwords of ATOTD.   
 
This approach mirrors the strategy Claus Bremer employs by using the visual resemblance 
and correspondence of words as a means by which to contract the intra-relational space of the 
poem and fold the words upon each other.  In Fig. 59, the words ‘rendering the legible 
illegible’ are folded upon each other in a three-step process that relies of two levels of 
equivalence.  Firstly, there is visual doubling of ‘legible’ in illegible which allows the first fold, 
and secondly, there is the spatial equivalence of the words, ‘rendering’ and ‘illegible’ (which 
both contain nine letters), that allows the statement to both describe and perform itself.  
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Figure 59: Claus Bremer, 1963. ‘The German original begins lesbares in unlesbares übersetzen’, translated 
by Emmett Williams,1967.  (Williams 2013, n.p.)   
 
 
 
 Figure 60: A Somehow of Where Dim, 2016-2018.  Detail, page spread 2 of 11, lines 2 – 5.  Vinyl wall print, 
1000 x 80 cm (approx.).  A transposition of Henry Weinfield’s translation of Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw 
of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance into the vocabulary of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho. 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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While the re-presentation of ASOWD in the visual format of ATOTD follows the same logic 
of Bremer’s use of visual resemblance to overlap words, it does not fold neatly into any form 
of spatial symmetry.  Figs. 60 and 61 show that, when forced into the places of their equivalent 
urwords from ATOTD, the words from WH collide, overlap and efface each other.  In a sense, 
this visual appearing ‘repeats’ or reverses the step of the algorithm that subtracts the 
typographical space of ATOTD, where the linear and expanded text is contracted into the 
typographaical places of ATOTD.  However, in keeping with visual translation of ATOTD 
by Marcel Broodthaers into a visual object (see Fig. 61), the format of ASOWD is also 
subtracted from its original book form and re-presented as a serial work, with the exception 
that all page spreads are also subtracted, leaving the work to be ‘read’ as single page (or ‘frieze’) 
that is directly affixed to the gallery wall.  By miming Broodthaers’ gesture, ASOWD is 
transposed from the ‘place’ of literature to the ‘place’ of art. 
 
 
 
Figure 61: Marcel Broodthaers, Un Coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hazard, 1969.  Edition of ten on twelve anodized 
aluminum plates, 32 x 50 cm each.  Available from Musées royaux de Beaux-Arts de Belique:  https://www.fine-
arts-museum.be/fr/la-collection/marcel-broodthaers-un-coup-de-des-jamais-nabolira-le-hasard-image 
 
The process of collapsing or forcing ASOWD onto the spatial structure of ATOTD in a sense 
displaces the semantic ‘illegibility’ of the text and replaces it with the visual illegibility of 
transposed words which take their respective places simultaneously.  While this work may 
suggest a potential link between the visual and aural qualities of text and that a process of 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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displacement and replacement is unfolding, the ‘logic’ or basis upon which this process takes 
place remains implicit and, thereby, absent from the ‘appearing’ that is the work itself.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 62: A Somehow of Where Dim, 2016-2018. Detail, page spread 5 of 11.  Vinyl wall print, 1000 x 80 cm 
(approx.).  A transposition of Henry Weinfield’s translation of Stéphane Mallarmé’s, A Throw of the Dice Will 
Never Abolish Chance into the vocabulary of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho.  
 
 
 
 
While the two attempts above may have failed to reveal the logic of the algorithm in the 
product it produces, they do however show how these works can take place within and across 
the visual languages of the ‘place’ of literature and the ‘place’ of art.  To further my attempt 
to show how the logic of the algorithm as the ‘appearing’ it produces, I repeat the three keys 
steps of the algorithm on WOCIT itself and, by doing so, reproduce three derivative works.     
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6.3 Work 3: Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Unabridged) 
 
To lessen the impact of the ‘abridged’ version of WOCIT, I attempt to dilute the impact of 
the text by diluting its contents and placing emphasis on how each word corresponds to a 
given urword list drawn from ATOTD.  To achieve this, I repeat Step 2 of the original 
algorithm by carrying out the following instruction: for each of the 124 urwords, subtract all 
words that are not generated from the equivalent urword list from ATOTD.   
 
This approach multiplies and expands the ‘abridged’ version of WOCIT to 125 copies: one 
for each urword in addition to an ‘addendum’, which includes the non-translatable words from 
WH in addition to its punctuation marks.  This step effectively repeats the initial subtraction 
investigations of WH, TU and Hamlet in Chapter 4 (see Figs. 15, 16, and 17 & 18 respectively), 
where the words that do not correspond to the ‘subject’ of the first paragraph of WH are 
subtracted or blanked-out from the text.  Repeating and completing the task of manually 
[un]writing each volume some 125 times represents another Sisyphean task, where each non-
corresponding word needs to be individually subtracted to identify how each urword list takes 
place with the transposed text. 
 
 
 
Figure 63: Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Unabridged), 2016-2018.  Detail, vol. 84: 
pp. 26-27.  One hundred and twenty-five ready[un]made objects placed on a shelf, 20.5 cm x 192 
cm x 14 cm. 
 
Of the 124 urword volumes, 105 contain words, with some 19 volumes containing no words 
at all: {Aa, Ae, Ah, Ax, Fy, Ja, Jo, Ka, Oh, Ox, Oy, Qi, Uh, Xu, Ya, Ye, Yu, Za, Zo}.  Fig. 
63 above shows how the words from the ‘on’ urword list are scattered throughout the text.  
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By re-presenting and expanding the ‘abridged’ version, the emphasis on the word order 
imposed by the decomposed urwords of WH is displaced and replaced so that each volume 
mimes or echoes the spatial logic of ATOTD.  Therefore, by effacing the serial progression 
and re-presenting the words of WOCIT spatially, they can be viewed and read as both visual 
and verbal language.  Moreover, as the selection and placement of these words is driven by 
the urword that names each volume, the ‘new’ relation between urword and word becomes 
apparent in the overall work. 
 
In terms of re-framing the physical appearance of the text, Figs. 64 and 65 show how these 
volumes mime the 1983 John Calder’s first edition of WH.  Internally, the individual volumes 
follow the ‘abridged’ version, with the addition of a volume number and volume name.   
 
     
 
Figure 64: Left, Samuel Beckett, Worstward Ho, 1983, p. 3; Right, Anon., Would or Circumstances 
Inwardly Though (Unabridged), 2016-2018.  Detail, vol. 84, p. 3. One hundred and twenty-five 
ready[un]made objects placed on a shelf, 20.5 cm x 192 cm x 14 cm. 
 
While Work 3 helps to show the relationship between the urwords and the placement of the 
words from ATOTD in WOCIT, it significantly ‘dilutes’ the overall text by effacing Step 3 
of the algorithm and the role that the decomposed urwords of WH play in the [un]authoring 
of the text.  As a result, any manual attempt to read these volumes in the word order of the 
‘abridged’ text would prove to be a truly insurmountable and impossible task.  This leads to 
the problem of how to visually reconstitute the word order that is determined by Step 3, while 
at the same time, maintaining the presence of the spatial separation of the urword lists as the 
source of each word placement. 
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
READY[UN]MADE: ABSENCE & PRESENCE IN THE INTRA-RELATIONAL OBJECT 139 
 
   
 
Figure 65: Left, Samuel Beckett, Worstward Ho, 1983.  Detail of spine, 20.5 
x 13.5 x 0.8 cm; Right, Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though 
(Unabridged), 2016-2018.  Detail of spines, vols. 9–24. One hundred and 
twenty-five ready[un]made objects placed on a shelf, 20.5 cm x 192 cm x 14 
cm. 
 
 
6.4 Work 4: Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Ready[un]read) 
 
To address the limitations, I make two attempts.  My first (and abandoned) attempt aims to 
re-present Work 3 by condensing the 125 volumes back into a single ‘open’ volume, where 
each page is removed and set side-by-side to form a line of all the pages of text.  The challenge 
is to maintain the spatial separation of Work 3 in the process of reconstituting the ‘abridged’ 
text.  To achieve this, I begin to print each page from each volume on acetate and, then, layer 
the pages to show the separation and spatial ‘depth’ of the combined pages.    
 
Figs. 66 and 67 show the visual effects of effacing the ‘whiteness’ and displacing the visual 
isolation of each page, by multiplying and layering them.  Fig. 67 provides an oblique view 
which reveals how this strategy maintains the spatial separation of the urword lists from Work 
3 when the text is ‘re-abridged’.  Of note, is how the materiality of the acetate pages and the 
order of layering of the urword page-spreads (in alphabetical order from top to bottom) 
determines whether words are legible or not.  By introducing spatial depth, adjacent words 
appear to float and drift when they take place on different urword ‘planes’.  Moreover, such an 
effect disrupts the spatiotemporal logic of standard texts, where a word that appears on a 
surface layer seems to be more recent than one that occurs at a lower depth.  For example, in 
Fig. 66 (left-hand side), in the phrase ‘Eternal of old’, the word ‘Eternal’ appears to occur after 
the ‘deeper’ words, ‘of’ and ‘old’, respectively.  While such effects provide insights into how 
grounding the text on urword lists further destabilizes any linear reading, it does not reveal the 
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presence and absence of the urword(s) within each word placed.  In fact, this process in its 
attempt to restore the seriality of the abridged text that Work 3 effaces, shows the operation 
of the urword categories but, in doing so, ‘breaks’ the formal link between urwords and words 
that Work 3 establishes.   
 
 
   
 
Figure 66: Study for Work 4: an attempt to ‘re-abridge’ Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though 
(Unabridged), 2016.  Detail, pp. 8-9.   
 
 
   
 
Figure 67: Study for Work 4: an oblique view of an attempt to ‘re-abridge’ Would or Circumstances Inwardly 
Though (Unabridged), 2016.  Detail, pp. 8-9. 
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Figure 68:  Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Ready[un]read), 2017.  Detail, ‘On’, pp. 26-27. 
 
 
To overcome this limitation, I make a second attempt by setting out to show how urwords 
take place within and across the individual words of the text.  To undertake this, I repeat Step 
3 of the algorithm and decompose WOCIT into its urwords.  This is yet another Sisyphean 
task: when decomposed, the 8,653 words of WOCIT contain 27,196 urwords, effectively 
trebling it.  Rather than effacing a composite word after its urwords are identified (as is the case 
in the production of WOCIT), each word is partially ‘erased’ or ‘dimmed’ in order to reveal 
the place of each urword within it.  Fig. 68 above shows the distribution of the urword, ‘on’, 
across pages 26 and 27 of WOCIT.  When compared to Fig. 63, the eight words derived from 
the ‘on’ urword list from ATOTD are expanded to include all 22 words that contain the urword, 
‘on’, within these pages.71  Such an approach, therefore, shows how individual urwords take 
place within and across the urword categories that Work 3 sets out to delineate and ‘define’.   
 
To show this play of urwords within and across the text, I make a visual-audio ‘book’, where 
I record a ‘ready[un]read’ reading of the text and, then, visually show the appearance and 
disappearance of urwords by way of stop-animation.  In keeping with the partial visual 
effacement of the words in the text, the audio is whispered. This work is constructed by 
establishing a close correspondence between the saying of each word and the appearance of its 
constituent urwords.  As Fig. 68 illustrates, each urword is visually linked to all the other urwords 
that take place across the page spread.  When read, the urword images follow the words and 
                                                        
71 Fig. 63 includes eight ‘on’ words: contained, reason, on, long, on, hallucination, emanation, suspension.  
Whereas, Fig. 68 includes 22 ‘on’ words: hallucination, contained, constellation, reason, one, one’s, conjunction, 
one, someone, division, reason, on, long, on, someone, demon, hallucination, one, emanation, bones, long, 
suspension. 
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show, firstly,  a visual urword ‘narrative’ within the spoken ‘narrative’ and, secondly, how the 
urwords (and other words) are visually dispersed and repeated across the screen.   
 
In terms of presentation, the double page spreads of the book are cropped so that they conform 
to the widescreen video aspect ratio of 16:9.  Making this work involves the production of 
5,704 separate (two-page) images.  As there are 27,196 urwords and, if the spaces between 
words are taken into account, the work contains approximately 37,000 individual edits.  The 
outcome produced runs to 80 minutes and 34 seconds and appears to reveal the operation of 
two equivalences.  Firstly, internally, by way of the correspondence that links urwords within 
and across the urword categories of Work 3, and secondly, externally, by linking the visual 
appearing of the urword(s) with the uttering of each word.   
 
By showing the relationship between the visual appearance and aural annunciation of words 
and urwords, Work 4 reveals the presence (and absence) of the ‘new’ relation (between urword 
and word) that serves to disorganize and reorganize the source texts and, thereby, provides 
the means by which the algorithm [un]authors and re-authors.  However, while this work 
may show the operation of this key relation in the work, it does not perhaps show the logic 
or basis of the algorithm as the work itself.   To attempt this, I efface the visual product of the 
algorithm by transposing the visual presence of the urwords into their aural presence.  
 
 
6.5 Work 5: Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Ready[un]said) or (Quod) 
 
To present the urwords of WOCIT as the logic and the appearing of the work itself, it is 
necessary to efface the visual product of the algorithm.  This work, in a sense, transposes the 
visual presentation of the urwords in Work 4 into an aural presence.  Without a visual form to 
structure this work, a new structure is needed.  To provide this, I draw from Samuel Beckett’s 
wordless plays for TV, Quad I & Quad II.   As Beckett sets aside the verbal in favour of the 
visual, I counter this gesture by effacing the visual in favour of the verbal to transpose the 
visuality of Work 4 into the aurality of Work 5.   
 
Figs. 69 and 70 show the pattern of movement the four players take as they enter and exist a 
square shape and pass by all its external (A, B, C, D) and internal (A1, B1, C1, D1) points.  
Beckett’s figures are cloaked and hooded in white and shuffle through the space.  They take 
turns each playing solo and then, also, as a duet, trio and quartet.  When performing together 
they shuffle in unison at a tempo of ninety paces per minute.  As the pattern and structure of 
their movement avoids the centre of this ‘quad’, the players’ paths never cross.  I transpose 
this visual structure into an aural one where the eight points of the external and internal 
squares are replaced by speakers.  The idea here is to spatialize the reading or narrative of the 
text so that it follows the same exhaustive pattern as the players in Beckett’s play.  While the 
‘voices’ of Work 5 do not move, they whisper urwords of the text to ‘cloak and hood’ their 
identity.   
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Figure 69:  Brett Stevens’ schematic illustration of the 
movement of the four figures in Samuel Beckett’s Quad 
II. (Stevens 2010, p. 168). 
 
 
To keep in line with the players from Quad II, each step taken equates to each urword 
whispered.  As the players take six paces from A to B along the outside of the external square, 
four paces to the internal square and, then, two and three paces to reach the other side, the 
corresponding voices speak six urwords from A to C, then, four from C to c1, then, two from 
c1 to a1 and, finally, these steps from a1 to B.  Fig. 70 shows the layout of the sound 
installation.  When compared to the pattern from Beckett’s play in Fig. 69, Fig. 70 shows the 
direction of each voice is averaged to the midpoints between speakers.  For example, the 
direction of ‘travel’ of position A is half way between position C and position c1.  This is done 
due to technical issues and the difficulty in shifting the direction of sound in the same way 
that the players shift direction as they negotiate and avoid the centre and each other.  Due to 
the orientation of the speakers, the sound will travel through the space in the pattern detailed 
in Figs. 71 and 72.   
 
 
Figure 70:  Schematic illustration of the direction and ‘movement’ of the four ‘voices’ of Fig. 69, transposed 
from the movement of travel of the four figures in Samuel Beckett’s Quad II (available from YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ZDRfnICq9M). 
A B
C D
a1
b1
c1
d1
Image removed due to copyright restrictions
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Figure 71:  Transposition of the movement of the four figures in Samuel Beckett’s Quad II (available from 
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ZDRfnICq9M) 
 
 
 
Figure 72:  Pattern of urword distribution across eight audio channels.  Detail, urwords 1–242 of 27,196. 
 
Fig. 72 shows the patterns of urword utterances.  While it shows the progression from one 
voice to four voices all speaking in unison, this progression continues to three voices, then, 
two and, finally, back to one.  To exhaust this pattern, so each voice commences each pattern, 
takes 1,440 steps or urwords.  As this work includes 27,196 urwords, this cycle is repeated just 
No. urword B b1 D d1 C c1 A a1 No. urword B b1 D d1 C c1 A a1 No. urword B b1 D d1 C c1 A a1 No. urword B b1 D d1 C c1 A a1
0001 ON c1 a1
0002 LA c1 a1
0003 AY c1 a1
0004 BE A 0064 ER C A 0124 LA D C A 0184 OS B D C A
0005 YO A 0065 HO C A 0125 AY D C A 0185 ST B D C A
0006 ON A 0066 AR C A 0126 ST D C A 0186 LA B D C A
0007 BE A 0067 SH C A 0127 TA D C A 0187 UN B D C A
0008 AI A 0068 HA C A 0128 AR D C A 0188 CH B D C A
0009 AM A 0069 AD C A 0129 BO D C A 0189 HE B D C A
0010 MI C 0070 DO D C 0130 AR B D C 0190 ED B D C A
0011 ID C 0071 OW D C 0131 FA B D C 0191 LA B D C A
0012 RE C 0072 ON D C 0132 AL B D C 0192 UN B D C A
0013 KO C 0073 NE D C 0133 EH B D C 0193 CH B D C A
0014 ON c1 0074 AY d1 c1 0134 HO b1 d1 c1 0194 HE b1 d1 c1 a1
0015 IN c1 0075 OR d1 c1 0135 OO b1 d1 c1 0195 ED b1 d1 c1 a1
0016 SO a1 0076 GO c1 a1 0136 OD d1 c1 a1 0196 DE b1 d1 c1 a1
0017 OM a1 0077 TE c1 a1 0137 HE d1 c1 a1 0197 ES b1 d1 c1 a1
0018 ME a1 0078 EN c1 a1 0138 NE d1 c1 a1 0198 PE b1 d1 c1 a1
0019 ON B 0079 BE B A 0139 ER B C A 0199 ER B D C A
0020 NE B 0080 EN B A 0140 HI B C A 0200 AT B D C A
0021 OM B 0081 NE B A 0141 RE B C A 0201 TE B D C A
0022 OR B 0082 EA B A 0142 NO B C A 0202 EL B D C A
0023 ME B 0083 AT B A 0143 ON B C A 0203 RE B D C A
0024 ER B 0084 AI B A 0144 NE B C A 0204 ES B D C A
0025 FA A 0085 IN C A 0145 NE D C A 0205 MA B D C A
0026 AL A 0086 MI C A 0146 ER D C A 0206 AN B D C A
0027 EH A 0087 ID C A 0147 NO D C A 0207 NO B D C A
0028 HO A 0088 MI C A 0148 AM D C A 0208 OR B D C A
0029 OO a1 0089 ED c1 a1 0149 MI d1 c1 a1 0209 ON b1 d1 c1 a1
0030 OD a1 0090 HI c1 a1 0150 ID d1 c1 a1 0210 IN b1 d1 c1 a1
0031 HO b1 0091 IS b1 a1 0151 IN b1 c1 a1 0211 LI b1 d1 c1 a1
0032 OR b1 0092 AG b1 a1 0152 HE b1 c1 a1 0212 IN b1 d1 c1 a1
0033 ZO b1 0093 AI b1 a1 0153 EN b1 c1 a1 0213 NE b1 d1 c1 a1
0034 ON D 0094 IN B D 0154 ET B D A 0214 HO B D C A
0035 ON D 0095 ST B D 0155 TE B D A 0215 OR B D C A
0036 OW D 0096 GI B D 0156 ER B D A 0216 ZO B D C A
0037 LA D 0097 ID B D 0157 NA B D A 0217 ON B D C A
0038 AT D 0098 OM B D 0158 AL B D A 0218 HE B D C A
0039 TI D 0099 NO B D 0159 RE B D A 0219 LA B D C A
0040 IO B 0100 LO B A 0160 EA B C A 0220 AR B D C A
0041 ON B 0101 OW B A 0161 AD B C A 0221 BO B D C A
0042 UR B 0102 AY B A 0162 EN B C A 0222 AR B D C A
0043 TI B 0103 OR B A 0163 NO B C A 0223 FA B D C A
0044 IN b1 0104 ME b1 a1 0164 OU b1 c1 a1 0224 AL b1 d1 c1 a1
0045 AN b1 0105 ER b1 a1 0165 UG b1 c1 a1 0225 EH b1 d1 c1 a1
0046 NO d1 0106 BE b1 d1 0166 HA b1 d1 a1 0226 HO b1 d1 c1 a1
0047 IT d1 0107 IN b1 d1 0167 AT b1 d1 a1 0227 OO b1 d1 c1 a1
0048 HO d1 0108 MI b1 d1 0168 HA b1 d1 a1 0228 OD b1 d1 c1 a1
0049 OW C 0109 IS D C 0169 AT B D C 0229 TO B D C A
0050 HO C 0110 SI D C 0170 BE B D C 0230 BE B D C A
0051 OR C 0111 LI D C 0171 EN B D C 0231 YO B D C A
0052 ZO C 0112 IS D C 0172 NE B D C 0232 ON B D C A
0053 ON C 0113 TI D C 0173 EA B D C 0233 IN B D C A
0054 PE C 0114 IN D C 0174 AT B D C 0234 LI B D C A
0055 ER D 0115 AG B D 0175 RE B D A 0235 IN B D C A
0056 TA D 0116 AI B D 0176 EA B D A 0236 NE B D C A
0057 AI D 0117 IN B D 0177 AD B D A 0237 MO B D C A
0058 IN D 0118 ST B D 0178 MA B D A 0238 OS B D C A
0059 IN d1 0119 ID b1 d1 0179 AS b1 d1 a1 0239 ST b1 d1 c1 a1
0060 ID d1 0120 DI b1 d1 0180 ST b1 d1 a1 0240 IN b1 d1 c1 a1
0061 AN c1 0121 LO d1 c1 0181 TE b1 d1 c1 0241 HO b1 d1 c1 a1
0062 NO c1 0122 OU d1 c1 0182 ER b1 d1 c1 0242 OU b1 d1 c1 a1
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under 19 times and, with voices whispering at a rate of 90 words per minute, the work runs 
to 302 minutes or a tick over five hours. 
 
While Work 4 is a video that can be viewed at a distance from ‘outside’ the text, Work 5 effaces 
the visual and ‘expands’ the spatiality of the text to envelop and place the viewer-as-listener 
‘inside’ the text and at the level of the individual urwords as they ‘encircle’ and travel across 
the installation space.  By moving from the visual to the aural, the re-presentation of the 
urwords as the work itself shows how they form the basis of both the algorithm and its product, 
WOCIT.  Unlike Bremer’s work, which describes and performs the action of the statement: 
‘rendering the legible illegible’, this work does not make present a logic that is the 
performance of the steps of the algorithm itself but, rather, reveals the ‘logic’ of the algorithm 
as the ‘ground’ upon which it operates.  The ‘logic’ that therefore ‘appears’ in WOCIT (and 
ASOWD) and its subsequent works is nothing other than the absence and presence of urwords 
that form the basis of the function of the algorithm to [un]author and re-author.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
[…] to make of this submission, this admission, this fidelity to 
failure, a new occasion, a new term of relation, and of the act which, 
unable to act, obliged to act, he makes, an expressive act, even if 
only of itself, of its impossibility, of its obligation.72 
 
Samuel Beckett, 1965 
 
 
This project sets out to revisit Duchamp’s gesture of the Readymade and the role that 
language and placement play in meditating the relationship between objects and how they are 
seen and read.  By limiting and, hence, redefining the creative act of the ‘artist’ to the choosing, 
naming and signing of an already made object, Duchamp sets aside traditional notions of 
‘authorship’, artistic subjectivity, and ‘creative’ labour.  He favours a strategy that deploys 
language to ‘delay’ the immediacy of visual experience by requiring a viewer to also become 
a reader of the visual and verbal languages that the ‘reconsigned’ object contains.  To achieve 
this, Duchamp displaces the neutrality of the ‘non-art’ support and replaces it with the 
particularity of the already made industrially produced object and, by doing so, produces 
‘nothing’ and thereby fails to meet or accommodate the presumptions and ‘expectations’ of a 
‘conventional’ viewer (or consumer) of art.  
 
While Duchamp relies on the placement and the external framing effects of language to 
‘transform’ the object, this project identifies an ‘internal’ pathway within language in its 
attempt to ‘pass’ one textual object through another.  By miming the anartistic gesture of the 
Readymade, this project responds to the following research questions: 
 
• Can an ‘object’ or artwork be passed through another? 
 
• What are the steps required to facilitate this and what is the product of this process?   
 
• Can the process (the intra-relational logic) that both creates and drives a product’s re-
production become apparent in and as the work itself?   
 
In response to the first question, the project fails to ‘cleanly’ pass one (textual) object through 
another.  While ‘urwords’ (as analogous to prime numbers and, hence, the ‘atoms’ or building 
blocks of language) provide an internal pathway for discrete textual objects to be brought into 
relation with each other, this does not allow a textual object to pass through another object 
unscathed.  Rather, the objects appear to fuse and exchange material and, by doing so, 
‘reproduce’ a hybrid ‘text’, which outwardly contains the subtracted and [un]authored 
vocabulary from one text that is ‘re-composed’ by the decomposed urword structure of 
                                                        
72 Quoted from Samuel Beckett, Proust and Three Dialogues with George Duthuit, 1999, p. 125. London, John 
Calder (Publishers) Limited. 
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another.  In WOCIT, the words from ATOTD thereby displace and replace the words of 
WH, whereas, the order of the urwords of WH, re-orders the ‘narrative’ of ATOTD.  As a 
result, the two objects do not simply outwardly ‘rendezvous’, they ‘physically’ impact and 
affect each other and form a dialectical relationship that is mediated by a shared ‘chemistry’: 
the commonality of their respective urwords.  Such a union, transposes and combines the 
identities of the two source objects to reproduce a ‘new’ textual object which ‘resembles’ the 
attributes of its ‘parents’ but becomes a unique ‘entity’ in and of itself. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 5, this project identifies three main steps to ‘pass’ a (textual) object 
through another: subtraction, decomposition and transposition.  When combined, they form a basic 
algorithm for forcing a correspondence between two already made literary objects.  These steps 
reference the three ways of exhausting language identified in Beckett by Deleuze (1997) and 
are developed by appropriating and misapplying ideas drawn from Bergson’s theory of 
perception, the decomposability of prime numbers as the atoms of arithmetic, and Benjamin’s 
demands of ‘good’ translation, respectively.  When applied to the text, ATOTD, an additional 
preliminary step is required to subtract the typographical structure to reduce it to a linear text.  
Accordingly, in the re-production of WOCIT, the project identifies the following steps.  
Firstly, there is a constraint or limit imposed on the poem, ATOTD, that subtracts the 
material selections (or words) of both Mallarmé and his translator, Henry Weinfield, from the 
other compositional innovations associated with the clustering and arrangement of the text 
across the page.  Only a basic and conventionally read word order remains.  Secondly, the 
material of ATOTD is, then, brought into relation with and collated into the urword lists or 
categories (as representative of the speculative hypothesis that two-letter ‘urwords’ can operate 
as the ‘atoms’ that form the basis of all other words).  As a result, the ‘poetry’ of the poem is 
decontextualized from the poem itself, by way of subtraction.  Although a sense of the 
original word order is retained in each list, the material of the poem is scattered, repeated in 
places, and effectively doubled.  Thirdly, with WH, the word order and basic structure of the 
composition is retained, however, the word selections or vocabulary of Beckett’s text are 
decomposed, with the text re-written in the language of urwords.  This effectively reduces the 
vocabulary of WH (from 447 words to 124 urwords) but also involves an expansion or 
doubling of the quantity of words in the decontextualized text (from 4,434 to 8,653 words).  
This process also decontextualizes the text of WH from ‘itself’, by reducing it to the language 
of the urword set and, then, re-contextualizing it by adding the vocabulary (the words 
selections and word order) of ATOTD.  Finally, the subtracted words from the urword lists 
from ATOTD are married to the decomposed urwords of WH to reproduce the ‘new’ text, 
WOCIT.  
 
When responding to the question regarding what is the product of this process, one cannot 
provide a definitive answer.  If this ‘product’ is simply the outcome of the algorithm, then, 
determining what specifically WOCIT (or ASOWD) represents is not a straight forward task.  
For example, initially, WOCIT may simply appear to embody the outcome of a process which 
results in WH being reduced to its bare bones and buried beneath the decontextualized 
remains of a ‘materiality’ drawn from ATOTD.  Considered in this way, WOCIT is perhaps 
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little more than a translated (or encrypted) version of WH, with Beckett’s text re-written into 
the concepts and imagery associated with the ready[un]made materials of Mallarméan poetics.  
Does this text, then, merely re-present Beckett’s text through the ‘eyes’ (or point-of-view) of 
the words from Mallarmé’s poem?  For this to be possible, the process (of transposing one text 
into the language of another) would need to be ‘transparent’, with nothing added, subtracted, 
altered or affected by the displacement of the words from WH and replacement with their 
‘equivalent’ words from ATOTD.  It would also suggest that this process is one-way, where 
the Mallarméan words actively replaces the passive remains of WH.  However, this is not a 
one-way process.  While Beckett’s text may be ‘poeticized’ by the language of ATOTD, one 
can equally claim that the structuring and use of words in WH (in type, number and 
‘behaviour’, of how they ‘perambulate’ across the page, etc.) also serves to decontextualize and 
disorganize, re-contextualize and re-order, Mallarmé’s poetics.    
 
When reproduced as a ‘book’, WOCIT parodies and mimes not only the notion of authorship 
but also the ‘place’ of literature itself. Cloaked in the accoutrements of ‘place’, Work 1 
demonstrates the power of context and ‘habit’ of how one ‘should’ engage with and respond 
to this object.  Presented as a ‘book’, it may lead us to attempt to read and make sense of it as 
we might any other text, with the expectation that meaning will accumulate over the span of 
the work.  We thereby expect its content to communicate and convey some form of social 
content: to say some ‘thing’ by way of words, presented in a grammatical order, that may 
symbolize and refer to some ‘thing’, event, experience, etc., in particular.   
 
However, engaging with WOCIT in such a way may lead to frustration and resignation.  For 
it is perhaps the product of what Lecercle (1990, p. 49) refers to as ‘dialetical creativity, a type 
of creativity that is not restrained by grammatical rules and conventions’.  WOCIT’s 
grammatical ‘rule-breaking’, however, is incidental and results from its fidelity to another 
form of logic, ordering and arranging, where the conventions and grammar of language 
remain invisible and ‘outside’ its means of re-production.  WOCIT adheres to an alternative 
set of rules, conventions and associations that serve to de-contextualize and estrange language 
from itself and, by doing so, expose the already made nature of language that speaks itself, rather 
than ‘I speak language’ (Lecercle 1990, p. 103).  
 
Accordingly, when read, WOCIT does not proffer a clear and unobstructed view of a whole.  
The ‘images’ it describes and the ‘utterances’ it makes are fragmented, disjointed and fail to 
contextualize each other.  The unity, consistency and coherence, that one might associate with 
the ‘authorship’ of a literary work, does not materialize.  Any apparent ‘logos’ that readily 
guarantees meaning remains absent, voided.  While some sentences make sense and are 
intriguing and suggestive (e.g. ‘The never shipwreck not one’s never’), others seem stunted 
and stuttered, thus appearing to offer no sense at all (e.g. ‘Division off the its the number the 
the another’).  There is, however, something about the text that makes it ‘work’ and 
communicate on some level.  When read aloud, WOCIT is reminiscent of a soliloquy, a 
declarative statement that resounds a certain confidence and claim to ‘authority’.  Its rhythmic 
quality pervades the text and exceeds the semantic implications of the individual words and 
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sentences used.  The [un]grammatical nature of the text appears to have the potential in this 
regard to place an Anglophone ‘reader’ semantically outside their first language, thus making 
it less transparent and more material and audible—as an object in itself—and not simply as 
something that merely serves to symbolize and refer to some ‘thing’ other than itself.    
 
WOCIT appears to fulfil Benjamin’s notion of ‘good’ translation, where the task of the 
translator is ‘to find the intention toward the language into which the work is to be translated, 
on the basis of which an echo of the original can be awakened in it’ (Benjamin 1997, p. 159).  
As a result, the requirement for a wholesale transfer of meaning across languages is set aside.  
The priority appears to be to maintain the prosody of the original text’s metrical structure as 
a means of preserving the ‘authenticity’ of the original text.  For Benjamin, then, a ‘good’ 
translation embeds the ‘logic’ of the original language within the translated words as a means 
of preserving how it sounds and operates as ‘a mode of referring’ (Sandbank 2015, p. 216).  It is 
literalness or the constraint of pairing words that facilitates such a translation because ‘the 
word, not the sentence, is the original element of language’ (Benjamin 1997, p. 162) and, 
thereby, carries with it the original text’s word order so that its manner of meaning is retained 
and resounds in the translated text.  A translation is therefore carried out for ‘the sake of the 
text, not the reader’ (Sandbank 2015, p. 216), so that the complementarity of the two 
languages brought together in translation has the potential to not only improve the original 
but take it towards its ‘ideal version’ (ibid.), as a step towards its realization in and as ‘pure 
language’.   
 
Simply considering WOCIT in terms of a translation and, as a reciprocal relationship between 
WH and ATOTD would, however, necessarily efface, limit, and thereby fail to appreciate, 
the decisive and divisive role that the urword categories play—as an ‘apparatus’ (or dispositive) 
for categorizing and processing ‘data’—in bringing into being the relationship between, and 
superimposition of, these two textual objects.  If the algorithm (as a constraint) contains a 
common logic, then, perhaps WOCIT is more of a reflection of the hypothesis that urwords 
can in fact provide a means by which words can be equated.  Accordingly, rather than being 
passive and transparent as simply a medium of exchange, the constraint of the urwords (as a 
‘new’ basis for defining the relationship between words) forms the ‘logic’ of the outcome of 
the algorithm’s appearing.  If we accept and apply the OuLiPo axiom that ‘a text written 
according to a constraint describes the constraint’ (Perloff 2010, p. 97), then, what WOCIT 
perhaps describes and reflects is not Beckett according to Mallarmé or vice versa but, rather, 
the function of the algorithm itself, as a disorganizing and re-organizing principle that is 
imposed upon these already made textual objects.  While this transfer process enables a direct 
correspondence, one cannot argue that it does not add, subtract, alter or affect the texts as 
they ‘interact’.  It would appear, then, that the algorithm is not simply a surrogate of 
authorship or translation that benignly facilitates the combination of the source materials but, 
rather, is an [un]creative and [un]original process that actively predetermines the outcome 
itself.   
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While it may be convenient to reduce WOCIT to being merely a reflection of the logic 
inherent in the instructions that produced it, this in turn would be to ignore or efface the role 
the materials play and the other potential significations and significances of the work.  Perhaps, 
the only thing that appears ‘clear’ about the ‘product’ of the algorithm is that it problematizes 
the act of reading, of not only how we read and respond to it but also from where it can be 
read from.  That is, to read or respond to this ‘text’ at all, we must first place it in a given 
context, where the ‘ground’ we read it from provides the means by which any particular 
‘reading’ can take place.  For example, do we read WOCIT as an ‘authentic’ work of literature, 
a short novel, a long poem, a translation, or as philosophical treatise on ‘x, y, z’?  As language, 
as ‘code’, does it contain a ‘secret’ to be deciphered?  Or, is it rather to be read as an inauthentic 
text, as a simulation and ruse that parodies, cheats and mocks a ‘reader’ and her search for 
meaning, by deliberately not following the assumptions, conventions, and implicit 
agreements between ‘writers’ and ‘readers’ to produce a work ‘that almost rings true’?  Or, 
given this exegesis, ‘should’ this ‘object’ be viewed solely from the ‘place of art’ and, thereby, 
subjected and limited to an evaluation according to art’s traditions, premises, definitions and 
practices?  If so, such an approach would predetermine the outcome by forcing an order on 
the contingent materiality of this object and, by doing so, constrain its ‘ability’ to be other 
than what we may presuppose it to be.  To adopt such an approach would, therefore, 
necessarily involve the active refusal and dismissal of other possibilities for deciding what the 
‘product’ of the algorithm can—and cannot—be.  For example, can this ‘product’ also be read 
from the field of mathematics (as a simulation of the use of prime numbers in number theory, 
etc.) or cryptography or even, perhaps, from the point of view of computer science and 
artificial intelligence, where algorithms are used to mime or simulate human ‘intelligence’ and 
‘creativity’, etc.?  Therefore, to ‘make’ sense of this object requires one to unmake it: to 
[un]author and [re]author it by applying one’s own set of constraints to it.  As the ‘authorship’ 
of this text is not ‘grounded’ by a common logic (for producing meaning), WOCIT literally 
becomes a ‘singularity’ and an undecidable object.  Moreover, it also leads to the seemingly 
paradoxical condition of how a work produced by ‘categories’, through a process of re-
categorization, can problematize the reading and reception of it by way of categories.   
 
In response to the final research question, ‘can the process (the intra-relational logic) that both 
creates and drives a product’s re-production become apparent in and as the work itself?’, I 
‘repeat’ or re-stage each step of the algorithm to produce Works 2 – 5 (inclusive).  The purpose 
of these works is to attempt to show how the presence and absence of the urwords perform as 
both the logic and appearing of the algorithm itself.  By reapplying each step of the algorithm, 
Works 3, 4 & 5 attempt to re-author WOCIT to reveal the various relationships that the 
urwords have within the text.  In Work 3, the relationship is externalized, where the urword 
categories are represented as volumes that reveal the individual placement of words derived 
from ATOTD.  This attempt implies or makes present the relationship between the urword 
which names each volume and the words it contains.  In Work 4, this relationship between 
word and urword takes place across spoken words and the visual presence of all urwords (within 
a given page-spread) as they appear within the text itself.  In Work 5, the ‘page’ of Work 4 is 
displaced and replaced with the ‘physicality’ of space itself.  With no visible text, the link 
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between word and urword is ‘broken’, so that WOCIT is reduced to its whispered urwords, that 
echo the presence and absence of their place within the text itself.  This gesture, perhaps, 
attempts to tease-out from WOCIT what Benjamin appears to privilege as operating within 
and across languages: the sound or rhythm of language as a mode of referring itself.   
 
In an observation from The Green Box, Duchamp suggests that the product of an algebraic 
comparison, ‘c’, that is produced from the ratio ‘a’ and ‘b’ (c #$ = c), is of little importance once 
the values, ‘a’ and ‘b’, are known.  What remains significant is the ‘sign of the ratio’ (__) or 
‘sign of accordance’, of that which brings the two values into relation (Sanouillet and Peterson 
1973, p. 28).  If ‘a’ is the ‘exposition’ (i.e. WOCIT) and ‘b’ all the possibilities that the 
algorithm can produce, then, what remains significant is the urwords that provide the ‘sign of 
accordance’ as the means that brings these terms into relation.   
 
If urwords function as the building blocks of language and serve to ‘re-ground’ it, then, one 
might be tempted to conclude that Work 5 re-presents the ‘logic’ of the process, as the 
‘appearing’ of the work itself.  That is, by effacing the text of WOCIT, the urwords ‘emerge’ 
as the ‘sign of accordance’ that drive this ‘new’ relation that hitherto is present yet absent.  
However, such a conclusion fails to account for the individual steps of the algorithm, as a 
logical sequence of ‘authorial’ reasoning that also produces the ‘appearing’ of the work.  
Accordingly, the project fails to show how the logic as the appearing of the work takes place 
in any one manifestation of the product of the algorithm.  The ‘logic’ that underlies and drives 
the algorithm thereby remains elusive and, perhaps, manifests itself not in any particular 
outcome but, rather, takes place within and across the various iterations, ‘spaces’ and ‘places’ 
in which these works take place.     
 
From the above, it appears that the project fails to effectively pass an object through another.  
Moreover, it does not definitely take account of the product of such a passage and, also, does 
not produce a work where the logic that drives its appearing takes place in and as the work 
itself.  Despite these failings, however, it does identify a ‘universal’ means by which already 
made textual objects can be combined to ‘[un]create’ or reproduce another textual object.  
Contrary to Plato’s assertion that poetry forbids ‘dianoia’ (the thought that deduces and links), 
the algorithm literally [un]creates by deducting and connecting ‘poems’ to reproduce a textual 
object that resembles and parodies the attributes of its source objects.  It achieves this by 
identifying the absence and presence of urwords as ‘foreign’ yet internal elements that can be 
used to reconceive, re-ground and re-model language as some ‘thing’ that is physically 
constructible and de-constructible.   
 
While Duchamp’s ‘paradigm’ of the Readymade appears to be associated with the notion of 
the anartist, this research project seeks to re-engage—albeit apagogically—with ‘expressive 
mimeticism’, de-skilled anartistic labour, and the ‘internal’ composition or assemblage of 
artworks.  By miming and displacing the gesture of the Readymade and replacing it with an 
‘ascesis of closure’ and ‘ethics of deferral’, that constitutes the gesture of the ‘ready[un]made’, 
this project both supplements and complements the paradigm of art after the Readymade.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
Figure 73: Work 1: Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Abridged), 2014-2018.  Detail, 
a ready[un]made object placed upon a shelf, 20.5 cm x 192 cm x 14 cm.  Image: Curtis Hay 
(RMIT) 
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Figure 74: Installation view.  Left, Work 2: A Somehow of Where Dim, 2016-2018.  Detail, vinyl wall print, 1000 
x 80 cm (approx.).  Right, Work 1: Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Abridged), 2014-2018.  Detail, 
a ready[un]made object placed upon a shelf, 20.5 cm x 192 cm x 14 cm.  Image: Curtis Hay (RMIT). 
 
 
 
Figure 75: Work 2: A Somehow of Where Dim, 2016-2018.  Detail, vinyl wall print, 1000 x 80 cm (approx.).  A 
transposition of Henry Weinfield’s translation of Stéphane Mallarmé’s A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish 
Chance into the vocabulary of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho. Image: Curtis Hay (RMIT). 
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Figure 76: Work 3: Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Unabridged), 2016-2018.  One hundred and 
twenty-five ready[un]made objects placed on a shelf, 20.5 cm x 192 cm x 14 cm.  Image: Curtis Hay (RMIT). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 77: Work 3: Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Unabridged), 2016-2018.  One hundred and 
twenty-five ready[un]made objects placed on a shelf, 20.5 cm x 192 cm x 14 cm.  Image: Curtis Hay (RMIT). 
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Figure 78: Installation view.  Left, Work 4: Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though (Ready[un]read), 2017.  
Video projection, 80 minutes and 34 seconds.  Right, Work 3: Anon., Would or Circumstances Inwardly Though 
(Unabridged), 2016-2018.  One hundred and twenty-five ready[un]made objects placed on a shelf, 20.5 cm x 192 
cm x 14 cm. Image: Curtis Hay (RMIT). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
